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U.S. District Judge Carlton W. Reeves announced on June 27 that he would order Mississippi 
officials not to enforce part of H.B. 1523, 
a recently-enacted state law scheduled 
to go into effect on July 1, because it 
would circumvent the Supreme Court’s 
2015 ruling requiring states to afford 
equal marriage rights to same-sex 
couples. The challenged provision, 
Section 3(8)(a), allowed Circuit Court 
Clerks to “recuse” themselves from 
issuing marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples if they have a sincere religious 
belief opposed to same-sex marriage. 
The provision says that same-sex 
couples will be entitled to get marriage 
licenses, but provides no mechanism to 
make sure that they can get them in case 
there is nobody in a particular clerk’s 
office who has not recused himself 
or herself. The Order is published as 
Campaign for Southern Equality v. 
Bryant, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83036, 
2016 WL 3574410 (S.D. Miss., June 
27, 2016). Then, just days later, as H.B. 
1523 was scheduled to go into effect on 
July 1, Judge Reeves issued a lengthy 
decision in two other pending cases, 
granting a preliminary injunction 
against the entire statute based on his 
finding that it probably violated both 
the 1st and 14th Amendments. Barber 
v. Bryant, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86120, 
2016 WL 3562647 (S.D. Miss., June 30, 
2016). Although Governor Phil Bryant, 
a Republican who is the lead defendant 
in all three cases, announced a swift 
appeal to the 5th Circuit, Attorney 
General Jim Hood, a Democrat who is 
also a named defendant, hinted he might 
not be joining that appeal, suggesting 
that religious folks in Mississippi had 
been “duped” by the legislature enacting 
a useless and probably unconstitutional 
measure. Subsequently, Hood signaled 
that he definitely would not join the 
appeal, stating that the law had hurt 
the state’s reputation and that it should 
expend resources on defending it when 
there were so many other underfunded 
initiatives.
On July 7, Governor Bryant filed a 
motion informing Judge Reeves that he 
intended to appeal to the 5th Circuit, 
and asking that the injunction be stayed 
and the law be allowed to go into effect 
pending the appeal, according to news 
reports on July 8 (Memphis Commercial 
Appeal). Of course, his motion could 
only succeed if Judge Reeves agreed 
that the governor likely to prevail 
on the merits in his appeal. (One 
constitutional law professor was quoted 
in a local newspaper as stating that the 
Establishment Clause conclusion was 
so clear that he would not use it as an 
exam question.) When Reeves did not 
immediately issue a ruling staying his 
preliminary injunction, Bryant had a 
motion filed in the 5th Circuit on July 11, 
urging the court to issue a stay without 
waiting for Reeves to rule. At the heart 
of Bryant’s motion was the contention 
that H.B. 1523 did not present any sort 
of serious Establishment Clause issue. 
His counsel (Drew L. Snyder, James 
A. Campbell [of Alliance Defending 
Freedom], and the James Otis Law 
Group LLC) argued that the conscience 
protection for clerks who do not want to 
issue same-sex marriage licenses was 
no more violative of the Establishment 
Clause than laws in more than 40 states 
exempting those with objections to 
abortions from having to participate in 
them. Indeed, they argued, there is a 
well-established practice in American 
law recognizing exemptions from 
general legal obligations for those whose 
religious or moral scruples compel 
them to refrain from actions. They 
cited as other examples conscientious 
objection from military service or from 
dispensing contraceptives. They also 
argued that H.B. 1523 avoids inflicting 
any harm on same-sex couples by 
requiring that steps be taken to assure 
that they are not delayed in obtaining 
marriage licenses as a result of a clerk’s 
recusal (although the statute does not 
specify how that assurance will be 
implemented). They also argued that 
the Mississippi law does not require 
anybody to discriminate against gay 
people.
In his June 27 Order, recalling a 1962 
ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the 5th Circuit, Meredith v. Fair, 305 
F.2d 343, which “chastised our State 
for ‘a carefully calculated campaign 
of delay and masterly inactivity” in 
response to federal desegregation 
orders, Judge Reeves announced that 
he would “reopen” the Mississippi 
marriage equality case “for the parties 
to confer about how to provide clerks 
with actual notice of the Permanent 
injunction” and for the parties “to confer 
on appropriate language to include in 
Judge Reeves granted a preliminary injunction against the entire statute 
based on his finding that it probably violated both the 1st and 14th 
Amendments.
Federal Court Enjoins Implementation of Mississippi 
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an Amended Permanent Injunction.” As 
noted below, he came back to this theme 
in his June 30 order, comparing the 
language with which Governor Bryant 
had criticized the Obergefell decision 
and the language used by segregationist 
Mississippi governors in the 1950s and 
1960s to criticize the Supreme Court’s 
ruling on racial segregation. 
Robbie Kaplan, a New York attorney 
who represents the Campaign for 
Southern Equality, the plaintiff in the 
Mississippi case, had filed a motion 
seeking to reopen the marriage case 
in order to ensure that same-sex 
couples in the state are not subjected to 
unconstitutional discrimination because 
of H.B. 1523. A large team of pro-bono 
attorneys from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 
Wharton & Garrison, a New York firm 
where Kaplan is a partner, is working on 
the case, together with attorneys from 
several southern states, including local 
counsel from Mississippi.
Reeves is also presiding in two 
other lawsuits involving challenges 
and defenses to the constitutionality of 
other provisions of H.B. 1523, which 
was explicitly enacted in response to the 
Supreme Court’s Obergefell v. Hodges 
decision and which shelters public 
employees and private businesses from 
any liability or adverse consequences 
if they refuse to deal with same-sex 
couples based on their religious beliefs. 
The law also allows government offices 
and businesses to deny transgender 
people appropriate access to restrooms 
and other gender-designated facilities, 
once again based on a “sincere religious 
belief” that a person’s gender is 
immutably determined at birth. 
Judge Reeves, an African-American 
man who was appointed to the district 
court by President Barack Obama, 
presided over the Mississippi marriage 
equality case, Campaign for Southern 
Equality v. Bryant, issuing a ruling 
in November 2014 that the state’s 
constitutional and statutory bans on 
same-sex marriage violate the 14th 
Amendment. He issued a preliminary 
injunction to that effect on November 
25, which was stayed while the state 
appealed to the 5th Circuit, which, 
after hearing oral argument in this and 
cases from other states in the circuit in 
January 2015, put a hold on the appeal 
until the Supreme Court decided the 
Obergefell case.
The Obergefell decision, announced 
on June 26, 2015, said that same-sex 
couples were entitled to enter into civil 
marriages “on the same terms and 
conditions as opposite-sex couples.” 
“This resolved the issue nationwide,” 
wrote Reeves, who subsequently issued 
a Permanent Injunction in response to an 
order from the 5th Circuit (see 791 F.3d 
625) directing him to “act expeditiously 
on remand and enter final judgment.” 
Reeves’ July 2015 Permanent Injunction 
ordered that the state “and all its agents, 
officers, employees, and subsidiaries, 
and the Circuit Clerk of Hinds County 
and all her agents, officers, and 
employees, are permanently enjoined 
from enforcing Section 263A of the 
Mississippi Constitution and Mississippi 
Code Section 93-1-1(2).”
Shortly after Reeves issued his 
injunction, the Mississippi Attorney 
General’s office advised all 82 Circuit 
Court clerks to grant marriage licenses 
“to same-sex couples on the same terms 
and conditions accorded to couples of 
the opposite sex.” But in response to this 
motion, the State argued that the only 
Circuit Court Clerk bound by the court’s 
injunction was the Hinds County Clerk, 
who was named in that Order, because 
the clerks are county employees rather 
than state employees.
When the Mississippi legislature 
convened for its 2016 session, it promptly 
passed H.B. 1523, which was clearly 
intended to send a message that the 
state would happily tolerate and protect 
discrimination against same-sex couples 
and LGBT individuals by privileging 
those with anti-gay religious beliefs. 
This was largely symbolic when it came 
to discrimination by private businesses 
and landlords, since Mississippi law did 
not then forbid discrimination because 
of sexual orientation or gender identity 
in employment, housing and public 
accommodations. It was only after H.B. 
1523 was enacted that the city of Jackson 
became the first jurisdiction in the state 
to legislate against such discrimination. 
Thus, at the time H.B. 1523 was passed, 
this “privilege” was not necessary 
to “protect” free exercise of anti-gay 
religious views by Mississippians, 
especially as the state already had a 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 
place that would at least arguably protect 
individuals against undue burden of 
their religion if the state didn’t have a 
compelling interest to require them to 
comply with a generally applicable law.
The provisions in H.B. 1523 about 
bathroom use and marriage licenses 
threatened to have more significant 
practical effect, setting up a clash with 
federal constitutional and statutory 
requirements. Over the past few months, 
issue has been joined in several lawsuits 
in other federal districts contesting 
whether federal sex discrimination laws 
override state laws and require employers 
not to discriminate against LGBT 
people or to deny bathroom access to 
transgender employees and students. As 
Judge Reeves pointed out in his June 27 
Order, states “lack authority to nullify 
a federal right or cause of action they 
believe is inconsistent with their local 
policies.” In this case, the marriage 
license provision clearly violates federal 
constitutional requirements established 
in the Obergefell decision.
“In H.B. 1523,” wrote Reeves, “the 
State is permitting the differential 
treatment to be carried out by individual 
clerks. A statewide policy has been 
‘pushed down’ to an individual-level 
policy. But the alleged constitutional 
infirmity is the same. The question 
remains whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires marriage licenses 
to be granted (and out-of-state marriage 
licenses to be recognized) to same-
sex couples on identical terms as they 
are to opposite-sex couples.” And the 
precise question before Reeves was 
whether it was necessary to modify his 
2015 injunction to make it clear that all 
government employees involved in the 
marriage process, including the State 
Registrar and the Circuit Court Clerks, 
are bound by his injunction.
Reeves concluded that the Registrar 
was clearly bound, but that it would be 
preferable to make it more explicit that 
the Circuit Court Clerks are bound as 
well, since a violation of the injunction 
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would subject them to potential liability, 
including the costs of defending lawsuits 
against them and possible contempt 
penalties if they refused to obey the 
court’s Order.
Much of Judge Reeves’ June 27 Order 
was devoted to technical procedural and 
jurisdictional issues, which he resolved 
in every instance against the state 
defendants, from Governor Phil Bryant 
on down.
He also agreed with the plaintiffs 
that they should be able to conduct 
discovery against the State Registrar 
in order to learn which Clerks had filed 
forms seeking to recuse themselves 
from issuing marriage licenses. The 
Registrar, who is supposed to receive 
those forms under H.B. 1523, had been 
claiming that since she was not a party 
to the marriage lawsuit, she was not 
bound by the court’s injunction and 
thus not subject to a discovery demand 
in this case. Reeves asserted that “there 
are good reasons to permit discovery 
from the Registrar strictly for purposes 
of enforcing the Permanent Injunction. 
In 2016, Mississippi responded to 
Obergefell by creating a new way to 
treat same-sex couples differently 
than opposite-sex couples. That the 
differential treatment is now pushed 
down to county employees should be 
irrelevant for discovery purposes. The 
State will have the documents that 
show exactly where and by whom the 
differential treatment it authorized in 
HB 1523 will now occur. The Plaintiffs 
should be able to receive that post-
judgment discovery from an appropriate 
State employee, like the Registrar.”
Reeves rejected the technical 
argument that the State, as such, was 
not a party to the lawsuit. For technical 
reasons of constitutional law, the State 
as an entity can’t be sued in federal 
court by its citizens without its consent, 
so state officials rather than the State 
itself are designated as defendants 
in cases like the marriage equality 
lawsuit. But this is really a technicality. 
The Attorney General defended the 
marriage ban using state funds and 
employees and, Reeves pointed out, 
it is well established that a federal 
court “may enjoin the implementation 
of an official state policy” because 
the state is “the real party in interest” 
even though the lawsuit was brought 
against named state officials. Reeves 
signaled that the amended form of the 
Injunction would add language from 
the Obergefell decision to make clear 
that same-sex couples are entitled to the 
same treatment as different-sex couples 
because, as the 5th Circuit said last July, 
Obergefell “is the law of the land and, 
consequently, the law of this circuit.”
“Mississippi’s elected officials may 
disagree with Obergefell, of course, 
and may express that disagreement 
as they see fit – by advocating for a 
constitutional amendment to overturn 
the decision, for example,” wrote 
Reeves. “But the marriage license issue 
will not be adjudicated anew after every 
legislative session. And the judiciary 
will remain vigilant whenever a named 
party to an injunction is accused of 
circumventing that injunction, directly 
or indirectly.”
Just minutes before H.B. 1523 was 
scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 
Judge Reeves filed a 60-page opinion 
explaining why he was granting a 
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs 
in two other cases challenging the 
measure, which he consolidated for this 
purpose under the name of Barber v. 
Bryant, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86120, 
2016 WL 3562647 (S.D. Miss., June 30, 
2016). According to this June 30 Order, 
H.B. 1523 likely violates both the 1st 
Amendment’s Establishment of Religion 
Clause and the 14th Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause. Reeves’ lengthy, 
scholarly opinion expanded upon some 
of the points he made just days earlier, 
but this opinion was necessarily more 
expansive because it was addressed to 
the entire bill, not just the clerk recusal 
position at issue in the June 27 Order.
Unlike the earlier ruling, the June 
30 Order treated H.B. 1523 as broadly 
unconstitutional on its face. At the heart 
of H.B. 1523 is its Section 2, which 
spells out three “sincerely held religious 
beliefs or moral convictions” that are 
entitled, as found by Judge Reeves, to 
“special legal protection.” These are “(a) 
Marriage is or should be recognized as 
the union of one man and one woman; 
(b) Sexual relations are properly 
reserved to such a marriage; and (c) 
Male (man) or female (woman) refer to 
an individual’s immutable biological sex 
as objectively determined by anatomy 
and genetics at birth.” According to the 
statute, any person or entity that holds 
one or more of these beliefs is entitled 
to be free from any sanction by the 
government for acting upon them by, 
for example, denying restroom access 
to a transgender person or refusing to 
provide goods or services to a same-sex 
couple for their wedding.
The state may not override federal 
rights and protections, and the plaintiffs 
argued in these cases that by privileging 
people whose religious beliefs contradict 
the federal constitutional and statutory 
rights of LGBT people, the state of 
Mississippi had violated its obligation 
under the 1st Amendment to preserve 
strict neutrality concerning religion and 
its obligation under the 14th amendment 
to afford “equal protection of the law” 
to LGBT people. Reeves, who ruled in 
2014 that Mississippi’s ban on same-sex 
marriage was unconstitutional, agreed 
with the plaintiffs as to all of their 
arguments.  For purposes of granting a 
preliminary injunction, he did not have 
to reach an ultimate decision on the 
Reeves, who ruled in 2014 that Mississippi’s ban 
on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, 
agreed with the plaintiffs as to all of their 
arguments.  
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merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. It would 
suffice to show that they were “likely” 
to prevail on the merits. But anybody 
reading Reeves’ strongly-worded opinion 
would have little doubt about his view 
of the merits.
In an introductory portion of this 
opinion, he spelled out his conclusions 
succinctly: “The Establishment Clause 
is violated because persons who 
hold contrary religious beliefs are 
unprotected – the State has put its 
thumb on the scale to favor some 
religious beliefs over others. Showing 
such favor tells ‘nonadherents that they 
are outsiders, not full members of the 
political community, and adherents 
that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community,’” quoting 
from a Supreme Court decision from 
2000, Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290. “And the 
Equal Protection Clause is violated by 
H.B. 1523’s authorization of arbitrary 
discrimination against lesbian, gay, 
transgender, and unmarried persons.”
Much of the opinion was devoted to 
rejecting the state’s arguments that the 
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring 
the lawsuits, that the defendants were 
not liable to suit on these claims, and 
that injunctive relief was unnecessary 
because nobody had been injured 
by the law. Reeves cut through these 
arguments with ease. A major Supreme 
Court precedent backing up his decision 
on these points is Romer v. Evans, the 
1996 case in which LGBT rights groups 
won a preliminary injunction against 
Colorado government officials to prevent 
Amendment 2 from going into effect. 
Amendment 2 was a ballot initiative 
passed by Colorado voters in 1992 that 
prevented the state from providing any 
protection against discrimination for 
gay people. The state courts found that 
the LGBT rights groups could challenge 
its constitutionality, and it never did go 
into effect, because the Supreme Court 
ultimately found that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. Judge Reeves 
ended his introductory section with a 
quote from Romer: “It is not within our 
constitutional tradition to enact laws of 
this sort.”
On June 27, Judge Reeves had 
alluded to Mississippi’s resistance to 
the Supreme Court’s racial integration 
rulings from the 1950s and 1960s, 
and he did so at greater length in the 
June 30 opinion, focusing on how H.B. 
1523 was specifically intended by the 
legislature as a response to the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges. 
Mississippi legislators made clear 
during the consideration of this bill that 
its intention was to allow government 
officials and private businesses to 
discriminate against LGBT people 
without suffering any adverse 
consequences, just as the state had earlier 
sought to empower white citizens of 
Mississippi to preserve their segregated 
way of life despite the Supreme Court’s 
rejection of race discrimination under 
the 14th Amendment.
Reeves quoted comments by 
Governor Bryant criticizing Obergefell 
as having “usurped” the state’s “right 
to self-governance” and mandating the 
state to comply with “federal marriage 
standards – standards that are out of step 
with the wishes of many in the United 
States and that are certainly out of step 
with the majority of Mississippians.” 
In a footnote, Reeves observed, “The 
Governor’s remarks sounded familiar. 
In the mid-1950s, Governor J.P. 
Coleman said that Brown v. Board of 
Education ‘represents an unwarranted 
invasion of the rights and powers of 
the states.’” Furthermore, “In 1962, 
before a joint session of the Mississippi 
Legislature – and to a ‘hero’s reception’ 
– Governor Ross Barnett was lauded 
for invoking states’ rights during the 
battle to integrate the University of 
Mississippi.” Reeves also noted how 
the racial segregationists in the earlier 
period had invoked religious beliefs as 
a basis for refusing to comply with the 
Supreme Court’s decisions.
Turning to the merits, Reeves 
addressed the state’s argument that the 
purpose of the statute was to “address 
the denigration and disfavor religious 
persons felt in the wake of Obergefell,” 
and the legislative sponsors presented 
it as such, as reflected in the bill’s title: 
“Protecting Freedom of Conscience 
from Government Discrimination Act.” 
Reeves pointed out what was really 
going on. “The title, text, and history 
of H.B. 1523 indicate that the bill was 
the State’s attempt to put LGBT citizens 
back in their place after Obergefell,” he 
wrote. “The majority of Mississippians 
were granted special rights to not serve 
LGBT citizens, and were immunized 
from the consequences of their actions. 
LGBT Mississippians, in turn, were 
‘put in a solitary class with respect to 
transactions and relations in both the 
private and governmental spheres’ to 
symbolize their second-class status.” 
(The quotation is from Romer v. Evans.) 
“As in Romer, Windsor, and Obergefell,” 
Reeves continued, “this ‘status-based 
enactment’ deprived LGBT citizens of 
equal treatment and equal dignity under 
the law.”
Because state law in Mississippi 
does not expressly forbid discrimination 
because of sexual orientation or gender 
identity, the state tried to claim that 
in fact the bill did not have the effect 
of imposing any new harm. However, 
subsequently the city of Jackson 
passed an ordinance forbidding such 
discrimination, and the University of 
Southern Mississippi also has a non-
discrimination policy in place. “H.B. 
1523 would have a chilling effect on 
Jacksonians and members of the USM 
community who seek the protection 
of their anti-discrimination policies,” 
wrote Reeves. “If H.B. 1523 goes into 
effect, neither the City of Jackson nor 
USM could discipline or take adverse 
action against anyone who violated their 
policies on the basis of a ‘Section 2’ 
belief.”
The court held that because of the 
Establishment Clause part of the case, 
H.B. 1523 was subject to strict scrutiny 
judicial review, and also pointed 
out that under Romer v. Evans, anti-
LGBT discrimination by the state is 
unconstitutional unless there is some 
rational justification for it. He rejected 
the state’s argument that it had a 
compelling interest to confer special 
rights upon religious objectors. “Under 
the guise of providing additional 
protection for religious exercise,” he 
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wrote, H.B. 1523 “creates a vehicle for 
state-sanctioned discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. It is not rationally related to a 
legitimate end.” Indeed, he asserted, 
“The deprivation of equal protection of 
the laws is H.B. 1523’s very essence.”
Reeves found that the standard for 
ordering preliminary relief had been 
met. Not only was it likely that H.B. 
1523 would be found unconstitutional 
in an ultimate merits ruling, but it was 
clear that it imposed irreparable harm 
on LGBT citizens, that a balancing of 
harms favored the plaintiffs over the 
defendants, and that the public interest 
would be served by enjoining operation 
of H.B. 1523 while the lawsuits 
continue. “The State argues that the 
public interest is served by enforcing 
its democratically adopted laws,” he 
wrote. “The government certainly has a 
powerful interest in enforcing its laws. 
That interest, though, yields when a 
particular law violates the Constitution. 
In such situations the public interest is 
not disserved by an injunction preventing 
its implementation.” Reeves concluded, 
“Religious freedom was one of the 
building blocks of this great nation, 
and after the nation was torn apart, the 
guarantee of equal protection under law 
was used to stitch it back together. But 
H.B. 1523 does not honor that tradition 
of religious freedom, nor does it respect 
the equal dignity of all of Mississippi’s 
citizens. It must be enjoined.”
In his motion to the 5th Circuit to 
stay the June 23 and June 30 injunctions, 
Governor Bryant argued, as detailed 
above, that Reeves erred on every one 
of his findings, and contended that 
Reeves’ Establishment Clause rulings 
would place in question numerous 
federal and statute statutes authorizing 
religious exemptions from compliance 
with general laws. He also argued that 
the correct standard of review for the 
constitutionality of H.B. 1523 was 
rationality review, not heightened or 
strict scrutiny, and that the measure 
easily passed the rationality test because 
so many religious exemption statutes 
have been upheld against challenge by 
the courts. ■
Federal Trial Courts Divided Over Title 
VII Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Claims
Last July, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), reversing its position dating back 
fifty years, issued a ruling that a gay man 
could charge a federal agency employer 
with sex discrimination, in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
for denying him a promotion because 
of his sexual orientation. Baldwin 
v. Foxx, 2015 WL 4397641 (EEOC 
2015), is an administrative ruling, not 
binding on federal courts, and federal 
trial judges are sharply divided on the 
issue. During May and June, federal 
district judges in Virginia, New York, 
Illinois, Mississippi, Connecticut, 
Indiana, and Florida issued rulings 
in response to employers’ motions 
to dismiss Title VII claims of sexual 
orientation discrimination. In each case, 
the employer argued that the plaintiff’s 
Title VII claim had to be dismissed 
as a matter of law because the federal 
employment discrimination statute 
does not forbid sexual orientation 
discrimination.
Title VII was enacted as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although the 
House committee considering the bill 
took evidence about sex discrimination, 
it decided to send the bill to the House 
floor without including “sex” as a 
prohibited basis for discrimination, 
because this was deemed too 
controversial and might sink the bill. 
During the floor debate, however, 
a southern representative, Howard 
Smith of Virginia, a conservative 
Democrat who was opposed to the 
proposed ban on race discrimination, 
proposed an amendment to add “sex” 
to the list of prohibited grounds. Most 
historical accounts suggest that Smith’s 
strategy was to make the bill more 
controversial, thus ensuring its defeat. 
More recent accounts have suggested 
that Smith, although a racist, was 
actually a supporter of equal rights for 
women and genuinely believed that sex 
discrimination in the workplace should 
be banned. (His amendment did not add 
“sex” to the titles of the bill addressing 
other kinds of discrimination.) The 
amendment passed, and ultimately the 
bill was enacted, going into effect in 
July 1965.
Because “sex” was added through a 
House floor amendment, the Committee 
Report on the bill says nothing about it, 
and the subsequent debate in the Senate 
(where the bill went directly to the floor, 
bypassing committee consideration) 
devoted little attention to it, apart from 
an amendment providing that pay 
practices “authorized” by the Equal Pay 
Act of 1963 (which bans paying men 
and women at different rates for the 
performance of “equal work”) would 
not be outlawed by Title VII. As a 
result, the “legislative history” of Title 
VII provides no explanation about what 
Congress intended by including “sex” as 
a prohibited ground of discrimination.
During the first quarter century of 
Title VII, the EEOC and the federal 
courts consistently rejected claims that 
the law outlawed sexual orientation 
discrimination. In the absence of 
explanatory legislative history, they 
ruled that Congress must have intended 
simply to prohibit discrimination 
against women because they are women 
or against men because they are men, 
and nothing more complicated or 
Federal trial judges in seven states issued 
rultings on the matter in May and June. 
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nuanced than that. This interpretation 
was challenged in 1989, when the 
Supreme Court ruled in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 
that a woman who failed to conform 
to her employer’s sex stereotypes 
could bring a sex discrimination case 
under Title VII, adopting a broader 
and more sophisticated view of sex 
discrimination. Since 1989, some 
lower federal courts have used the 
Price Waterhouse ruling to allow gay 
or transgender plaintiffs to assert sex 
discrimination claims in reliance on the 
sex stereotype theory, while others have 
rejected attempt to “bootstrap” sexual 
orientation or gender identity into 
Title VII in this way.  More recently, 
several federal appeals courts have 
endorsed the idea that gender identity 
discrimination claims are really sex 
discrimination claims, and a consensus 
to that effect has begun to emerge, but 
progress has been slower on the sexual 
orientation front.
Last summer the EEOC’s decision 
in Baldwin v. Foxx presented a 
startling turnabout of the agency’s 
view. The EEOC does not adjudicate 
discrimination claims against non-
governmental and state employers, 
but it is assigned an appellate role 
concerning discrimination claims by 
federal employees. In Baldwin v. Foxx, 
the EEOC reversed a ruling by the 
Transportation Department that a gay 
air traffic controller could not bring 
a sexual orientation discrimination 
claim under Title VII. Looking at the 
developing federal case law since Price 
Waterhouse and seizing upon a handful 
of federal district court decisions that 
had allowed gay plaintiffs to bring 
sex discrimination claims under a 
sex stereotype theory, the agency 
concluded that a sexual orientation 
discrimination claim is “necessarily” a 
sex discrimination claim and should be 
allowed under Title VII.
Since that July 15 ruling, many 
federal district judges have had to rule 
on motions by employers to dismiss Title 
VII sexual orientation discrimination 
claims. The precedential hierarchy of 
the federal court system has required 
some of them to dismiss those claims 
because the circuit court of appeals to 
which their rulings could be appealed 
had previously ruled adversely on the 
issue. In other circuits, however, the 
question is open and some judges have 
taken the EEOC’s lead.
On May 5, U.S. District Judge Robert 
E. Payne in Virginia found that he was 
bound by 4th Circuit precedent to reject 
a sexual orientation discrimination 
claim under Title VII in Hinton v. 
Virginia Union University, 2016 WL 
2621967, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60487 
(E.D. Va.), even though the plaintiff, 
an openly-gay administrative assistant 
at the university, had alleged clear 
evidence of anti-gay discrimination by 
the university president. Judge Payne 
found that a 1996 decision by the 4th 
Circuit, Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of 
America, 99 F.3d 138, was still binding. 
Payne noted that other federal trial 
courts were divided about whether to 
defer to the Baldwin ruling, but in any 
event he felt bound by circuit precedent 
to dismiss the claim.
A district judge on Long Island, 
Sandra J. Feuerstein, reached a similar 
result in Magnusson v. County of 
Suffolk, 2016 WL 2889002, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 64897 (E.D.N.Y., May 17, 
2016), dismissing a Title VII claim by 
an openly-lesbian custodial worker 
at the Suffolk County Department of 
Public Works, who alleged that her 
failure to comply with her supervisors’ 
stereotypes of how women should 
dress had led to discrimination against 
her. Relying on prior decisions by the 
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals, such as 
Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 
211 (2nd Cir. 2005), Judge Feuerstein 
refrained from discussing more recent 
developments and dismissed the claim, 
asserting that the plaintiff’s “claims 
regarding incidents of harassment 
based on her sexual orientation do not 
give rise to Title VII liability.” 
Also relying on Dawson, U.S. 
District Judge Jeffrey Alker Meyer 
(D. Conn.) dismissed a Title VII sex 
discrimination in Pelletier v. Purdue 
Pharma LP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
84099, 2016 WL 3620710 (June 29, 
2016), holding that the gay male 
plaintiff had failed to alleged facts 
sufficient to fit within the narrow sex 
stereotyping theory that the 2nd Circuit 
might recognize in a Title VII claim 
brought by a gay man. “Here, construing 
plaintiff’s complaint liberally,” wrote 
Judge Meyer, “he has alleged that his 
employer decided to discipline and fire 
him as a result of learning that he was 
in a long-term relationship with another 
man. On the facts alleged, there is ‘no 
basis to surmise that [plaintiff] behaved 
in a stereotypically feminine manner 
and that the harassment he endured was, 
in fact, based on his non-conformity 
with gender norms instead of his sexual 
orientation,’” quoting from another 2nd 
Circuit case, Simonton v. Runyon. Judge 
Meyer granted the motion to dismiss 
the Title VII sex discrimination claim 
“without prejudice to plaintiff’s filing 
an amended complaint within 14 days 
from the date of this ruling that re-pleads 
the claim if such facts actually exist and 
are alleged that would warrant a claim 
of gender-based sex discrimination.” 
Judge Meyer never mentioned Baldwin 
or the alternative argument, which some 
other district judges have accepted, that 
a man having a long-term relationship 
with another man can be considered 
sufficient to state a gender stereotype 
claim, which is part of the EEOC’s 
underlying reasoning in Baldwin v. 
Foxx. Plaintiff Gary Pelletier had also 
filed a sexual orientation complaint 
with the Connecticut Commission on 
Human Rights and Opportunities, but 
he did not assert a supplementary state 
law claim in his Title VII lawsuit, and 
in any event there were no allegations 
that he had exhausted his administrative 
remedies under Connecticut law. His 
complaint was filed pro se, but he was 
represented by counsel at the hearing on 
the motion, which may partly explain 
why Judge Meyer is willing to entertain 
a new complaint. The case also raises 
a claim under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, which was not 
dismissed. (Imagine a supervisor 
telling somebody prior to his discharge 
that “they could get younger people to 
take your job.”) 
On May 31, a senior district judge 
in Illinois decided that prudence 
in light of the developing situation 
counseled against dismissing a pending 
“perceived sexual orientation” claim 
in the case of Matavka v. Board of 
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Education, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
70451 (N.D. Ill.). Judge Milton I. 
Shadur confronted the school district’s 
motion to dismiss a discrimination 
claim by an employee at J. Sterling 
Morton High School, who alleged that 
“he experienced severe harassment 
from his coworkers and supervisors, 
including taunts that he was ‘gay’ and 
should ‘suck it,’ frequent jokes about his 
perceived homosexuality, and hacking 
of his Facebook account to identify 
him publicly as ‘interested in boys and 
men’, and an email stating ‘U . . . are 
homosexual.’” Judge Shadur observed 
that the Chicago-based 7th Circuit 
Court of Appeals had in the past rejected 
sexual orientation discrimination 
claims under Title VII, which “would 
appear to bury” Matavka’s Title VII 
claim. But, he noted, Baldwin v. Foxx, 
while not binding on the court, may 
prompt a rethinking of this issue, and 
that the 7th Circuit heard oral argument 
on September 30 of a plaintiff’s appeal 
from a different federal trial judge’s 
dismissal of a sexual orientation 
discrimination claim in the case of 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Community College, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25813, 2015 
WL 926015 (N.D. Ind., March 3, 2015). 
“Should Hively follow recent district 
court decisions in finding Baldwin 
persuasive,” he wrote, “that finding 
plainly would affect the disposition of 
Morton High’s motion. That being so, 
the prudent course at present is to stay 
this matter pending the issuance of a 
decision in Hively.” The 7th Circuit had 
not issued a decision in Hively as of this 
writing. Judge Shadur stayed a ruling 
on the motion until July 29, and said 
that if the 7th Circuit had not issued a 
ruling by then, he might stay it further. 
The EEOC filed an amicus brief in 
Hively, urging the Circuit to adopt a 
new precedent consistent with Baldwin.
The federal appeals courts are not 
bound by any rules about how soon 
after oral argument they must issue 
opinions. Sometimes the 7th Circuit 
moves quickly. During 2014 it took just a 
week after the August 26 oral argument 
to rule affirmatively on a marriage 
equality case on September 4, giving 
the states of Wisconsin and Indiana 
time to petition the Supreme Court for 
review before the start of the Court’s 
October term. The panel that heard 
the Hively argument had not ruled in 
more than eight months, suggesting that 
an extended internal discussion may 
be happening among the nine active 
judges of the 7th Circuit, to whom the 
panel’s proposed opinion would be 
circulated before it is released. Panels 
may not depart from circuit precedent, 
but a majority of the active judges 
on the circuit can overrule their past 
decisions. A 7th Circuit ruling reversing 
the district court’s dismissal of the 
Hively complaint would be a major 
breakthrough for Title VII coverage of 
sexual orientation claims.
In an Indiana case that could be 
affected by a ruling in Hively while it 
is pending, Somers v. Express Scripts 
Holdings, 2016 WL 3541544, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84268 (S.D. Ind., 
June 29, 2016), the plaintiff, who may 
or may not be gay, avoided dismissal of 
his Title VII sex discrimination claim 
by taking care never to mention sexual 
orientation in his sexual harassment 
complaint, hoping to bring his case 
within the Supreme Court’s same-sex 
harassment precedent of Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 
U.S. 75 (1998). Brian Somers alleged 
that harassing co-workers called him 
“fat motherfucker,” “faggot,” “gay,” and 
“prison bitch,” and that one said that 
Somers “had a soft ass and he would 
like to poke it.” Somers asserted that 
when he complained to a supervisor, he 
was told to “get over it” and no action 
was taken. The employer argued that 
Title VII did not govern the claim, 
because it was clearly – in the eyes of 
the employer – a sexual orientation 
discrimination claim not covered by 
Title VII. While acknowledging 7th 
Circuit precedent holding that sexual 
orientation claims may not be brought 
under Title VII, District Judge Jane 
Magnus-Stinson notes that Somers is 
not explicitly alleging sexual orientation 
discrimination and comments, “Express’ 
assumption that Mr. Somers’ claims 
must be based on sexual orientation 
assumes a key fact that is not alleged 
in Mr. Somers’ complaint – namely, 
his sexual orientation. Instead, the only 
question before the Court at this time 
is whether the factual allegations in 
Mr. Somers’ complaint set forth a Title 
VII claim based on his sex that is both 
plausible on its face and gives Express 
sufficient notice of the nature of Mr. 
Somers’ claims.” The judge concluded 
that this standard had been met, and 
that the employer’s argument “ignores 
the federal notice pleading standard.” 
Since the court found that Somers 
had pleaded “plausible claims for 
harassment and constructive discharge 
based on his sex,” the motion to dismiss 
must be denied. In Oncale, the Supreme 
Court said that one way a plaintiff could 
prove a same-sex harassment claim 
would be to show that the harasser 
was homosexual. In a footnote, Judge 
Stinson wrote: “To the extent that 
Mr. Somers suggests in his response 
brief that the employee who allegedly 
harassed him may be a homosexual, the 
Court will not accept that as true at this 
stage of the litigation because it is not 
alleged in his complaint.” 
Meanwhile, two other decisions 
issued in June have taken opposite 
views on the question. In Brown v. 
Subway Sandwich Shop of Laurel, 2016 
WL 3248457, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
76526 (S.D. Miss., June 13, 2016), U.S. 
District Judge Keith Starrett bowed 
to prior 5th Circuit rulings, such as 
Brandon v. Sage Corp., 808 F.3d 266 
(2015), rejecting sexual orientation 
claims under Title VII, and he even 
claimed, somewhat disingenuously, that 
the Baldwin decision did not support the 
plaintiff’s claim, stating that Baldwin 
“takes no position on the merits of the 
claim and resolves only timeliness and 
jurisdictional issues.” While this may 
appear to be technically true, since the 
EEOC was ruling on an appeal from the 
Transportation Department’s dismissal 
of the claim and not ultimately on the 
merits, on the other hand the EEOC 
definitely did take a “position” on the 
question whether sexual orientation 
discrimination claims are covered by 
Title VII; it had to address this question 
in order to determine that it had 
jurisdiction over the claim. The EEOC 
clearly stated in Baldwin that sexual 
orientation discrimination claims 
are “necessarily” sex discrimination 
claims.
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By contrast, U.S. District Judge 
Mark E. Walker of the Northern 
District of Florida, finding that the 11th 
Circuit Court of Appeals has not issued 
a precedential ruling on the question, 
refused to dismiss a “perceived sexual 
orientation” discrimination claim in 
Winstead v. Lafayette County Board 
of County Commissioners, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 80036, 2016 WL 3440601, 
on June 20. Pointing out that the 11th 
Circuit had ruled in 2011 in Glenn v. 
Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, that a gender 
identity discrimination claim could be 
considered a sex discrimination claim 
under the Equal Protection Clause 
using a sex stereotyping theory, Judge 
Walker found that the Baldwin ruling, 
which also discussed sex stereotyping 
as a basis for a sexual orientation claim, 
was persuasive and should be followed.
Judge Walker rejected the argument 
made by some courts that using the 
stereotyping theory for this purpose was 
inappropriately “bootstrapping” claims 
of sexual orientation discrimination 
under Title VII. “These arguments 
seem to this Court to misapprehend the 
nature of animus towards people based 
on their sexual orientation, actual or 
perceived,” he wrote. “Such animus, 
whatever its origin, is at its core based 
on disapproval of certain behaviors 
(real or assumed) and tendencies 
towards behaviors, and those behaviors 
are disapproved of precisely because 
they are deemed to be ‘inappropriate’ 
for members of a certain sex or gender.”
He concluded: “This view – that 
discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is necessarily 
discrimination based on gender or 
sex stereotypes, and is therefore sex 
discrimination – is persuasive to this 
Court, as it has been to numerous 
other courts and the EEOC.” He also 
contended that it “follows naturally 
from (though it is not compelled by) 
Brumby, which is binding Eleventh 
Circuit precedent. Simply put, to treat 
someone differently based on her 
attraction to women is necessary to 
treat that person differently because 
of her failure to conform to gender 
or sex stereotypes, which is, in turn, 
necessarily discrimination on the 
basis of sex.”
Ironically, Judge Walker turned to 
an opinion written by the late Justice 
Antonin Scalia, an outspoken opponent 
of LGBT rights, to seal the deal. He 
quoted from Scalia’s opinion for the 
Supreme Court in Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, a 1998 
decision that same-sex harassment 
cases could be brought under Title VII. 
“No one doubts,” wrote Judge Walker, 
“that discrimination against people 
based on their sexual orientation was 
not ‘the principal evil Congress was 
concerned with when it enacted Title 
VII,’” quoting Scalia, and continuing 
the quote, “‘But statutory prohibitions 
often go beyond the principal evil to 
cover reasonably comparable evils, 
and it is ultimately the provisions 
of our laws rather than the principal 
concerns of our legislators by which 
we are governed.’” Scalia was opposed 
to relying on “legislative history” to 
determine the meaning of statutes, 
instead insisting on focusing on the 
statutory language and giving words 
their “usual” meanings.
Judge Walker concluded that his 
decision not to dismiss the Title 
VII claim “does not require judicial 
activism or tortured statutory 
construction. It requires close attention 
to the text of Title VII, common 
sense, and an understanding that ‘in 
forbidding employers to discrimination 
against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment 
of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes,’” a quotation from Sprogis 
v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1198 (7th 
Cir. 1971), which had been quoted by 
the Supreme Court in Manhart, an 
important early sex discrimination case 
under Title VII that rejected the use of 
sex-based actuarial tables to require 
women to make larger contributions 
for pension coverage than men because 
they live longer on average. 
Judge Walker rejected an alternative 
analysis proffered by the EEOC in 
Baldwin, however, observing that it 
would not support coverage for sex 
discrimination claims by bisexual 
plaintiffs!
Judge Walker’s decision provides the 
most extended district court discussion 
of the merits of allowing sexual 
orientation discrimination claims 
under Title VII, but it will not be the 
last word, as the EEOC pushes forward 
with its affirmative agenda to litigate 
this issue in as many federal courts 
around the country as possible, building 
to a potential Supreme Court ruling. So 
far, the Supreme Court has refused to 
get involved with the ongoing debate 
about whether sexual orientation or 
gender identity discrimination claims 
are covered under Title VII. It refused 
to review the 11th Circuit’s decision 
in Glenn v. Brumby, for example, 
presumably because of the absence of 
a circuit split, as Glenn is so far the 
only case holding that gender identity 
discrimination claims should be dealt 
with as sex discrimination claims under 
the Equal Protection Clause. But the 
Court can’t put things off much longer. 
An affirmative 7th Circuit ruling in 
Hively would create the kind of “circuit 
split” that usually prompts the Supreme 
Court to agree to review a case. That 
may not be long in coming. 
Although the 7th Circuit is likely to 
be the first to rule on this, an appeal 
is also pending in the 2nd Circuit from 
a March 9, 2016, district court ruling 
in Christiansen v. Omnicom Group, 
Inc., 2016 WL 951581 (S.D.N.Y.), in 
which the district judge also dismissed 
a gay plaintiff’s Title VII claim, 
relying on 2nd Circuit precedents. 
On June 28, the deadline for amicus 
filings, both the EEOC and a group of 
128 members of Congress filed briefs 
urging the 2nd Circuit to abandon its 
past decisions and embrace the broader 
understanding of sex discrimination 
that the EEOC described in its Baldwin 
decision. The congressional brief 
argued that the history of repeated 
unsuccessful introductions of bills to 
adopt an express federal ban on sexual 
orientation discrimination should not 
be construed as a belief by Congress 
that Title VII does not already cover 
this form of discrimination. Instead, 
the brief argues, particularly with 
respect to the Equality Act introduced 
last year, the purpose of the bill is to 
“clarify” and make “explicit” what is 
already implicitly covered in the ban 
on sex discrimination. ■
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In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit affirmed the decision of the District Court 
for the District of Maryland, which 
dismissed Karen Greene’s complaint 
against the Harris Corporation and its 
employee, Harl Dan Pierce. Greene v. 
Harris Corp., 2016 WL 3425579, 2016 
U.S. App. LEXIS 11316 (June 22, 2016). 
Greene alleged that Harris and Pierce: 
(1) discriminated against her because 
of her sexual orientation and personal 
appearance in violation of Howard 
County, Maryland Code (HCC) § 
12.208; and (2) tortiously interfered 
with her business relationship with 
Eurest Services, Inc., a cleaning 
contractor that employed Greene and 
assigned her to work at Harris Corp. 
Both claims were dismissed pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)
(6), with the Court notably concluding 
that Greene’s discrimination claim 
failed to allege sufficient facts showing 
that an employment relationship 
existed between herself and Harris. 
Circuit Judge Barbara Milano Keenan 
wrote for the court.
Howard County’s ordinance 
explicitly prohibits sexual orientation 
discrimination by an “employer,” who 
is defined under HCC § 12.208(I)(a) 
as a person engaged in an industry 
or business who has at least five full-
time or part-time employees during a 
specific time period. Section 12.208(I)
(a) also defines an employee as an 
individual employed by an employer — 
a definition that the court characterizes 
as circular. These definitions undermine 
the county’s attempt to protect 
LGBT workers from workplace 
discrimination. Plaintiffs, who work 
under independent contracts, cannot 
easily establish that an employment 
relationship existed between themselves 
and their respective defendants; like 
Greene, they therefore cannot state 
discrimination claims that survive a 
dismissal motion.
In Greene’s case, she had previously 
operated her own cleaning company 
that contracted with Harris for 14 years, 
until Pierce terminated her contract 
supposedly for budgetary reasons 
in March 2010. Greene’s complaint 
characterized her relationship with 
Pierce as “contemptuous.” Since he 
began working at Harris in 2008, 
Pierce treated Greene in a rude manner 
and made derogatory statements about 
her personal appearance to other 
Harris employees. He also became 
visibly upset after learning from a co-
worker that she is a lesbian, just one 
or two months before he terminated 
Greene’s services. 
Later that year in December, Greene 
was employed by Eurest, Harris’s new 
cleaning contractor, and assigned to 
return to Harris as a janitor. When 
Pierce learned that Greene was working 
there, he promptly had a Harris security 
officer escort her from the premises on 
her first day. He then emailed Harris’ 
facilities manager, stating that Greene 
was previously dismissed for charging 
too much money, inappropriately 
searching his office, and screaming 
obscenities at him. Afterwards, he 
told Eurest that Greene was banned 
from Harris and must be removed 
immediately from working at the 
office. Eurest subsequently terminated 
Greene’s employment, which it admits 
it would not have done but for Pierces 
statements (which Pierce ultimately 
recanted in this case).
By the time Greene appealed the 
district court’s decision, the 4th Circuit 
was no stranger to the joint-employment 
doctrine or the challenges presented 
by staffing agency-client contracts. 
The Court had recently issued its 
decision in Butler v. Drive Automotive 
Industries of America, Inc., 793 F.3d 
404 (4th Cir. 2015), which concerned 
a Title VII discrimination claim. In 
Butler, the court developed a nine-
factor test to identify joint employers 
and prevent them from evading 
liability by hiding behind staffing 
Restrictive Definition of Employment Presents a Challenge 
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agencies. The Butler court concluded 
that the plaintiff had established an 
employment relationship necessary to 
sustain her Title VII claim by showing 
that: (1) she worked side-by-side 
with workers solely employed by the 
defendant-client; (2) she was directly 
engaged in producing the client’s 
product; and (3) she was supervised 
by a manager employed by the client. 
Thus, showing these three of the nine 
factors was sufficient to establish an 
employment relationship in Butler.
The court came to a different 
conclusion when applying the nine-
factor test in Greene, finding that 
Greene’s allegations failed to raise 
sufficient facts showing an employment 
relationship with Harris. In support 
of her claim, Greene alleged that 
Harris contracted for various powers 
typically retained by employers, 
including the rights to: (1) accept or 
reject prospective janitors provided by 
Eurest, and remove them from their 
assignments “for cause”; (2) assign an 
on-site Harris employee to supervise 
Greene; (3) select which days Greene 
would work at the office; and (4) 
provide the cleaning supplies Greene 
must use. However, the court instead 
concluded that Harris’ authority to 
accept or reject Eurest personnel 
merely arose from the company’s 
right to ensure that its service contract 
was performed to its satisfaction. The 
court also rejected Greene’s assertion 
because she failed to allege that: (1) her 
duties were related to Harris’ business 
product; (2) she performed work also 
undertaken by Harris employees; 
(3) Eurest and Harris intended that 
their contract established any type 
of employment relationship between 
Eurest personnel and Harris; or (4) she 
met with or received direction from 
any Harris supervisor in the few hours 
she worked there. 
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U.S. District Judge Tanya Walton Pratt has ruled that Indiana was failing to comply with the 
Supreme Court’s mandate for marriage 
equality in Obergefell v. Hodges, 
decided last June 26, when the state 
refused to list the same-sex spouses of 
birth mothers on their children’s birth 
certificates. Ruling on cases brought 
by several same-sex couples who were 
married before their children were born, 
Judge Pratt found that the mandate to 
afford equal marriage rights to same-
sex couples included a requirement 
that the “parental presumption” applied 
to husbands of women who give birth 
should also be applied to their wives. 
Henderson v. Adams, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 84916, 2016 WL 3548645 (S.D. 
Ind., June 30, 2016).
Judge Pratt explained that the usual 
procedure in Indiana for issuing birth 
certificates starts when hospital staff 
“work with the birth mother to complete 
the State of Indiana’s ‘Certificate of Live 
Birth Worksheet,’” which was created by 
the state as part of its Birth Registration 
System. “Staff at the hospital upload the 
information provided on the Indiana 
Birth Worksheet to a State database. The 
county health department then receives 
notification that birth information 
has been added to the database. A 
notification letter to the birth mother 
is generated on a form provided by the 
State, which indicates that information 
has been received by the county health 
department and requests that the mother 
notify the county health department 
if there is an error with respect to the 
child’s identifying information.” If the 
mother wants a birth certificate, she 
has to request one, which will then be 
generated out of the database.
One of the questions on the 
Worksheet is whether the birth mother 
is married. If she answers “no,” she is 
asked whether a paternity affidavit has 
been completed for the child, in which 
case the person identified as the father 
will go into the database and be listed 
on the birth certificate. If there has been 
no affidavit, then the space is left blank, 
even if the mother knows the identity of 
the child’s biological father, and the birth 
certificate will list only the mother. If 
the answer is “yes,” the husband’s name 
will go into the database, and ultimately 
will be listed on the birth certificate. 
Even if the child of a married couple is 
conceived with donated sperm, there is 
a presumption that the husband is the 
father, unless the mother takes steps 
during this initial information-gathering 
process to make clear that her husband 
is not the biological father.
Even though all of the plaintiff 
couples in this case are married, the state 
refused to accept same-sex spouses into 
the database or to list them on the birth 
certificate. The state’s position was that 
the database and the birth certificates 
generated from it are supposed to create 
a true record of the biological parentage 
of the child, and that because a same-
sex spouse of a birth mother is not 
biologically related to the child, listing 
her in the database and on the birth 
certificate would create a false record. 
The state took the position that a same-
sex spouse could only be listed in the 
database and the birth certificate if she 
adopted the child with the permission 
of the birth mother, a process involving 
expenses and delay, during which time 
the child would have only one legal 
parent.
Judge Pratt accepted the plaintiffs’ 
argument that “Indiana’s refusal to 
grant the status of parenthood to female 
spouses of artificially-inseminated 
birth mothers while granting the status 
of parenthood to male spouses of 
artificially-inseminated birth mother 
violates the Equal Protection Clause,” 
because it was sex discrimination, pure 
and simple.
Furthermore, sex discrimination 
requires heightened scrutiny, putting 
the burden on the state to justify its 
policy and show that it advances an 
important state interest. Because the 
state presumes, without proof, that 
the husbands of birth mothers are the 
parents of their children, the policy does 
not, in fact, advance the state’s asserted 
interest of creating a “true” record 
of the child’s biological parents. The 
state argued that it was the duty of the 
married birth mother to advise hospital 
staff while completing the Worksheet if 
her child was conceived through donor 
sperm so that her husband’s name would 
be excluded from the database, but this 
was clearly a spurious argument, since 
the Worksheet does not prompt hospital 
staff members to ask this question.
“The State Defendant’s argument that 
the birth mother should acknowledge 
that she is not married to the father of 
her child when she has been artificially 
inseminated or else she is committing 
fraud when she has been artificially 
inseminated is not consistent with the 
Indiana Birth Worksheet, Indiana law, 
or common sense,” wrote Judge Pratt. 
“The Indiana Birth Worksheet asks, 
‘are you married to the father of your 
child,’ yet it does not define ‘father.’ 
This term can mean different things to 
different women. Common sense says 
that an artificially-inseminated woman 
married to a man who has joined in the 
decision for this method of conception, 
and who intends to treat the child as his 
own, would indicate that she is married 
to the father of her child. Why would she 
indicate otherwise?”
Judge Pratt pointed out that the 
Worksheet, devised by the state, made 
no attempt to elicit the information that 
the State deemed to be so important, 
and, furthermore, “there is no warning 
of fraud or criminal liability.” She 
pointed out that some other states had 
enacted specific statutory language to 
deal with the use of donor insemination 
by married couples and the issuance 
of appropriate birth certificates, but 
Indiana has failed to do so. She pointed 
out, however, that in one such state, 
Wisconsin, litigation is pending because 
that state has also been refusing to list 
same-sex spouses on birth certificates.
Ultimately, she pointed out, the 
Worksheet process as set up by the state 
did not achieve its articulated purpose 
of creating a “true” record of biological 
parents, and was administered in a 
Federal Judge Orders Indiana to List Two Moms on Birth 
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way that clearly discriminated against 
same-sex couples. Rejecting the state’s 
argument that employing a parental 
presumption was not required under 
Obergefell’s mandate of equal marriage 
benefits, she pointed out, “the state 
created a benefit for married women 
based on their marriage to a man, which 
allows them to name their husband on 
their child’s birth certificate even when 
the husband is not the biological father. 
Because of Baskin [the 7th Circuit’s 
marriage equality ruling, which the 
Supreme Court declined to review] 
and Obergefell, this benefit –which is 
directly tied to marriage – must now be 
afforded to women married to women.”
In addition to finding an equal 
protection violation, Judge Pratt found 
a Due Process violation because in 
Obergefell the Supreme Court referred to 
both clauses of the 14th Amendment as a 
source of the freedom to marry. Since the 
Supreme Court identified that freedom 
as a fundamental right, strict scrutiny 
would apply, and the state’s rationale for 
its position of this case was obviously 
insufficient to meet the “compelling 
interest” test, and Judge Pratt so found. 
The judge concluded: “Given Indiana’s 
long-articulated interest in doing what is 
in the best interest of the child and given 
that the Indiana Legislature has stated 
the purpose of Title 31 is to protect, 
promote, and preserve Indiana families, 
there is no conceivable important 
governmental interest that would justify 
the different treatment for female 
spouses of artificially-inseminated 
birth mothers from the male spouses of 
artificially-inseminated birth mothers. 
As other district courts have noted, the 
holding of Obergefell will inevitably 
require ‘sweeping change’ by extending 
to same-sex married couples all benefits 
afforded to opposite-sex married 
couples. Those benefits must logically 
and reasonably include the recognition 
sought by Plaintiffs in this action.”
Counsel for plaintiffs include Megan 
L. Gehring, Richard A. Mann, PC, 
Raymond L. Faust, Skiles Detrude; 
Richard A. Mann; William R. Groth, 
Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & 
Towe LLP; and Karen Celestino-
Horseman, Austin & Jones PC (all are 
of Indianapolis). ■
Maryland High Court Adopts De Facto 
Parent Standing for Lesbian Co-Parents
Overruling a 2008 precedent and reversing lower court decisions in this case, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland, that state’s highest court, 
ruled on July 7 that the same-sex spouse 
of a birth mother, who gave birth to 
their child shortly before they were 
married, has standing as a “de facto 
parent” to pursue custody and visitation 
in the context of their present divorce 
proceeding even though she never 
adopted the child. Conover v. Conover, 
2016 WL 3633062, 2016 Md. LEXIS 
433, reversing 224 Md. App. 366, 120 
A.3d 874 (2015). The co-parent will not 
be required to show that the birth mother 
is unfit or that she can prove “exceptional 
circumstances” justify departing from 
the general rule that unrelated “third 
parties” do not have standing to seek 
custody of children. 
The court found that the decision it 
overturned, Janice M. v. Margaret K., 404 
Md. 661 (2008), was based on a faulty 
reading by the court of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57 (2000), that failed adequately 
to perceive the narrow scope of that 
ruling, and had also relied improperly on 
distinguishable earlier Maryland cases. 
Furthermore, the court characterized 
Janice M. as an “archaic” precedent 
that was out of step with the trend of 
decisions in other states. (Ironically, on 
July 5 the Court of Appeals of Michigan 
issued a ruling on the exact same issue 
taking the opposite position, see below.) 
Judge Sally D. Adkins wrote the 
court’s opinion, which had the support 
of four judges. There were concurring 
opinions by three judges suggesting 
slightly different tests to establish “de 
facto” parent status, but all ultimately 
ruling in favor of the co-parent’s right 
as a “de facto” parent to seek custody 
and/or visitation depending upon the 
trial court’s determination of the best 
interest of the child.
“Child custody and visitation 
decisions are among the most serious 
and complex decisions a court must 
make,” wrote Judge Adkins, “with 
grave implications for all parties. The 
dissolution of a non-traditional marriage 
just compounds the difficulties of this 
already challenging inquiry.” Michelle 
and Brittany Conover’s relationship 
began in July 2002. They decided 
together that Brittany would conceive 
a child with anonymous donor sperm 
obtained through Shady Grove Fertility 
Clinic. She became pregnant in 2009, 
giving birth to their son in April 2010. 
The birth certificate listed only one 
parent: Brittany. The space for a father 
was left blank. When their son was 
about six months old they married in the 
District of Columbia. Maryland at that 
time recognized same-sex marriages 
contracted in D.C. but did not issue 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
After a year of marriage the women 
separated. Brittany allowed Michelle 
overnight and weekend access to their 
son until July 2012, when she prevented 
further contact. Brittany filed a formal 
divorce action in February 2013 in 
the Circuit Court in Hagerstown. Her 
divorce complaint stated that there were 
no children of the marriage. Michelle 
filed an answer seeking visitation 
rights with their son, and subsequently 
counter-complained for divorce, again 
requesting visitation rights (but not 
custody). Brittany opposed custody, 
arguing that Michelle was not related to 
the boy and thus lacked standing under 
Maryland law.
Michelle asked the court to interpret 
Maryland’s statute governing custody 
disputes involving children “born to 
parents who have not participated in a 
marriage ceremony with each other” 
to place her in the same position as 
a father. The statute allows a father in 
such circumstances to assert parental 
rights if four tests are met: a judicial 
determination of paternity, the father’s 
acknowledgement in writing that he is 
the father, the father has “openly and 
notoriously recognized the child to be 
his child; or has subsequently married 
the mother and has acknowledged 
himself, orally or in writing, to be the 
father.” Michelle took the position 
that she satisfied at least three of these 
tests, most pertinently the last, so she 
should be deemed a parent. The lower 
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courts determined, however, that 
Michelle lacked standing. Since the son 
was conceived and born before they 
married, no presumption applied that 
Michelle, as the spouse of Brittany, was 
the boy’s parent, and the court found 
that the statute Michelle was relying 
upon could not be construed in gender-
neutral terms. The courts also rejected 
Michelle’s argument that she should be 
deemed a “de facto” parent, relying on 
the precedent of Janice M. holding that 
Maryland did not recognize that doctrine. 
The court granted the divorce but denied 
Michelle’s request for visitation based 
solely on lack of standing. Thus, the 
trial court never determined whether 
ordering visitation would be in the best 
in interest of the child. The intermediate 
appellate court affirmed, and the Court 
of Appeals granted Michelle’s petition 
for certiorari. The court’s opinion 
answers affirmatively the first question 
posed in Michelle’s petition: “Should 
Maryland reconsider Janice M. v. 
Margaret K. and recognize the doctrine 
of de facto parenthood?”
Ultimately the logic of the court’s 
decision was derived from its conclusion 
that “the primary goal of access 
determinations in Maryland is to serve 
the best interests of the child.” This 
must be done while respecting the 
constitutional right of a fit parent to have 
custody and to control the raising of her 
child, where it is claimed that a “non-
parent” should be entitled to access to 
the child. Courts in other states have 
used a variety of legal theories when 
confronted with unmarried same-sex 
couples terminating their relationships 
and battling over access to the children 
they were raising. One doctrine that has 
emerged and achieved wide acceptance 
– the de facto parent doctrine – was 
first adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 
N.W.2 419 (1995). This doctrine poses 
a four-part test: “the legal parent must 
consent to and foster the relationship 
between the third party and the child; 
the third party must have lived with 
the child; the third party must perform 
parental functions for the child to a 
significant degree; and most important, 
a parent-child bond must be forged.” In 
other words, in order to be a de facto 
parent, somebody must be a parent in 
all practical respects as a result of a 
relationship supported by the child’s 
legal parent. (In a concurring opinion 
in Conover, Judge Shirley Watts would 
modify this test in cases where the child 
has two known legal parents to require 
that the relationship of the third party 
have been fostered with the consent 
of both of them; her reservations were 
not essential to deciding this case, 
because the son was conceived through 
anonymous donated sperm.) 
The Maryland Court of Appeals 
concluded that this de facto parent 
doctrine should be adopted to determine 
whether an unmarried partner of a birth 
parent should be able to seek custody and/
or visitation in the event of dissolution 
of the adults’ relationship.  Thus, the co-
parent would not be obliged as a mere 
third party to prove that the child’s legal 
parent is “unfit” or that “exceptional 
circumstances” would justify invading 
her constitutional parental rights. In 
deciding whether to award visitation in 
this case, the court would be concerned 
with the best interest of the child once 
the de facto parent status of Michelle 
was recognized. The court rejected 
Brittany’s argument that the legislature 
has the sole authority to make this 
change in Maryland law, pointing out 
that the existing legal framework is 
largely the result of judicial decision-
making, not legislation.
“We overrule Janice M. because 
it is “clearly wrong” and has been 
undermined by the passage of time,” 
wrote Judge Adkins, making clear 
that “de facto parents are distinct from 
other third parties. We hold that de 
facto parents have standing to contest 
custody or visitation and need not 
show parental unfitness or exceptional 
circumstances before a trial court 
can apply a best interests of the child 
analysis.” Judge Adkins described 
the best interest of the child as being 
“of transcendent importance,” and 
concluded, “With this holding we fortify 
the best interests standard by allowing 
judicial consideration of the benefits a 
child gains when there is consistency in 
the child’s close, nurturing relationships. 
We do so carefully, adopting the 
multi-part test first articulated by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in H.S.H.-K. 
This test accommodates, we think, the 
dissonance between what is in the best 
interest of a child and a parent’s right to 
direct and govern the care, custody, and 
control of their children.”
The court returned the case to 
the Circuit Court “for determination 
of whether, applying the H.S.H.-K. 
standards, Michelle should be 
considered a de facto parent, and conduct 
further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.” Thus, it will remain for the 
trial court both to determine Michelle’s 
status and, if she is a de facto parent, 
whether it is in the child’s best interest to 
order visitation. This determination will 
naturally have to take into account the 
fact that Brittany has not allowed contact 
with the child, now age 6, since July 
2012, four years ago, so one anticipates 
that the trial court will hear expert 
testimony from both parties about the 
impact of reestablishing contact after 
this prolonged gap in the life of a very 
young child.
Interestingly, Michelle Conover 
now identifies as a transgender man 
and transitioned after the divorce, but 
the court indicated in a footnote that 
“she explained that she would refer 
to herself using female pronouns and 
her former name for consistency with 
the record and that her gender identity 
is not material to any legal issue in 
this appeal.” The court agreed to this 
arrangement, and Michelle’s current 
name appears nowhere in the opinion, 
but a press release by Free State Legal, 
whose deputy director and managing 
attorney Jer Welter represents Michelle, 
identifies the appellant as “Michael 
Conover.” One wonders whether or how 
the trial court will take this transition 
into account in making the “best 
interest” determination. If Brittany 
(who is no longer using Conover as her 
surname) remains strongly opposed to 
visitation, it would not be surprising 
if she sought to make this an issue in 
the best interest determination by the 
Circuit Court. 
More than forty-five organizations 
collaborated on seven amicus briefs 
that were filed in support of the 
appellant before the Court of Appeals, 
including LGBT rights groups, 
women’s rights groups, and a large 
group of law professors specializing in 
family law. ■ 
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A panel of the Court of Appeals of Michigan unanimously ruled on July 5 that Michelle Lake, 
a lesbian co-parent, lacked standing 
to seek “parenting time” with the 
biological child of her former same-
sex partner, Kerri Putnam. Reversing 
a decision to award parenting time by 
the Washtenaw Circuit Court in Lake 
v. Putnam, 2016 Mich. App. LEXIS 
1297, 2016 WL 3606081, the appeals 
court held that the co-parent was a mere 
“third party” who did not come within 
the standing requirements of the state’s 
Child Custody Act. Judge Colleen A. 
O’Brien wrote the opinion for the panel, 
with Judge Douglas B. Shapiro filing a 
concurring opinion.
Judge Shapiro’s concurrence provides 
a more sympathetic version of the facts 
than O’Brien’s. “While the parties 
disagree as to details,” he wrote, “it is 
undisputed that they lived together for 
about a decade as a same-sex couple, 
that about five years into the relationship 
defendant bore a child by artificial 
insemination, that for several years the 
parties each acted as a parent to the 
child, and that they were both viewed as 
parents by the child. It is also undisputed 
that several years later, around 
September 2014, defendant ended the 
relationship, moved out with the child, 
and entered into a new relationship 
with a different woman. Defendant 
initially allowed plaintiff visitation with 
the child, but eventually she refused 
to do so. In June 2015, plaintiff filed 
this action seeking parenting time.” In 
addition, as Judge O’Brien pointed out 
in her opinion for the court, although 
the women could have married in other 
jurisdictions, they did not do so. Neither 
did the plaintiff adopt the child with 
the consent of the defendant, although 
that would have been possible when the 
women were living with the child for 
some time in Florida, where the state 
courts had invalidated a statutory ban on 
“homosexuals” adopting children. (At 
the time, Michigan courts did not allow 
co-parent adoptions, which was one of 
the issues in DeBoer v. Snyder, one of the 
cases that was ultimately consolidated in 
Obergefell v. Hodges.) Thus, the plaintiff 
was not legally related to the child or to 
the child’s mother at any time. 
The Family Court judge in 
Washtenaw County, Darlene O’Brien, 
overruled the defendant’s objection to 
the plaintiff’s standing and awarded 
parenting time to the plaintiff, but the 
court of appeals granted the defendant 
leave to appeal.
The question, then, was whether 
some legal doctrine recognized in 
Michigan was available for her to assert 
standing to seek visitation after the 
women’s relationship ended. Courts in 
other states are divided on this question. 
The plaintiff pinned her hopes on the 
doctrine of “equitable-parent” that 
is recognized in Michigan. As Judge 
O’Brien describes Michigan’s version 
of the doctrine, “a husband who is not 
the biological father of a child born 
or conceived during wedlock may, 
nevertheless, be considered that child’s 
natural father if three requirements are 
satisfied: (1) the husband and the child 
must mutually acknowledge their father-
child relationship, or the child’s mother 
must have cooperated in the development 
of that father-child relationship prior to 
the time that the divorce proceedings 
commenced; (2) the husband must 
express a desire to have parental rights 
to the child; and (3) the husband must 
be willing to accept the responsibility 
of paying child support.” If these tests 
are met, the husband would be deemed 
an equitable parent with standing to 
seek custody and/or visitation as part of 
a divorce proceeding, the determining 
factor in that ruling being the best 
interest of the child. Plaintiff asserted 
that she met the tests. However, O’Brien 
pointed out, the plaintiff “ignores one 
crucial, and dispositive, requirement for 
the equitable-parent doctrine to apply 
– the child must be born in wedlock.” 
She pointed out that Michigan courts 
have consistently refused to extend this 
doctrine to heterosexual partners who 
have a child while living in unmarried 
cohabitation where the man is not 
the biological father of the child. In 
other words, although the court did 
not describe it as such, this equitable 
–parent doctrine is similar to the 
“parental presumption” that other states 
apply to determine a husband’s parental 
status when his wife gives birth, without 
requiring proof in every case that the 
husband is the child’s biological father.
Responding to the plaintiff’s argument 
that refusing to extend this doctrine 
to give her standing discriminates 
because of her sexual orientation, the 
court asserted that its failure to extend 
the doctrine to unmarried heterosexual 
couples refutes that argument. As to the 
argument that the two women should be 
treated as if they were married because 
Michigan and Florida’s refusal to allow 
same-sex marriage during the time 
they were living together violated their 
constitutional rights as proclaimed in 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the court pointed 
out that plaintiff did not introduce any 
evidence suggesting that the women 
would have married had that option 
been available to them. After all, at 
the time their child was born, they 
could have married in other states or 
Canada (just across the border from 
Michigan), although their home states 
did not then recognize out-of-state 
same-sex marriages. Another part of 
the Obergefell ruling, however, was that 
states were obligated to recognize such 
out-of-state marriages. 
Michigan Appeals Court Rejects Lesbian Co-Parent Standing 
in Visitation Suit
The plaintiff pinned her hopes on the doctrine 
of “equitable-parent.”
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As an alternative argument, the 
plaintiff urged the court to follow 
the persuasive precedent of Ramey v. 
Sutton, 2015 OK 79, 362 P.3d 217 (2015), 
in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
applied a theory of “in loco parentis” to 
a similar set of facts to find that a lesbian 
co-parent should be afforded a hearing 
to show that it was in the best interest of 
the child for her to be recognized as a 
legal parent for purposes of custody and/
or visitation. Judge O’Brien found that 
Oklahoma’s version of “in loco parentis,” 
which had never been embraced by 
Michigan courts, was distinguishable 
from Michigan’s equitable-parent 
doctrine, and “our Supreme Court has 
squarely rejected the argument that 
holding oneself out as a child’s parent, 
alone, is sufficient to be considered that 
child’s parent under the equitable-parent 
doctrine.” 
The court acknowledged that 
“especially in light of the Obergefell 
decision” this sort of case is “complex”, 
but “we simply do not believe it is 
appropriate for courts to retroactively 
impose the legal ramifications of 
marriage onto unmarried couples several 
years after their relationship has ended,” 
which the court said was “beyond the 
role of the judiciary.” 
“In sum,” concluded O’Brien, 
“while we acknowledge that the issues 
presented in child-custody disputes, 
including those involving same-sex 
couples, present challenges, we conclude 
that the equitable-parent doctrine does 
not extend to unmarried couples. This 
is true whether the couple involved is 
a heterosexual or a same-sex couple.” 
Thus, the trial court’s visitation order 
had to be reversed.
In his concurring opinion, Judge 
Shapiro asserted that the case could have 
turned out differently had the plaintiff 
presented some evidence that the 
women would have married before their 
child was born had the states where they 
resided (Michigan and, briefly, Florida) 
allowed it. He pointed out that last year 
the Court of Appeals had ruled in favor 
of parental standing in a case where a 
same-sex couple had married out-of-
state before having their child, using 
the reasoning of Obergefell to confer, 
in effect, retroactive recognition of the 
marriage for purposes of determining 
standing of the non-biological parent. 
See Stankevich v. Milliron, 313 Mich. 
App. 2233 (2015). “I would not limit 
our application of Obergefell to cases 
where the parties actually married in 
another jurisdiction,” he wrote. “The 
fact that marriage was available in 
some other jurisdiction did not remove 
the unconstitutional burden faced by 
same-sex couples residing in a state that 
barred same-sex marriage within its 
borders. The impediment was defined 
by state law, and the existence of that 
law to those who lived under it should 
not now be treated as constitutionally 
insignificant because other states treated 
the issue differently.”
Thus, in Shapiro’s view, “plaintiff 
is correct that Obergefell demands 
extension of the equitable-parent 
doctrine,” but only if the plaintiff 
can show that the women would have 
married had the state allowed it. “My 
colleagues are rightfully concerned 
about retroactively imposing marriage 
on a same-sex couple simply because 
one party now desires that we do so,” 
he continued. “However, that concern 
is fully addressed by a factual inquiry 
into the facts as they existed at the time 
the child was born or conceived. The 
question is whether the parties would 
have married before the child’s birth 
or conception but did not because of 
the unconstitutional laws preventing 
them from doing so.” He referred to the 
Oregon Court of Appeals decision In re 
Madrone, 350 P.3d 495 (2015), to support 
this point. “I would adopt this approach 
and hold that a party is entitled to seek 
equitable-parent rights arising out of a 
same-sex non-marital relationship where 
the evidence shows by a preponderance 
of the evidence that but for the ban on 
same-sex marriage in the parties’ state 
of residency, they would have married 
prior to the birth of the child.” But that 
is not this case. “While the affidavits 
presented to the trial court on behalf of 
the plaintiff state that the parties were 
in a committed relationship and that 
while in that relationship they raised the 
child together as co-parents, none of the 
affidavits, including plaintiff’s, state or 
allow for an inference that but for the 
then-existing unconstitutional barriers 
to same-sex marriage the parties would 
have married.” Shapiro concluded 
that if the plaintiff had presented such 
evidence, the correct move for the 
court of appeals would be to remand 
the case for a hearing by the trial court 
to determine whether such a thwarted 
intent to marry could be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
This kind of opinion can be very 
frustrating to read, because it focuses 
on legality and avoids human issues 
that should, logically, weigh heavily in a 
family relationship dispute. The keystone 
of custody and visitation determinations 
is supposed to be what is in the best 
interest of the child. Asserting technical 
standing requirements prevents the 
court from reaching this issue. The trial 
judge in this case, having accepted the 
plaintiff’s argument that she could assert 
the rights of an equitable-parent, did get 
to that ultimate issue and concluded she 
should have parenting time with the 
child. The court of appeals’ insistence on 
the technical rules of standing override 
that finding, resulting in a decision that 
seemingly sacrifices the best interest of 
the child, which is contrary to the usual 
policy goal of family law.
The plaintiff also tried to argue that 
depriving the child of contact with 
one of her parents violates the child’s 
own constitutional rights, but the court 
quickly dismissed this argument without 
any serious consideration, blithely 
asserting, “Generally, persons do not 
have standing to assert constitutional 
or statutory rights on behalf of another 
person. That is precisely what plaintiff 
is trying to do, i.e., assert the child’s 
constitutional rights. Accordingly, 
we reject this argument as well.” 
One wonders whether the trial judge 
appointed a guardian ad litem to 
represent the child’s interest, as such a 
party could advance this constitutional 
argument on the child’s behalf. Perhaps 
Michigan attorneys will respond to this 
ruling by adopting a different litigation 
strategy to require the court to confront 
the issue of the child’s best interest free 
of the standing barrier. In the meantime, 
of course, the plaintiff could seek review 
of this decision in the Michigan Supreme 
Court. 
The plaintiff is represented by Jay 
Kaplan of the American Civil Liberties 
Union of Michigan. Anne Argiroff 
represents the defendant. ■
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts has granted in part and denied in part 
a summary judgment motion made 
by Shiver Jobs Corps Center and their 
employee Jamie Wilson in a sexual 
orientation discrimination case brought 
against them by a former employee in 
Griffin v. Adams & Assocs. Of Nevada, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83760, 2016 WL 
3580613 (D. Mass., June 28, 2016).
William Griffin, an overnight center 
shift manager at Shriver’s business in 
Devens, Massachusetts, alleged that 
starting in February 2012, when Wilson 
was made his supervisor, Wilson began 
to make discriminatory statements 
at or regarding him. In April 2012, 
Griffin wrote to Human Resources and 
an investigation into the claims was 
made. Months later, Griffin received 
a disciplinary letter for not being in 
the area to which he was assigned and 
shortly thereafter he wrote a second 
letter to Human Resources raising 
sexual orientation discrimination 
issues. Following an investigation that 
resulted in no findings of discriminatory 
conduct, Wilson allegedly became very 
upset and stated to Griffin that she 
was “protected” and would see that 
“everything that needs to happen to 
[him] happens to [him]” and later made 
graphic comments to Griffin regarding 
his conduct “in the bathroom and with 
other gay men.” Upon returning to 
work after several months on leave, 
Griffin found Wilson was no longer his 
supervisor but now a peer, and found 
that a photo of him and his boyfriend 
was damaged and in the trash. Griffin’s 
performance was subsequently found to 
be below acceptable standards and he 
was placed in a corrective action plan. 
One evening, Griffin was suspected 
of being intoxicated at work and it is 
disputed whether coworkers later found 
Griffin at a bar consuming an alcoholic 
beverage. Griffin was shortly thereafter 
terminated.
Griffin sued in state court asserting 
claims under Massachusetts’ Law against 
Discrimination and 42 U.S.C. Section 
1983. Defendants removed the case to 
federal court and secured dismissal of 
the federal claim. Defendants moved for 
summary judgment on all of Griffin’s 
state claims for unlawful hostile work 
environment and retaliation. 
District Court Judge Denise Casper 
ruled on the motion for summary 
judgment on June 28. A preliminary 
issue was whether Griffin’s claims were 
timely pursuant to Massachusetts law 
requiring a claim be brought within 300 
days of discriminatory conduct. Judge 
Casper ruled that Griffin had failed to 
link earlier discriminatory acts under the 
“continuing violation doctrine” because 
he failed to establish that no reasonable 
person would have refrained from filing 
a complaint during the limitations 
period when Griffin had written a fifteen 
page letter to management outlining the 
discrimination he believed he had faced, 
and therefore he could not have had 
“good reason to believe” that the issues 
he encountered would cease.
With respect to Griffin’s hostile work 
environment claim, Judge Casper noted 
that conduct outside the 300 days, while 
not actionable, could still be considered 
for background on the overall situation. 
Judge Casper found that since the alleged 
discriminatory acts against Griffin were 
more than “garden-variety expletives or 
annoyances,” a reasonable fact-finder 
could find they were motivated because 
of gender stereotypes or Griffin’s sexual 
orientation. She further ruled that the 
conduct may be found to be sufficiently 
severe or pervasive and that therefore 
triable issues of fact existed. 
With respect to Griffin’s retaliation 
claim, there was no question that 
Griffin engaged in protected conduct 
by writing a letter alleging the 
discriminatory conduct, and that he 
was eventually terminated; however, 
Griffin and defendants disagreed as to 
whether there was a causal connection 
between his protected conduct and 
the reason for his termination. Judge 
Casper noted that while the nine 
months between Griffin’s letter and his 
termination did tend to undermine any 
casual connection, Griffin also relied 
on “alleged discriminatory conduct he 
was subjected to after his complaints 
and the allegedly unjustified citations 
for poor performance.” Noting that 
on the evening Griffin was allegedly 
intoxicated at work defendants did not 
send Griffin to the hospital for a drug and/
or alcohol test as was company policy, 
Judge Casper relied on a Massachusetts 
Supreme Court case ruling that “failure 
to follow established procedures or 
criteria . . . may support a reasonable 
inference of intentional discrimination.” 
She further noted that while those 
who made the final determination to 
terminate Griffin did not know of his 
prior complaints, the decision was made 
on the recommendation of a supervisor 
to whom he had made his earliest 
complaint, and that fact coupled with 
the failure to have him take an alcohol 
test as well as Wilson’s threats following 
the discrimination investigation were 
“sufficient to raise a reasonable inference 
of pretext.” Accordingly, Judge Casper 
denied summary judgment against 
Griffin.
Having found that conduct prior to 
September 2012 was not actionable, 
Judge Casper granted defendants’ 
summary judgment with respect to 
“liability regarding discriminatory acts 
prior to September 22, 2012,” and denied 
defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment on Griffin’s hostile work 
environment and retaliation claims.  
– Bryan Johnson-Xenitelis
Massachusetts Gay Man’s Workplace Discrimination Case 
Survives Summary Judgment
Griffin alleged Wilson made discriminatory 
statements at or regarding him. 
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When the Justice Department filed suit against North Carolina for a declaration that 
H.B.2’s bathroom provision violates 
the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA), it put into play a provision of 
that statute, 42 U.S.C. sec. 13925(b)(13)
(c), which provides that upon the filing 
of a civil action “alleging a pattern 
or practice of discriminatory conduct 
on the basis of sex in any program or 
activity of a State government or unit 
of local government which receives 
funds made available under [VAWA], 
and the conduct allegedly violates 
the provisions of [VAWA] and neither 
party within forty-five days after 
such filing has been granted such 
preliminary relief with regard to the 
suspension or payment of funds as 
may be otherwise available by law, the 
Office of Justice Programs shall cause 
to have suspended further payment of 
any funds under this chapter to that 
specific program or activity alleged by 
the Attorney General to be in violation 
of the provisions of [VAWA] until such 
time as the court orders resumption 
of payment.” In other words, federal 
funding for a variety of rape prevention 
and domestic violence programs in 
North Carolina that depend on federal 
funds under VAWA would have to be 
suspended 45 days after May 10. 
For a while nobody was really 
paying attention to this, but suddenly 
somebody woke up to the reality that 
before the end of June the federal 
money would stop flowing to these 
programs unless the court issued a 
preliminary injunction to keep the 
money flowing. United States v. State 
of North Carolina, 2016 WL 3561726 
(M.D.N.C., June 23, 2016). The State 
and the Justice Department quickly 
reached an agreement to ask the federal 
court to issue such a preliminary 
injunction, which District Judge 
Thomas Schroeder did on June 23. 
However, Judge Schroeder agonized 
through a rather lengthy opinion trying 
to explain how such an injunction could 
be issued when the state failed to show 
that it was likely to prevail on the merits 
of the underlying issue: whether the 
bathroom provisions of H.B. 2 violate 
the VAWA, as alleged by the Justice 
Department. Alone among the statutes 
cited by DOJ in its complaint, VAWA 
actually explicitly defines its ban on 
discrimination “because of sex” to 
include discrimination because of 
gender identity; on top of that, of course, 
the 4th Circuit has already ruled in G.G. 
v. Gloucester County School Board, 
822 F.3d 709 (April 19, 2016), rehearing 
en banc denied (May 31), that the ban 
on sex discrimination in Title IX (and 
by analogy Title VII), also cited in the 
complaint, includes a ban on gender 
identity discrimination. 
The state is arguing, without 
much credibility, that the bathroom 
provision does not discriminate 
against transgender people, “merely” 
requiring them to use single-gender 
facilities or facilities consistent with 
their biological sex as specified on 
their birth certificate when they need 
a bathroom. In a summary judgment 
motion subsequently filed on July 5, 
DOJ blasted that contention out of the 
water, but, of course, that motion hadn’t 
been filed yet when Judge Schroeder 
had to decide before a statutory 
deadline for suspending funding that 
would hit on June 23. 
Ultimately, he concluded that even 
though preliminary injunctive relief 
normally depends on a strong showing 
that the defendant is likely to prevail on 
the merits, there is no controlling 4th 
Circuit precedent that would prevent 
him from issuing the jointly-requested 
injunction in light of the practical 
consequences of cutting off federal 
funding for these important programs 
for the duration of the litigation. While 
pointing out that lack of a showing 
of likelihood of success “is normally 
fatal to any request for a preliminary 
injunction,” this was not the usual 
case. “With the consent of all parties, 
however,” he wrote, “courts sometimes 
enter preliminary injunctions without 
any findings regarding the likelihood 
of success on the merits . . . The Fourth 
Circuit has acknowledged this practice 
without comment.”
In stating his decision to grant 
the injunction, he wrote: “The 
court does so particularly mindful 
of how the entrenched positions of 
the parties would otherwise likely 
inflict substantial harm on innocent 
third parties if VAWA funding 
were to be suspended. As the 
parties acknowledge, the continued 
operation of rape crisis centers and 
the other VAWA-funded programs 
unquestionably serves the public 
interest. The court is also cognizant, 
however, that if the allegations of the 
complaint are correct, maintenance of 
the status quo will continue to inflict 
harm on transgender individuals under 
enforcement of the law.” He cautioned 
that by agreeing to allow funding for 
these programs to continue, neither 
party was making any representation 
“as to any other party’s likelihood of 
success on the merits. As a result, the 
entry of this preliminary injunction 
shall not prejudice the parties’ positions 
in this case or further findings by the 
court.”
Presumably, if Judge Schroeder 
were to grant the DOJ’s motion for 
preliminary injunction that was filed 
on July 5, the State would have to cease 
enforcing H.B.2’s bathroom provision 
while the litigation continued, and thus 
the flow of federal money would no 
longer be endangered. Since the G.G. 
ruling by the 4th Circuit intimated, 
if not actually holding, that schools 
receiving federal funds from the 
Education Department might have 
to let transgender students access 
bathrooms consistent with their gender 
identity, chances do not look good for 
the State to succeed in defeating DOJ’s 
motion for preliminary injunction. ■
Federal Court Agrees to Let VAWA Funding in North 
Carolina to Continue During Pendency of H.B. 2 Lawsuit
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To prove an Eighth Amendment claim of denial of health care, a prisoner must show both a 
serious medical need and “deliberate 
indifference” to that need. Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1977).  The 
“deliberate indifference” element includes 
a subjective inquiry into the correctional 
defendants’ state of mind, Farmer v. 
Brennan, 522 U.S. 825, 837 (1994), 
on the shoals of which many inmate 
plaintiffs founder.  But only rarely does 
a court allow direct inquiry into a health 
care providers’ state of mind.
In Sunderland v. Suffolk County, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77212 
(E.D.N.Y., June 14, 2016), U.S. 
Magistrate Judge A. Kathleen 
Tomlinson ordered Suffolk County, 
New York, jail officials to search 
their personal computers for evidence 
of what they were thinking when 
they denied hormonal treatment to 
transgender inmate Jeremy Sunderland. 
While the opinion is light on medical 
background, it recites that jail officials 
failed to continue pre-incarceration 
hormone treatment (or any other 
transgender treatment) for Sunderland 
during 16 months she was at the jail, 
because they deemed it “non-essential” 
or “frivolous.”  The complaint includes 
a claim against Suffolk County under 
Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City 
of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), alleging 
a failure in training and supervision 
of providers of care for transgender 
patients and an attitude of “let the next 
correctional facility” deal with it. 
Judge Tomlinson granted a motion 
to compel discovery of the providers’ 
computerized business and personal 
e-mails and hard drive information 
according to a list of agreed search 
terms that included gender dysphoria, 
gender identity, transgender status, 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, homosexual 
and sexual preference, as well as more 
colloquial words or phrases, such as 
“tranny, trannie, trannies, she-male, 
transvestite, queer, cross-dress . . . , 
hermaphrodite, he-she, [and] she-he.” 
She allowed a “look-back” period of 
five years. “The Court concludes that 
Plaintiff has the right to pursue emails 
and other correspondence the Individual 
Defendants may have created/saved 
on their personal computers or sent 
from their personal email accounts 
which reference Plaintiff or discuss 
issues related to gender dysphoria. This 
information falls within the broad scope 
of relevant discovery under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) in light 
of Plaintiff’s allegations against the 
Individual Defendants and her Monell 
claim against the County.”
The decision surveys several 
federal decisions from the Second 
Circuit and from District Courts 
in New York allowing discovery 
of personal computer information 
“which may contain information 
going to bias or motivation” and “may 
support Plaintiff’s claims of deliberate 
indifference” – noting in particular 
the Eighth Amendment state of mind 
cases Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 
698, 704 (2d Cir. 1998); and Hathaway 
v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 
1996).
Judge Tomlinson did not require 
production of the computers themselves, 
nor did she order a “forensic 
inspection”; but she reminded counsel 
that they were “obliged to supervise and 
oversee the search for and production 
of electronically stored information 
and documents from the Individual 
Defendants’ computers and email 
accounts. Simply handing over the search 
terms to the Individual Defendants to 
run on their own is not sufficient.” 
Citing Greene v. Netsmart 
Technologies, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 59710, 2011 WL 2225004, 
at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2011), report 
and recommendation adopted, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59730, 2011 WL 
2193399 (E.D.N.Y. June 2, 2011), 
Judge Tomlinson observed: “[C]
ounsel is responsible for coordinating 
her client’s discovery efforts[,] both 
in terms of the client’s duty to locate 
relevant information and the client’s 
duty to preserve and timely produce 
that information.” The Court required 
individual affidavits if no responsive 
documents were found and in camera 
inspection for any documents deemed 
“private,” accompanied by a “cover 
letter setting forth the asserted privilege 
for each document.”
Such broad judicial leave to explore 
bias is uncommon in prison medical 
care cases in this writer’s experience. 
Perhaps the court was persuaded in 
part by the allegations of such recent 
and cavalier handling of a transgender 
patient in a major jail. The case is useful 
for those contemplating discovery of 
defendants’ LGBT bias in civil rights 
cases generally. 
Sunderland is represented by David 
Bradley Shanies and by Hughes 
Hubbard & Reed, LLP, New York City. 
– William J. Rold
William J. Rold is a civil rights 
attorney in New York City and a former 
judge. He previously represented the 
American Bar Association on the 
National Commission for Correctional 
Health Care.
Federal Magistrate Orders Jail Officials’ Personal E-Mail 
Searched for Evidence of Transphobic Bias in Medical Case
Judge Tomlinson did not require production 
of the computers themselves, nor did she 
order a “forensic inspection.”
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U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff ruled on pending pre-trial motions in Cruz v. Zucker, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 87072, 2016 WL 3660763 
(S.D.N.Y., July 5, 2016), a lawsuit 
brought by a team of public interest and 
pro bono lawyers challenging the way 
New York’s Medicaid program provides 
or withholds coverage for gender 
transition medications and procedures. 
Most significantly, he granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs on their claim 
that a Medicaid regulation’s categorical 
ban on “cosmetic surgery” in connection 
with gender transition violates the 
requirement under Medicaid to fund 
medically necessary treatment. 
The named plaintiffs are four 
transgender individuals suing “on 
behalf of themselves and all others 
similarly situated.” The lawsuit targets 
both the exclusion of coverage for 
gender reassignment surgery and 
hormone therapy for individuals 
under age 18 and the regulation that 
imposes, according to Judge Rakoff’s 
interpretation, “a blanket ban on 
coverage of cosmetic procedures 
related to gender dysphoria,” including 
procedures that plaintiff contends are 
“medically necessary” as part of a 
gender transition process. 
Judge Rakoff had previously ruled 
in favor of class certification last year 
in Cruz v. Zucker, 116 F. Supp. 3d 334 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). The named defendant, 
Howard Zucker, the Commissioner 
of the New York State Department of 
Health (DOH), which administers the 
Medicaid program, asked the court to 
reconsider its prior decision against 
dismissal of the cosmetic surgery claim, 
contending that the program does not 
actually have a “blanket ban” because 
it has occasionally approved coverage 
for particular procedures on a case-by-
case basis, but Judge Rakoff concluded 
that regardless of whatever steps 
the department was taking to make 
exceptions, the written regulation is, 
as he previously construed it, a blanket 
ban, and denied that motion, because 
the overriding federal Medicaid 
statute requires coverage of “medically 
necessary” treatments for Medicaid-
eligible individuals. 
The defendant also sought 
decertification of the plaintiff class, 
arguing that individual issues presented 
by each transgender Medicaid participant 
predominate over common issues, 
making one big class inappropriate. 
The defendant argued that none of the 
named plaintiffs could represent the full 
range of issues presented by everybody 
in the proposed class. Rakoff denied 
this motion as well, finding that it would 
be appropriate to create “subclasses” to 
deal with different aspects of the case, 
but that there were enough common 
questions of law among all class 
members to justify retaining the full 
class certification. 
Both parties filed motions for 
summary judgment, which are 
supposed to be granted if there are no 
material factual issues requiring trial 
and it is appropriate to rule as a matter 
of law in favor of the moving party. 
The defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment argued that the plaintiffs lack 
standing to challenge the law. While 
Judge Rakoff agreed that some of the 
named class plaintiffs lacked standing 
because they had actually obtained 
coverage for requested services, and 
granted summary judgment as to them, 
he found that this was not true as to all 
of them or the entire class, so refused 
to grant summary judgment on the 
ultimate issues in the case. 
As to the merits, Rakoff granted 
the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment on the claim that a blanket 
exclusion of coverage for cosmetic 
surgery regardless of medical necessity 
violates the Medicaid statute. For some, 
this will be the big news coming out of 
this decision, since the categorical ban 
in the regulation presented a substantial 
barrier to individuals seeking coverage 
of all the procedures they and their 
doctors deemed necessary to a full, 
successful transition.
However, as to the issue of providing 
therapy for minors, Judge Rakoff 
concluded that there are significant 
material factual disputes that would 
preclude a complete summary judgment, 
although partial summary judgment in 
favor of defendants was appropriate. 
This claim naturally fell into two 
distinct categories: hormone therapy 
and surgical procedures. The judge 
ordered that the case proceed to trial on 
contested factual issues. Significantly, 
he found that some of the materials 
upon which the defendant was relying 
for its position should be excluded as 
hearsay. As to what remains for trial, 
he wrote: “This case will proceed to 
trial to determine (1) what treatments 
are medically necessary for individuals 
under 18 with gender dysphoria and (2) 
to what extend DOH has consistently 
followed a bona fide policy of limiting 
coverage of drug uses to those listed in 
the Medicaid Compendia [an official 
publication of federally-approved uses 
for drugs] in the context of treatments 
for gender dysphoria.” If hormone 
therapy and/or surgery are determined 
to be medically necessary for at least 
some members of the under-18 class, 
then a blanket rule against them 
violates the statute. The second issue 
is important because the governing 
Medicaid statute does not generally 
require coverage for the administration 
of drugs that are not in the Medicaid 
Compendia for the uses described 
therein (which greatly oversimplifies 
the disputed issue), and there is a lively 
dispute whether particular drugs should 
or should not be covered in the context 
of gender dysphoria therapy. 
The bottom line, then, is that DOH 
cannot impose a blanket exclusion for 
what it labels “cosmetic treatments” in 
connection with gender dysphoria for 
adults, and yet to be determined is the 
extent to which DOH can deny coverage 
for transition-related treatments for 
minors. 
Plaintiffs are represented by 
attorneys from the Legal Aid Society 
and the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, as 
well as attorneys working pro bono 
from various private firms and some 
solo practitioners. The New York 
Attorney General’s Office represents 
the Department of Health. ■
Federal Court Rules New York Medicaid Must Cover Medically 
Necessary Cosmetic Surgery for Gender Transitions
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On June 22, 2016 the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione) 
rendered an important judgment 
regarding the possibility, for a person in a 
same-sex relationship, to adopt the child 
of her partner. The ruling’s importance 
lies in the fact that it addresses a matter 
– stepparent adoption in the context of a 
same-sex couples – that was expressly 
excluded from the scope of the recent 
civil union statute approved by the 
Parliament (Act on Same-Sex Civil 
Unions and De Facto Partnerships 
(Law No. 71/2016, Official Journal No. 
118 of May 21, 2016, commented upon 
in 2016 LGBT Law Notes 226).
The petition to the Supreme 
Court was introduced by the public 
prosecutor (Procuratore Generale della 
Repubblica) against a co-mother who 
had sought to adopt the child of her 
same-sex partner. In the first instance, 
the Juvenile Tribunal of Rome (No. 
299/14 of July 30, 2014, commented 
upon in 2014 Lesbian/Gay Law Notes 
425) granted the petition, arguing that 
under the current law, sexual orientation 
is not a factor that could prevent such 
an adoption, and that the applicant 
was simply seeking to consolidate, 
from a legal standpoint, a situation 
that already existed as a matter of fact. 
Moreover, the Tribunal found that the 
child had developed a genuine bond 
with the applicant, so that the adoption 
could in no way harm the child. Upon 
appeal presented by the juvenile public 
prosecutor, the Court of Appeals of 
Rome affirmed the ruling (Procuratore 
della Repubblica presso il Tribunale dei 
Minori v. X, Dec. 23, 2015), concluding 
that stepparent adoption was a viable 
tool for same-sex couples to create a 
legal relationship between the biological 
parent’s same-sex partner and her child 
in absence of any statutory recognition.
The application filed by the public 
prosecutor with the Supreme Court 
concerned two arguments, plus a third 
one that was added in the course of the 
hearing. The prosecutor claimed, in 
particular, that there was a conflict of 
interest between the second mother and 
the child, as the former was attempting 
to create a relationship of a couple of the 
same sex that was by definition against 
the best interest of the latter. Second, 
she argued that the Court of Appeals 
had erred in granting the stepparent 
adoption, as the law requires child 
abandonment as a legal precondition for 
all kinds of adoption. Further, because 
of its ethical implications, the prosecutor 
asked the petition to be adjudicated en 
banc (i.e., before the entire Supreme 
Court, the so-called “Sezioni Unite”, as 
opposed to a single panel or “Sezione”).
The Supreme Court rejected all these 
claims and elaborated some principles 
to direct lower courts presented with 
petitions for same-sex stepchild adoption. 
First, the Court stated that hearing a 
case en banc is a purely discretionary 
decision which the Court is therefore 
not obliged to take depending on the 
case’s alleged ethical implications. “The 
Court of Cassation,” the Court said, 
“has already decided through single 
panels on questions related to socially or 
ethically significant matters.” Second, 
it stressed that the case at stake did 
not concern surrogacy, because the 
biological mother (the respondent’s 
partner) had recognized the child at 
her birth. This statement would exclude 
that the same plain reasoning could 
be applied to a couple of men seeking 
stepparent adoption of a child born from 
a surrogacy abroad, even if the Tribunal 
of Rome has already recognized such 
an adoption (Juv. Trib. Rome, Dec. 23, 
2015). Third, the Court excluded that 
a conflict of interest could exist in the 
case, as the respondent was simply 
seeking to consolidate a relationship 
that already existed as a matter of fact. 
In this regard, the Court clarified that 
any evaluation of such a conflict of 
interest is a matter for lower courts to 
decide on the merits, not the Supreme 
Court. Finally, it rejected the claim that 
stepparent adoption requires the child’s 
abandonment as a precondition for 
adoption. In fact, the Law on Adoption 
of 1983 (Law No. 184 of May 4, 1983, 
Right of the Minor to a Family) provides 
for a residual mechanism, the so-called 
“adoption in particular cases”, which 
requires only that pre-adoption foster 
care not be feasible.For same-sex 
couples, foster care is by definition not 
feasible because the child already has a 
parent – the biological one.
At the end of the ruling the Supreme 
Court stated very clearly that, in the 
context of adoption in particular cases, 
courts may not consider the parent(s)’s 
sexual orientation to be relevant, either 
directly or indirectly. The judiciary 
made a point that the legislature hasn’t 
even dared to take with the new law. – 
Matteo M. Winkler 
Matteo M. Winkler is an Assistant Pro-
fessor in the Tax & Law Department at 
HEC Paris.
Italian Supreme Court Allows Stepparent Adoption for Same-Sex 
Couples
The Court of Appeals of Rome concluded 
that stepparent adoption was a viable 
tool for same-sex couples to create a legal 
relationship between the biological parent’s 
same-sex partner and her child in absence of 
any statutory recognition.
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The Appeals Court of Massachusetts ruled in Commonwealth v. Christie, 2016 WL 3581839, 
2016 Mass. App. LEXIS 79 (July 6, 
2016), that the conviction of a man 
on charges of statutory rape, indecent 
assault and battery on a boy had to be 
reversed because of improper evidence 
based on the defendant’s possession 
of videos depicting “generic same-
sex sex” involving adults. At the 
same time, the court affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction on a charge of 
“dissemination to a minor of matter 
harmful to minors” for showing his 
12-year-old male victim a pornographic 
video.
In 2005, wrote Judge Rubin, Daniel 
“disclosed to his mother and the police 
a single alleged act of the defendant 
performing oral sex on him, and on that 
basis the defendant was charged with 
one count of statutory rape. On the eve 
of trial, in 2007, Daniel disclosed to the 
district attorney and the police all the 
other alleged sex acts.” Police obtained 
a search warrant for the defendant’s 
residence, and turned up DVDs and 
videotapes depicting both heterosexual 
and homosexual pornography depicting 
adults. At trial, Daniel testified that 
during the summer of 2005, when he was 
12, he and his mother were living with 
the defendant, who twice performed 
oral sex on him and got him to penetrate 
the defendant anally. He also testified 
about waiting in the car while defendant 
purchased a “sex toy” (i.e., a dildo) and 
some pornographic DVDs, and that the 
defendant “inserted the sex toy into 
Daniel’s anus, stopping when Daniel 
said he was ‘uncomfortable.’” Daniel 
also testified that defendant showed 
him some gay pornography depicting 
men having intercourse. 
The court described the defendant 
as “openly gay.” Referring to rulings 
at trial on admissibility of the 
pornography evidence, “the judge 
concluded correctly that evidence of 
a man’s homosexuality is irrelevant 
to whether he has a sexual interest in 
children,” wrote Judge Peter J. Rubin, 
“but in part in reliance on our decision 
in Commonwealth v. Wallace, 70 Mass. 
App. Ct. 757 (2007), he concluded that 
the same-sex pornography was relevant 
to the defendant’s sexual interest in 
Daniel and to the manner and means 
by which the charged rapes and sexual 
assault were allegedly committed, 
that the risk of unfair prejudice from 
this evidence did not substantially 
outweigh its probative value, and that 
with a proper limiting instruction 
the videotapes could be admitted in 
evidence. The judge excluded the 
heterosexual pornography.” As an 
attempt to lessen prejudice to the 
defendant, the trial judge refused to 
have the gay pornography exhibited 
to the jury, instead allowing the 
prosecution to introduce testimony 
describing its content.
The appeals court disagreed with 
the trial judge as to admissibility of 
the descriptions of the gay videos. 
While agreeing with the prosecution 
that “these descriptions were not 
introduced as impermissible propensity 
evidence” and that the judge had 
carefully instructed the jury that “the 
challenged evidence could not be 
used to demonstrate the defendant’s 
propensity to engage in such conduct 
in order to prove that he committed the 
charged acts in this case,” nonetheless 
it was improper for the judge to tell 
the jury that they could rely on these 
descriptions of the videotapes as 
evidence of “sexual interest and state of 
mind . . . as it relates to [Daniel] and 
as it relates to the manner and means 
by which the Defendant allegedly 
accomplished the alleged sexual 
assault.” While the Wallace case had 
allowed admission of heterosexual 
pornography, the court found the 
circumstances distinguishable in light 
of the contentions of the parties and the 
overall state of the evidence in that case. 
“As the judge in this case recognized, 
however,” wrote Judge Rubin, “and 
as this court has held, evidence of an 
adult’s homosexuality is irrelevant to 
sexual interest in children.” Rubin cited 
on this point the appeals court’s ruling 
in 2009 setting aside the conviction of 
Bernard Baran, a young man who was 
convicted of molesting children at the 
day care center where he work based on 
subsequently-discredited “rehearsed” 
testimony by young children and by 
the fact that he was openly gay. (Baran 
was discharged from state prison after 
a lengthy and debilitating incarceration 
and died prematurely a few years later.) 
Once again citing the Baran ruling 
(74 Mass. App. Ct. 256), Rubin wrote, 
“the myth that homosexual men 
have an interest in sex with underage 
children has been discredited. The use 
of evidence of an adult’s homosexuality 
to demonstrate a sexual interest in 
underage boys (or, indeed, underage 
children of either gender) is thus 
impermissible. Given this, we agree 
with the defendant that evidence of 
his interest in viewing depictions of 
adult males engaged in generic acts 
Massachusetts Appeals Court Vacates Statutory Rape Conviction 
Because of Improper Admission of Gay Porn in Evidence
“As the judge in this case recognized, however,” 
wrote Judge Rubin, “and as this court has 
held, evidence of an adult’s homosexuality is 
irrelevant to sexual interest in children.” 
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of same-sex sex, absent any additional 
factors like the ones present in 
Wallace, is irrelevant to whether he 
has an interest in sexual contact with 
an underage boy. The impropriety of 
admitting this evidence to show the 
defendant’s state of mind and sexual 
interest with respect to boys becomes 
clear if one imagines that the evidence 
was about heterosexual pornography 
and the victim were a girl. No court 
properly could find a defendant’s 
mere possession of adult heterosexual 
pornography relevant to proving his 
sexual interest in a female child.”
“The ingrained stereotypes and 
mistaken views still held by some 
individuals render evidence such as that 
introduced here unfairly prejudicial. 
Even though there was other evidence 
that the defendant here, who never 
disputed his sexual orientation, was 
gay, and that he owned pornography, 
the error in the admission of the explicit 
descriptions of his interest in same-sex 
sex, exacerbated by the instruction on 
its permissible use, was prejudicial.” 
The court concluded that reversal 
was required on all counts except 
dissemination, “with respect to which 
the jury were expressly informed they 
could not use this evidence.” 
Since retrial was likely, the court 
addressed other flaws in the trial court’s 
instructions. The jury had been told 
they could take the descriptions into 
account “as it relates to the manner 
and means by which the defendant 
allegedly accomplished the alleged 
sexual assaults.” Judge Rubin rejected 
the prosecution’s argument that the 
acts depicted in the videos were 
“unique enough” to “show that the 
defendant had an interest in engaging 
in those acts, whether with an adult or 
a child.” This was “generic” gay porn, 
the judge pointed out, “the ordinary 
means of men having same-sex sex. It 
follows from our holding above that, 
standing alone, an interest in viewing 
lawfully possessed depictions of adult 
men having gay sex is not relevant to 
the question whether a male adult has 
an interest in engaging in sex acts of 
that kind with underage boys, just as, 
standing along, an interest in viewing 
lawfully possessed depictions of adults 
engaged in heterosexual sex cannot 
support a conclusion that a male adult 
has an interest in engaging in sex acts 
of the same kind with underage girls.”
Judge Rubin also commented that 
because it was “undisputed” that the 
videos seized by the police in 2007 were 
not shown to Daniel by the defendant 
in 2005, they could not be admitted in 
support of a theory that the defendant 
showed him the videos to “groom him” 
into accepting the idea of having sex with 
the defendant. “Any such corroborating 
value of the defendant’s possession of 
these videotapes of generic acts of adult 
same-sex sex – at a different residence, 
two years after the crimes are alleged to 
have been committed – is too attenuated 
to overcome the risk of undue prejudice 
from this evidence,” he wrote. “These 
depictions thus may not be admitted for 
such a corroborative purpose under the 
applicable standard.” 
One of the videos seized by the 
police showed the use of a dildo, and 
one of the counts of statutory rape 
“involves an allegation of the use of such 
a device in a similar manner on Daniel,” 
wrote Rubin. However, he wrote, the 
prosecutor “has not put any evidence 
in the record before us to show that use 
of a sex toy is a sufficiently distinctive 
sexual act that it could be admitted to 
show the defendant’s specific interest in 
this practice . . . There is nothing in the 
record to support a conclusion that this 
conduct is so unusual that the probative 
value of evidence that the defendant 
possessed a visual depiction of it is more 
probative of his interest in engaging in 
it than unfairly prejudicial. Nor is there 
evidence that interest in the use of 
such a sex toy with an adult would be 
probative of an individual’s interest in 
using one with an underage child with 
whom he was unlawfully having sex.”
The court disclaimed expressing 
any view about the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence, but held that the statutory 
rape convictions must be reversed 
and the verdicts set aside, although, 
as noted above, the conviction on the 
dissemination charge was affirmed. 
Alexei Tymoczko represented the 
defendant on this appeal. ■
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ALABAMA – The Alabama Court of 
the Judiciary has acceded to a request 
by suspended Alabama Chief Justice 
Roy Moore to hold a hearing on his 
motion to dismiss ethical charges 
that were levied against him by the 
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission 
in response to complaints that he had 
violated judicial ethics by advising 
probate judges not to issue marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples after 
the U.S. Supreme Court had ruled in 
Obergefell that same-sex couples have 
a constitutional right to marry. Moore 
contends that the directive he issued was 
merely informing the probate judges 
of his opinion about the situation; he 
consistently took the view that the 
state courts, including the probate 
judges, were not bound by federal court 
rulings when it came to interpreting 
and enforcing the provisions of the state 
constitution, including its ban on same-
sex marriage. The hearing will take 
place on August 8. Meanwhile, Moore 
has filed a federal lawsuit, contesting the 
constitutionality of Alabama’s judicial 
disciplinary system, under which he 
was automatically suspended when the 
JIC asserted the charge against him. He 
is represented in the federal lawsuit by 
Alliance Defense Freedom, the right-
wing anti-gay litigation group that is 
also representing another member of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, Tom Parker, 
who has been notified that the JIC is 
investigating him for public comments 
he made about same-sex marriage. Oral 
arguments on JIC’s motion to dismiss 
the federal case, pending before U.S. 
District Judge W. Harold Albritton III, 
will be held on August 4. Moore was 
previously removed as Chief Justice 
in 2003 after he defied a federal court 
order to remove a Ten Commandments 
monument from the state supreme court 
building, but he was subsequently re-
elected by the people of Alabama, who 
evidently prize spunk over judgment 
in their Supreme Court justices. 
Huntsville Times, June 29. * * * The 
Associated Press reported on July 16 
that the Judicial Inquiry Commission 
had filed papers with the Court of 
Judiciary arguing that Moore should 
be removed as Chief Justice in order to 
“preserve the integrity, independence, 
impartiality of Alabama’s judiciary.” 
The Commission asserted that Moore 
had “disrespected the judiciary” by 
instructing probate judges in January 
2016 that a state injunction against 
same-sex marriage remained in “full 
force and effect” even though the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled in June 2015 that 
same-sex couples have a constitutional 
right to marry and a U.S. District Court 
had issued an order to probate judges 
banning enforcement of the state’s 
same-sex marriage ban. * * * The 
Associated Press (June 17) reported 
that Alabama Supreme Court Justice 
Tom Parker filed a lawsuit in federal 
district court, claiming that the Judicial 
Inquiry Commission is violated the 
First Amendment rights of Alabama 
judges to speak out against the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s marriage equality 
decision. The Southern Poverty Law 
Center filed a complaint before the 
Commission against Parker after 
he spoke out against the Obergefell 
decision on a conservative radio talk 
show in 2015. He is represented by 
Mat Staver of Liberty Counsel, who 
asserts that Parker “has a constitutional 
right to speak out on the case so long 
as he is not presently presiding over 
it.” Parker’s lawsuit challenges the 
“automatic suspension” provision, 
under which judges are suspended from 
active duty if the Commission decides 
to investigate charges against them.  
ALABAMA – Is the Alabama marriage 
equality case finally at an end? On 
June 7, Senior U.S. District Judge Callie 
V. S. Granade denied a motion by Judge 
Don Davis to withdraw as defendant 
class representative and a motion by 
Attorney General Luther Strange to 
dismiss the case as moot; instead, she 
granted plaintiffs’ motion for permanent 
injunction and final judgment in 
Strawser v. Strange, 2016 WL 3199523 
(S.D. Alabama). She found no evidence 
in the record to justify reconsidering 
her prior decision to designate Davis 
as the defendant class representative. 
Responding to the mootness argument, 
in which Attorney General Strange 
conceded that Obergefell v. Hodges is 
binding on Alabama officials – a point 
not yet conceded by suspended Alabama 
Supreme Court Justice Roy Moore, who 
maintains that Obergefell is binding 
only on the states of the 6th Circuit – she 
found persuasive the plaintiffs’ argument 
that “none of the Defendants’ assurances 
provide Plaintiffs or the members 
of the Plaintiff Class with a formal, 
enforceable order should the Attorney 
General (or a future Attorney General) 
or other Defendants violate this Court’s 
injunction or fail to fully recognize 
marriages validly entered into in 
Alabama or elsewhere. Current or future 
state and county officials may disagree 
about Obergefell’s applicability to the 
challenged Alabama laws or otherwise 
resist the decision. This Court agrees 
that the need for a permanent injunction 
is clear.” She quoted from a similar 
ruling by the district court in Florida in 
Brenner v. Scott, stating “a government 
ordinarily cannot establish mootness 
just by promising to sin no more.” “To 
demonstrate the case is moot,” she 
wrote, “Defendants must show that both 
of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(1) it can be said with assurance that 
there is no reasonable expectation that 
the alleged violation will recur, and (2) 
interim relief or events have completely 
and irrevocably eradicated the effects of 
the alleged violation.” Those conditions 
have not been met in Alabama, she 
found. “Given the actions of Alabama 
state and local officials during this 
litigation, both before and after the 
Supreme Court decided Obergefell, 
it cannot be said with assurance that 
there is no reasonable expectation that 
Alabama’s unconstitutional marriage 
laws will not again be enforced. 
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Although the Attorney General 
professes that he will continue to abide 
by the decision in Obergefell, like the 
defendant in Brenner v. Scott, ‘there 
has been nothing voluntary about 
the defendants’ change of tack.’ The 
Defendants defended this case with 
vigor from the outset and the challenged 
statutes remain on the books.” She 
pointed out the technicality that these 
plaintiffs cannot enforce the injunction 
that she issued in the companion case of 
Searcy v. Strange, which is the injunction 
against the Attorney General, and, “It is 
also apparent that certain Alabama state 
courts do not view this Court’s ruling 
in Searcy as binding precedent, as 
demonstrated by the writ of mandamus 
issued by the Alabama Supreme Court 
on March 3, 2015, requiring probate 
judges to discontinue the issuance of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.” 
So there, Roy Moore, your antics 
have helped to prevent Strange from 
obtaining a mootness dismissal! She 
also pointed out that although Moore 
is currently suspended, other members 
of the Alabama Supreme Court in 
concurring opinions “also expressed 
disagreement with Obergefell” and 
implied in their opinions that their 
court’s decision finding the marriage 
laws constitutional was still in effect. 
As long as that mandamus order has 
not been rescinded, there is no certainty 
that Alabama officials will behave 
appropriately. Thus, Judge Granade 
issued a permanent injunction against 
enforcement of the unconstitutional 
statutes. 
ARKANSAS – Reuters reported July 5 
that the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit 
accusing a McDonald’s restaurant 
in Bentonville, Arkansas, of firing a 
worker because he is HIV-positive. 
EEOC v. Mathews Management Co., 
No. 16-05166 (W.D. Ark., filed July 1, 
2016). The complaint alleges violations 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
both in discharging the worker and 
in requiring employees to report their 
use of prescription medications which 
would reveal conditions deemed to be 
disabilities. The John Doe worker was 
hired in November 2014 to perform 
janitorial duties, operate a cash register, 
work the drive-thru window, and open 
and close the restaurant. Doe was not 
hired as a food handler. 
ARKANSAS – In Huff v. Regis 
Corporation, 2016 WL 3453471, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79925 (W.D. Ark., 
June 20, 2016), the plaintiff suffered 
dismissal of his Title VII and ADEA 
complaint because he waited too long 
after receiving a right-to-sue letter from 
the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission before filing his complaint 
in federal court. Robert Huff was 
employed as a stylist at a hair salon in 
Fayetteville from 1992 until he was 
discharged on January 13, 2015. In 
his EEOC charge he related a tale of 
ridicule and harassment focused on his 
sexual orientation and age that would 
possibly be sufficient to meet federal 
pleading requirements. However, the 
EEOC dismissed his charge and issued a 
right to sue letter on September 23, 2015. 
Huff then waiting until March 23, 2016, 
to file his pro se complaint in the federal 
district court, alleging discrimination 
and defamation. The employer moved 
to dismiss, asserting both causes of 
action were time-barred. Responding to 
the motion, Huff wrote: “I understand 
about the time limits clearly. It was a 
misjudgment to turn the EEOC Right 
to Sue letter in late.” But he argued his 
case should not be dismissed because, 
wrote District Judge Timothy L. Brooks, 
“he feels he has evidence to prove his 
case on the merits, and ‘everyone in the 
United States has a right to be heard 
in front of a judge and even a right to 
a fair trial.” But time limits are, after 
all, time limits, and Judge Brooks found 
that this case did not qualify for any 
of the exceptions for equitable tolling, 
either as to the Title VII/ADEA claims 
or the state law defamation claim. That 
the plaintiff is a lay person representing 
himself does not excuse failing to 
file within statutory deadlines. The 
discrimination statutes require that a 
claim be filed in federal court within 
90 days after the Right to Sue letter is 
received, and Arkansas slander claims 
must be filed within a year. 
CALIFORNIA – On June 27 Los 
Angeles County Superior Court Judge 
Ann I. Jones signed a settlement 
judgment in the coordinated actions 
of Werner v. Spark Networks, Inc. 
and Wright v. Spark Networks, Inc., 
Case No. JCCP4823, in which two 
gay men alleged that the defendant, 
the owner/operator of several dating 
websites (including, most prominently, 
ChristianMingle.com), was violating 
the Unruh Act, California’s public 
accommodations statute, by providing 
services that only made matches for 
different-sex couples. As part of the 
settlement, Spark must allow users of 
the websites to seek same-sex matches, 
and has up to 24 months to tailor the 
websites to enhance its receptiveness 
to same-sex searches. In the words of 
the judgment, “Spark represents and 
warrants that it is updating the Mingle 
Sites, and to the extent Spark continues 
to operate any of the Mingle Sites in 
the future, such sites will be updated to 
create an experience which will allow 
individuals seeking same sex partners 
to use Spark’s matching technologies to 
find and be matched with others seeking 
same sex partners. For all of Spark’s 
sites to remain operational, Spark will 
update them within 24 months of the 
date of this Judgement.” Prior to this 
settlement, those registering on the 
site had to identify themselves either 
as “man seeking woman” or “woman 
seeking man.” Messrs. Werner and 
Wright felt unfairly left out. Media 
comment focused on ChristianMingle.
com, and the intriguing idea that gay 
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Christians might be seeking religiously 
compatible mates. Wall Street Journal, 
June 30; Washington Post, July 7. 
CALIFORNIA – The 2nd District Court 
of Appeal, reversing a decision by 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
Judge Michael L. Stern, ruled on June 
27 that an employment discrimination 
plaintiff alleging, inter alia, sexual 
orientation discrimination in violation 
of California law, was required to 
submit his claim to binding arbitration. 
Urchasko v. Compass Airlines, 2016 
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4836, 2016 
WL 3597425. John Urchasko sought to 
avoid arbitration by claiming that when 
he filled out the on-line employment 
application he had failed to check a 
box acknowledging his agreement to 
arbitrate. There was testimony on the 
motion that some sort of “computer 
glitch” had caused the relevant box not to 
appear on the application completed by 
Urchasko. But the text of the application 
made clear that the applicant agreed to 
submit all disputes to arbitration, said the 
court of appeal, rejecting Judge Stern’s 
conclusion that failure to check the box 
meant that Urchasko had not agreed to 
arbitrate. The court also rejected Stern’s 
conclusion that the text of the arbitration 
provision was unconscionable as a take-
it-or-leave-it contract in “tiny font” that 
was “replete with confusing exceptions, 
legalisms, and legal authorities” 
and lacked a copy of the American 
Arbitration Association rules to which it 
referred. The court of appeal pointed out 
that there was no dispute that Urchasko 
had signed the employment application, 
which included the text binding 
him to arbitrate disputes with the 
company. “Urchasko’s signature on that 
agreement, therefore, unquestionably 
constituted an objective manifestation 
of his assent to arbitration.” As to 
unconscionability, the court found 
that while there might be “aspects” 
of procedural unconscionability in 
this case, there was no evidence of 
substantive unconscionability, and both 
must be present to provide grounds to 
void an arbitration agreement. 
CALIFORNIA – U.S. District Judge 
Roger T. Benitez denied summary 
judgement to a man who was suing 
for false arrest and violation of his 4th 
Amendment rights as a result of his arrest 
by undercover police officers patrolling 
a known gay “cruising area” in Balboa 
Park. Cobb v. Rodriguez, 2016 WL 
3585459 (S.D. Cal., May 13, 2016). Police 
officers Calderson and Rodriguez were 
“notified that an individual may have 
propositioned an undercover officer for 
sex.” While questioning two individuals, 
they “heard moaning of a sexual nature 
and rustling coming from behind some 
bushes.” They aimed flashlights at the 
bushes and saw John Cobb “walking out 
of the wooded area and zipping up his 
pants.” They identified themselves as 
police officers and asked Cobb to speak 
to them. Cobb moved away from them 
and they moved to block his path. They 
claim that he began “cursing and yelling 
that the officers had no right to speak to 
him.” They put him in handcuffs and sat 
him on a bench. “Calderson observed 
that plaintiff could not sit still, was 
sweating profusely on a cool night, and 
that his eyes and fingers were moving 
uncontrollably.” Calderson concluded 
that Cobb was “under the influence of 
a controlled substance” and took him to 
the police station, where a blood sample 
was drawn and Cobb was booked and 
spent the night in jail. The test proved 
negative and he was not prosecuted. 
Cobb sued for false arrest and violation 
of his 4th Amendment rights, relying in 
part on recorded comments Calderson 
made during his shift: “BTW were 
working Redwood Circle . . . otherwise 
known as Gay Sex Ville . . . we’re 
scoops fir he lucky UC units hahaha” 
and “Well at least I wasn’t the UC 
units getting propositioned for gay 
sex LMAO.” Whatever that means . . . 
Judge Benitez denied Cobb’s summary 
judgment motion, finding that there 
were contested facts. For purposes of 
deciding the motion, he considered 
whether Cobb’s claims would be valid 
if the officers’ version of events was 
believed, and concluded that under those 
facts the officers had cause to do what 
they did. If their physical description 
of Cobb was believed, they could have 
reasonably concluded that he was high 
on something. The judge observed, in 
connection with Calderson’s recorded 
remarks, that Cobb was not arrested for 
a sex crime, but rather for being under 
the influence of drugs in public. That 
the police turned out to be mistaken 
as to that was not dispositive of the 
question of their legal liability to Cobb 
because, “where an officer has probable 
cause for an arrest, he cannot be liable 
for false arrest. As genuine issues of 
material fact exist and as Plaintiff has 
failed to demonstrate as a matter of law 
that Defendants did not have probable 
cause, he has also failed to show that he 
was falsely arrested as a matter of law.” 
The court also rejected a conspiracy 
claim, saying that Cobb “does little 
more than conclude that Calderson and 
Rodriguez (and others who are not a 
party to this action) are engaged in a 
conspiracy to harass homosexual men,” 
but that he had presented no evidence of 
any agreement between the officers, and 
Calderson testified in discovery that “no 
one directed him to arrest Plaintiff and 
the record reveals no evidence to dispute 
Calderon’s testimony.” Furthermore, 
of course, Calderson did not stop and 
arrest Cobb “for activity related to 
Plaintiff’s homosexuality” but rather 
for his appearance of being stoned. The 
court deemed Calderson’s comments 
irrelevant to Cobb’s case. 
CALIFORNIA – The opinion by Justice 
Kenneth R. Yegan of the California 2nd 
District Court of Appeal in Butler v. 
LeBouef, 2016 Cal. App. LEXIS 480, 
2016 WL 3398418 (June 20, 2016), 
sounds like a synopsis of an anti-gay 
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noir movie plot. One gets the gist from 
an introductory paragraph summarizing 
what the case is about: “An ethical 
estate planning attorney will plan for 
his client, not for himself. A license 
to practice law is not a license to take 
advantage of an elderly and mentally 
infirm client. As we shall explain, 
the factual findings of the trial court 
compel the conclusion that appellant 
used his license to take advantage 
of an elderly and mentally inform 
person to enrich himself. The trial 
court factual findings are disturbing, 
fatal to appellant’s contentions, and 
suggest criminal culpability.” What 
makes the case relevant for Law Notes 
is that appellant, John F. LeBouef, is a 
gay attorney, and the elder client, John 
Patton, was a gay “renowned interior 
designer” who was grieving the death 
of his domestic partner “and by the 
end of his life, was often emotionally 
out of control.” He was befriended by 
the appellant and the appellant’s life 
partner, who insinuated themselves into 
the client’s affairs and who instigated 
a change in the client’s estate plan to 
substitute appellant for client’s nieces 
as his principal beneficiary and gifted a 
vintage car to a friend and tenant of the 
appellant. “It was a radical change” in 
the estate plan, according to the court, 
and after the client died, the nieces 
challenged the will successfully in this 
case. The nieces were able to show that 
the appellant had pulled off similar 
schemes on eight prior occasions, but 
the trial court limited the evidence to 
the two most recent cases in which 
“appellant befriended an elderly 
person and drafted a will or trust 
naming himself or his partner principal 
beneficiary.” Indeed, in one case, 
appellant actually married an elderly 
woman who was a caretaker who had 
inherited substantial money from her 
patient; before the caretaker passed 
away, the appellant drafted her trust 
naming himself principal beneficiary, 
received the bulk of the estate on her 
death and collected surviving spousal 
social security benefits for the next seven 
years! The court noted a California 
statute that “prohibits donative transfers 
to broad categories of persons who, 
because of their relationship with the 
settlor/trustor, might exercise undue 
influence. Undue influence is presumed 
where the donative transfer is in favor of 
the person who drafted the instrument 
or where the person who transcribed 
it or caused it to be transcribed had a 
fiduciary relationship with the settlor/
trustor.” Of course an attorney-client 
relationship would qualify. The court 
rejected the appellant’s argument 
against reliance on the prior incidents, 
noting that a forensic expert had credibly 
testified to the unitary authorship of 
the documents in the various cases, 
which showed a pattern of operations. 
In a footnote, the court noted that the 
“original trust document and a laptop 
computer used by the appellant to 
prepare trust documents” had been 
“lost” in a suspicious “burglary” the 
“occurred just before appellant was 
scheduled to produce the documents 
for his deposition and a forensic 
examination. The police suspected it 
was a staged burglary because nothing 
else was taken and the house was made 
to look like it was ransacked. Expensive 
watches and art work were in plain sight 
but were not taken.” There were also 
discrepancies about when the client’s 
death was reported to 911, which the 
trial court found “troubling because it 
suggested that appellant spent hours 
in Patton’s house before reporting the 
death.” This is an amazing case to read. 
Somebody should consider turning it 
into a film. An unfortunate tale of gay 
people acting badly . . . 
CALIFORNIA – Halliburton, a major 
defense contractor that earns millions of 
dollars from government contracts every 
year, is being sued by Harrison Y. Harris, 
an African-American transgender man, 
an Army veteran who holds a computer 
engineering degree, who, according 
to his complaint, was treated in a 
discriminatory manner throughout his 
employment, both because of his race 
and his gender identity, was set up to 
fail by the work group to which he was 
assigned, and obtained no relief despite 
his frequently complaints, the last of 
which apparently led to his discharge. 
Harris v. Halliburton Company, 2016 
WL 3255074 (E.D. Cal., June 13, 2016). 
But his claims will probably never see 
the inside of a courtroom, because U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Jennifer L. Thurston 
recommended granting the company’s 
motion to compel arbitration of all 
claims. The key ruling came in the part 
of her opinion discussing “governing 
law.” Harris pointed to a provision of 
the Defense Appropriations Act of 
2010, under which “any government 
contractor which accepts a contract in 
excess of $1M from the Department of 
Defense must agree to not enter into 
any new or enforce any arbitration 
agreement that requires arbitration 
of Title VII and certain employment 
tort claims. Thurston found this did 
not apply to the case. “Significantly,” 
she wrote, “however, the Defense 
Appropriations Act applies to “military 
contractors with contracts of at 
least $1 million,” and “imposes no 
substantive prohibitions on arbitration.” 
“Because this action does not involve a 
government contract,” she wrote, “the 
Defense Appropriations Act ‘simply 
does not apply’.” On the other hand, 
she found that the Federal Arbitration 
Act does apply and mandates ordering 
arbitration so long as the arbitration 
agreement is not both procedurally 
and substantively unconscionable. In 
this case, Halliburton seems to have 
designed its forms to comply with 
the objections that California courts 
have raised at times to employment 
arbitration agreements as being too 
one-sided or imposing inequitable 
financial burdens on employees. She 
found in this case a “knowing waiver” 
of the right to trial by Harris, and that 
the arbitration agreement itself was 
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not oppressive or substantively unfair. 
“Plaintiff and Defendants entered into 
a valid arbitration agreement, which 
encompasses the issues in dispute,” 
she concluded. “As a result, ‘there 
is a presumption of arbitrability’ 
and Halliburton’s motion to compel 
arbitration should not be denied.” Judge 
Thurston’s report and recommendation 
will go to Chief District Judge Lawrence 
J. O’Neill. 
COLORADO – Lambda Legal filed 
a partial summary judgment motion 
in Smith v. Avanti, Civ. Action No. 
1:16-cv-00091-RM-MJW (D. Colo., 
motion filed June 16, 2016), an action 
challenging a landlord’s discrimination 
against a same-sex couple, one of 
whom is transgender, who were denied 
rental housing in Gold Hill, Colorado, 
because, as the landlord informed them, 
she feared the couple’s “uniqueness” 
would jeopardize the landlord’s 
position in the small community. In 
terms of building anti-discrimination 
doctrine for LGBT people, this case 
is an important potential precedent to 
establish that discrimination because 
of sexual orientation or gender identity 
(both implicated in the case) is 
“discrimination because of sex” within 
the meaning of the federal Fair Housing 
Act. (If the Equality Act introduced in 
Congress in July 2015 were to be passed, 
the Fair Housing Act would be amended 
to explicitly prohibit discrimination 
because of sexual orientation and 
gender identity.) In its motion, Lambda 
Legal uses federal court decisions 
under other sex discrimination statutes 
– most prominently Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 – in arguing 
that the discrimination alleged in this 
case, if proven, should be deemed to 
be sex discrimination. Although the 
basic facts are not disputed, the motion 
does not seek an ultimate ruling on the 
merits, but focuses on getting the court 
to rule that the FHA applies to this case. 
Lambda staff attorneys working on the 
case include Omar Gonzalez-Pagan and 
Karen Loewy; cooperating attorneys 
working on the case include Benjamin 
N. Simler and Matthew P. Castelli of 
Holland & Hart LLP. 
CONNECTICUT – Superior Court Judge 
William J. Wenzel denied a motion by the 
Connecticut Department of Corrections 
to dismiss a sexual orientation 
discrimination claim by an employee 
of the Department on exhaustion of 
administrative remedies grounds in 
Velazquez v. State of Connecticut 
Department of Corrections, 2016 WL 
3265950 (Judicial Dist. of Fairfield at 
Bridgeport, May 18, 2016). In the form 
complaint that Ernesto Velazquez filed 
with the Commission on Human Rights, 
Velazquez did not expressly state that he 
had been subjected to sexual orientation 
discrimination and did not identify his 
sexual orientation. He checked off the 
boxes for the general state employment 
discrimination statute and Title VII, 
but not the specific provision on sexual 
orientation claims. “The operable 
language of the Affidavit” that he 
submitted with his administrative 
complaint states “I was sexually 
harassed, subjected to unequal terms 
and conditions of my employment, 
and treated unfairly based on my sex 
(male).” In the space on the form for 
narrative, he “alleges being referred to 
as ‘homo’ and ‘faggot’ and being called 
‘bitch’ and ‘crazy.’ He alleges he was 
intimidated and insulted by being told 
to provide oral sex to another male staff 
member. He also alleges other forms of 
insult or harassment not overtly sexual 
in nature.” The Commission “released 
its jurisdiction over this complaint 
allowing plaintiff to commence a civil 
action based on that complaint.” In the 
civil action, he alleges sexual orientation 
discrimination. The agency’s motion to 
dismiss argued that because Velazquez 
did not explicitly posit his administrative 
complaint as a sexual orientation 
discrimination complaint or specifically 
identify the sexual orientation provision 
of the state law on that form, he failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies and his 
claim must be dismissed by the court. 
Judge Wenzel, while characterizing the 
issue as a “close call,” found that “the 
discrimination asserted in Count One 
was reasonably related to the allegations 
contained in plaintiff’s Affidavit and 
hence not barred by the doctrine of 
exhaustion.” Indeed, it is hard to credit 
that the agency is asserting that it was not 
put on notice of the nature of the claim 
when the affidavit refers to plaintiff 
being called “homo” and “faggot” and 
being subjected to demands to give 
oral sex to another male staff member! 
“Clearly being called ‘homo’ and 
‘faggot’ immediately raise questions 
about sexual orientation as these are 
the very essence of such terms,” wrote 
the judge. “These terms, especially the 
later, are immediately recognized as 
almost always intended to insult and 
demean a person simply because of 
their orientation.” Furthermore, “to 
expect a self-represented person trying 
to complete this form to recognize the 
appropriate statutory cite is indeed 
asking quite a bit,” and his citation of 
the general statute at least invoked the 
state’s anti-discrimination law, “which 
expressly includes the deprivation of 
rights based on sexual orientation. 
Whether or not it is a perfect fit, it puts 
the agency on notice of all the potential 
claims covered by the statutory 
language.” In other words, Judge Wenzel 
was being very kind to the attorney for 
the Corrections Department when he 
called this a “close call.” The exhaustion 
argument strikes us a bordering on the 
frivolous.
FLORIDA – Florida Attorney General 
Pam Bondi’s office has reached a 
settlement with two sets of attorneys 
who represented successful plaintiffs 
in marriage equality litigation over 
the subject of attorneys’ fees, after 
U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle 
CIVIL LITIGATION
Summer 2016    LGBT Law Notes   291
ruled in April that the plaintiffs were 
prevailing parties and urged the state 
to negotiate a fee settlement. According 
to an Associated Press report, the total 
agreed upon is just under $500,000.00. 
The ACLU of Florida will receive 
$213,000.00, and attorneys from 
Jacksonville will receive $280,000.00. 
thenewstribune.com, June 2, 2016.
HAWAII – Honolulu Civil Beat (June 
8) reported that the Hawaii Department 
of Education has created guidelines and 
policies for use by the state’s public 
schools in accommodating transgender 
students. The policies, modeled on 
those adopted by California and New 
York, “will offer transgender students 
alternative bathroom, uniform and locker 
room arrangements that correspond 
with their gender identity,” according 
to the article. “Nurse’s bathrooms 
will also be an option for transgender 
students or non-transgender students 
who are uncomfortable changing in 
the same locker room.” The guidelines 
also recognize the right of students 
to wear clothing typically associated 
with their gender identity, to use their 
preferred names and gender identity and 
pronouns, but official school documents 
will contain the same information as 
legal documents, such as passports or 
birth certificates. A student can begin 
“transitioning” at school without any 
involvement of a doctor or their parent. 
DOE “also drafted an individualized, 
confidential support plan to make it 
easier for school staff to keep track of 
the students’ legal names, preferred 
names and pronouns, chosen locker 
room/bathroom facilities, ‘go-to adults’ 
on campus and other arrangements.” 
ILLINOIS – In Students and Parents 
for Privacy v. U.S. Department of 
Education, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
77728, 2016 WL 3269001 (N.D. Ill.), U.S. 
District Judge Jorge L. Alonso granted a 
motion on June 15 to allow the Illinois 
Safe Schools Alliance and several 
transgender students to intervene in 
order to defend the settlement agreement 
between the federal government and 
Township High School District 211 
under which transgender students at the 
school will be allowed to use restroom 
facilities consistent with their gender 
identities. The case was instigated by 
lawyers from the Alliance Defense Fund 
(a/k/a Alliance Defending Freedom), 
an anti-gay “religious” litigation group 
that organized some disgruntled parents 
and students to form “Students and 
Parents for Privacy” in order to bring 
this lawsuit, challenging the settlement. 
They are arguing that the Education 
and Justice Departments violated the 
Administrative Procedure Act by 
adopting a “new rule” without going 
through the notice and hearing process, 
and that this “new rule” (that Title IX 
forbids gender identity discrimination) 
is not a valid interpretation of the 
statutory ban on sex discrimination 
by educational institutions that receive 
federal funding. They have also filed 
a copycat lawsuit in North Carolina, 
seeking to uphold that state’s “bathroom 
bill” which is being attacked in court 
by the federal government and private 
plaintiffs represented by the ACLU 
and Lambda Legal. While conceding 
that allowing intervention might make 
the case more “complex” because the 
individual stories of the intervening 
students will now become relevant, 
Judge Alsonso wrote that it would not 
make it “unnecessarily complex,” since 
the issues they will present are germane 
to the lawsuit, and resolving those 
issues in this case might stave off future 
lawsuits. A large team of attorneys 
represent the intervenors, including 
ACLU national and local offices and 
pro bono attorneys from the law firm 
Mayer Brown LLP in Chicago. 
INDIANA – In a state where there is no 
law against a business discriminating 
against a transgender person because of 
her gender identity, potential plaintiffs 
have to be inventive to find a cause of 
action. A transgender woman, Carmen 
Carter-Lawson, who encountered 
disrespectful conduct from a tow-
truck driver, sought to hold the driver’s 
employer liable under 42 U.S.C. sec. 
1983, alleging sexual harassment and 
“misconduct of business.” Carter-
Lawson v. Affordable Towing, 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79097 (N.D. Ind., 
June 17, 2016). Carter-Lawson filed pro 
se and asked to have filing fees waived. 
District Judge Philip P. Simon pointed 
out that because of the requested fee 
waiver, he was obligated to review the 
complaint and dismiss it if the action 
is frivolous or malicious, fails to state 
a legal claim, or seeks monetary relief 
from a defendant who is immune 
from such relief. He decided this case 
fell in the second category, because 
there was no plausible allegation 
that the defendant was a state actor, 
a prerequisite for a suit brought 
under Sec. 1983, which deals with 
deprivations of rights secured by the 
Constitution by a defendant who was 
acting under color of state law. Carter-
Lawson ingeniously suggested that 
because the local police department 
required Affordable Towing to have 
her sign a release in order to get her car 
back, there was state action involved, 
but the court was not buying. “In plain 
English,” wrote Simon, “the mere 
fact that the Gary Police Department 
instructed Affordable Towing to have 
Carter-Lawson sign a release regarding 
her settlement with Gary when she 
picked up her car is not enough to claim 
that the employee was acting at the 
state’s direction when he insulted her. 
For the same reasons, the ‘misconduct 
of business’ allegation – whichever 
constitutional right, privilege, or 
immunity that corresponds to – is 
therefore also insufficiently pled.” 
Consequently, the complaint was 
dismissed for failure to state a claim, 
and the request to proceed without 
paying a filing fee was denied.
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LOUISIANA – Granting summary 
judgment to the employer, U.S. District 
Judge Susie Morgan ruled in White v. 
Rouses Enterprises LLC, 2016 WL 
3127232, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72740 
(E.D. La., June 3, 2016), that a male 
employee’s Title VII claims of quid 
pro quo sexual harassment, hostile 
environment, and retaliation, levelled 
against a gay supervisor, were not 
supported by the summary judgment 
record before the court. Marcus 
White was employed as a butcher 
at defendant’s Metairie, Louisiana, 
grocery store from April 23, 2012, until 
he was discharged on September 15, 
2014. White claimed that a few days 
prior to his discharge he encountered 
his gay supervisor in the restroom 
and was propositioned for sex, which 
he angrily declined. He alleged that 
in order to legitimate the subsequent 
discharge his supervisor schemed with 
others at the store to frame him on a 
theft of merchandise charge. The court 
found that White’s factual allegations 
fell short of what would be required 
to withstand summary judgment; the 
supervisor’s statement in the restroom 
did not constitute a clear quid pro quo 
statement (“So, how bad you want that 
raise?” with no explicit mention of 
a sexual demand), there were plenty 
of factual allegations in the record 
documenting the charge that White had 
stolen groceries, that this was brought to 
light by a co-worker who knew nothing 
about the alleged sexual solicitation, 
that the decision to discharge White 
was made by higher-level managers 
who were also unaware of the alleged 
sexual solicitation, and that the gay 
supervisor was merely a conduit for 
communicating the discharge decision 
to White. The supervisor denied making 
any sexual solicitation, alleging that 
White had misconstrued his statement, 
and White’s credibility was impaired 
by his failure to complain about the 
alleged solicitation or to mention it to 
anybody until after he was discharged. 
Judge Morgan also found that White’s 
allegations were insufficient to put into 
play a “hostile environment” claim 
based on one equivocal incident. 
MARYLAND – The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
announced a favorable settlement of 
one of its first lawsuits asserting that 
an employer violated Title VII’s ban on 
sex discrimination by discriminating 
against a person because of his sexual 
orientation. EEOC v. Pallet Companies, 
Civ. Action No. 1:16-cv-00595-CCB 
(D. Md., Consent Decree filed June 
23, 2016). A BNA Daily Labor Report 
account of the settlement indicated 
that the proposed Consent Decree was 
subject to approval by District Judge 
Catherine C. Blake. The settlement 
requires the employer to pay $182,000 to 
Yolanda Boone, the lesbian complainant 
who claimed she was harassed due to 
her sexual orientation and discharged 
in retaliation for complaining to 
management. The settlement also 
requires the company to donate 
$20,000 to Human Rights Campaign to 
develop an employee training program, 
including a module on LGBT workplace 
issues. The training would have to 
be provided to employees at all the 
company’s facilities in its North Region, 
which covers Maryland, New Jersey, 
Maine, Massachusetts and Virginia. 
The employer agrees to post workplace 
notices concerning the company’s 
responsibilities under Title VII, 
including making personnel decisions 
“without regard” to an individual’s 
sexual orientation, and to provide 
employees copies of the company’s anti-
discrimination policy with a description 
of how and where to report violations.  
MARYLAND – U.S. District Judge 
Catherine Blake (D. Md.) has approved a 
settlement agreement in EEOC v. Pallet 
Companies, No. 16-00595, the first 
sexual orientation discrimination case 
under Title VII initiated by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission 
on behalf of a lesbian victim of 
employment discrimination. After its 
ground-breaking ruling last July 15 in 
Baldwin v. Foxx, the EEOC has added 
to its litigation priorities engaging 
in affirmative litigation to establish 
that sexual orientation discrimination 
claims can be brought under Title VII. 
The ultimate goal is to achieve binding 
appellate precedents, and the agency has 
amicus briefs on file in pending appeals 
in the 2nd and 7th Circuits in cases 
where gay plaintiffs suffered dismissals 
of Title VII suits because of adverse 
appellate precedents in those circuits. 
Under a consent decree signed by Judge 
Blake on June 28, 2016, the employer 
will pay complainant Yolanda Boone 
$7,200 in back-pay and $175,000 in 
damages, and will contribute $20,000 to 
Human Rights Campaign. The company 
will also retain an expert on LGBT 
issues to develop a training program, 
provide a toll-free hotline number for 
employee complaints, and provide a 
letter of recommendation for Boone, 
who is seeking new employment. In 
a statement released in response to 
approval of the settlement, the company 
said that is decision to settle rather 
than litigate a challenge to the EEOC’s 
jurisdiction reflects a commitment by 
the company to its LGBT employees, 
and that it offered to make the donation 
to HRC as part of the settlement. Reuters 
Legal, June 29.
NEVADA – The widow of Tommy “The 
Duke” David Morrison, former world 
heavyweight boxing champion who 
was disqualified from boxing allegedly 
because of an inaccurate HIV test result, 
suffered a setback in her suit against the 
testing laboratory and other defendants 
on June 23 when U.S. Magistrate Judge 
Peggy A. Leen granted Defendant’s 
motion to strike expert report and exclude 
testimony from Dr. Henry Soloway, 
whom Patricia Morrison claimed to 
have retained as her expert witness in 
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the case. Morrison v. Quest Diagnostics, 
2016 WL 3475432 (D. Nevada). Plaintiff 
alleges that her husband was informed 
shortly before the first of a series of 
scheduled heavyweight bouts that he 
had tested HIV-positive and would not 
be allowed to fight. According to the 
complaint, this false diagnosis – not 
discovered to be false until an unrelated 
medical procedure was performed 
several years later – “led to a downward 
spiral of Tommy’s life and eventually 
what was likely his early death.” In her 
initial designation of expert witnesses, 
Morrison disclosed Dr. Soloway as 
her expert, providing an affidavit and 
CV, and sought identification of other 
medical personnel who had in any way 
treated Tommy, reviewed his medical 
records, or “undertaken any diagnostic 
or treatment procedures.” Quest moved 
to strike Soloway as an expert for failure 
to comply strictly with a requirement 
under the rules to file a detailed expert 
report laying out the testimony he 
was prepared to give. Opposing the 
motion, Morrison stated her belief that 
Soloway “may have been harassed, 
threatened, silenced, intimidated, or is 
‘suffering from fear of the unknown,’” 
as a result of which he had disavowed 
being an expert in the case. The court’s 
discussion of the twists and turns the 
case has taken is too lengthy to be 
summarized here, but culminates in an 
itemization of things that are required 
to be in an expert report but are not 
included in Soloway’s affidavit. Judge 
Leen found that Soloway’s affidavit 
was not sufficient to meet the detailed 
expert report requirements. “Plaintiff’s 
opposition does not address these 
deficiencies or request additional time 
to cure the deficiencies,” she wrote. 
Indeed, plaintiff indicated that Soloway 
“has broken off communication with 
her.” Morrison’s counsel had told Quest’s 
counsel to contact Soloway directly to 
set up a deposition, but when contacted 
Soloway denied being a retained expert 
for Morrison. Leen rejected Morrison’s 
suggestion that the court compel 
Soloway to appear for a deposition, 
finding that “the court has no authority 
to compel a witness to serve as an 
involuntary expert witness for a party, 
or to provide uncompensated expert 
opinions.” (Morrison had claimed that 
Soloway offered to provide his expertise 
pro bono.) Thus, the motion to strike 
was granted, possibly putting a practical 
end to Morrison’s case. 
NEW JERSEY – Ruling unanimously 
in Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture 
Company, 2016 WL 3263896 (June 
15, 2016), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that an employer’s attempt 
to contractually require employees to 
accept a shorter statute of limitations 
than that provided by the N.J. Law 
Against Discrimination (which 
prohibits, inter alia, discrimination 
because of sexual orientation or gender 
identity) is unenforceable as a violation 
of public policy. The legislature’s 
judgment that individuals alleging 
unlawful discrimination should have 
up to two years to file their claims 
supports the important public purpose 
of protecting equal opportunity in 
employment, wrote Justice LaVecchia 
for the court, and the six-month 
limitation that the employer sought to 
enforce in this disability discrimination 
case would undermine that public policy. 
The plaintiff, a delivery driver, suffered 
a work-related knee injury and was laid 
off two days after he reported back for 
work after recovering from his injury. 
The employer claimed he was let go in 
a reduction-in-force, but the employee 
claimed that less senior people than 
him had been retained and asserted that 
the lay-off was also retaliatory because 
he had sought and obtained workers 
compensation benefits for his injury. 
The employer got the case dismissed 
by the Superior Court, affirmed by the 
Appellate Division, on the argument 
that the employee had waived his right 
to assert a discrimination claim against 
the company by filing it more than 
six months after his claim accrued, as 
required by his at-will employment 
contract as evidenced by the written job 
application he had signed. The plaintiff 
claimed that he had not understood 
the meaning of the terms “statute 
of limitations” and “waive” on the 
application form, but the lower courts 
noted that he had signed a statement 
that he had read and understood the 
application, and rejected his public 
policy claim. Because the Supreme 
Court found the public policy analysis 
sufficient to decide the case, it did 
not have to address the plaintiff’s 
unconscionability and adhesion contract 
arguments.
NEW YORK – The New York City 
Council passed Local Law 40 in 2003, 
providing that city police may not 
engage in “racial or ethnic profiling,” 
defined as an act “that relies on race, 
ethnicity, religion or national origin as 
the determinative factor in initiating 
law enforcement action against an 
individual, rather than an individual’s 
behavior or other information or 
circumstances that links a person or 
persons of a particular race, ethnicity, 
religion or national origin to suspected 
unlawful activity.” Concerned that this 
law was ineffective, the Council acted 
again in 2013 and passed Local Law 71, 
which expanded the list of protected 
characteristics in the anti-profiling 
provision to include “actual or perceived 
race, national origin, color, creed, age, 
alienage or citizenship status, gender, 
sexual orientation, disability, housing 
status.” The new measure added a private 
right of action limited to injunctive 
and declaratory relief and the award 
of attorneys’ fees and expert fees to 
prevailing parties. This law took effect 
November 20, 2013. The Patrolmen’s 
Benevolent Association, the police 
officers’ union, filed suit challenging 
the validity of the law. On June 23, 
a unanimous panel of the New York 
Appellate Division, 1st Department, 
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ruled in Patrolmen’s Benevolent 
Association v. City of New York, 2016 
N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4910, 2016 NY 
Slip Op 05057, that the state’s Criminal 
Procedure Law does not preempt the 
local law, citing the following two 
reasons: “the two laws occupy different 
legislative fields (criminal procedure 
and antidiscrimination); and second, 
there is no direct conflict between 
them.” The opinion stated “great respect 
and appreciation for the important 
contributions of police officers who 
enforce our laws and protect us all daily 
at risk to their own personal safety,” 
but recognized “the City’s legitimate 
interest in protecting New Yorkers from 
discriminatory law enforcement.”  
NEW YORK – Although the New York 
Court of Appeals usually attempts to 
issue decisions relatively promptly after 
oral arguments, the court announced 
early in July that it would not be issuing 
rulings in Brooke S.B. v. Elizabeth 
A.C.C. or Estrellita A. v. Jennifer D. 
(argued at the beginning of June) before 
taking its summer recess. These are 
cases in which the court was being 
asked by appellants to reconsider its 
quarter-century-old precedent in Alison 
D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991), 
as more recently reaffirmed in Debra 
H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010), 
under which unmarried same-sex co-
parents who have not adopted the legal 
or adoptive children of their partners do 
not have standing to seek visitation after 
the partnership breaks up, despite having 
formed a parental bond with the child. 
The New York Law Journal commented 
on July 6, “If the court does not make a 
ruling when it next convenes, beginning 
on Aug. 23, for its annual meeting to 
hear appeals over September’s primary 
elections, the judges are not expected to 
make a determination until after they 
resume hearing cases on Sept. 6.” In 
the meantime, trial courts continue to 
grapple with the difficulties of deciding 
these kinds of cases in the absence of 
appropriate modern precedents (as to 
which see the article above about the 
Maryland Court of Appeals’ recent 
adoption of the “de facto parent” 
doctrine for such cases). On July 8, 
the Law Journal reported Matter of 
P.R. v. C.B., V-15266-15/16C (Family 
Ct., Suffolk County, May 26, 2016), 
a typical co-parent dispute in which 
the respondent moved to dismiss on 
standing grounds in reliance on Alison 
D. and Debra H.. Judge Bernard Cheng 
observed that in light of the Court 
of Appeals precedents, he could not 
find standing based solely on the co-
parent relationship. However, the co-
parent’s detailed factual allegation that 
the parent had been neglectful of the 
child’s dental health resulting in serious 
complications (numerous cavities and an 
untreated abscess in the child’s mouth) 
might support an argument that this was 
a case in which “parental unfitness” or 
“extraordinary circumstances” could 
justify allowing the “legal stranger” 
to seek custody, pursuant to Matter 
of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543 
(1976). “The Court must view the 
allegations in the petition in the light 
most favorable to Ms. P.R. and afford 
her the benefit of every inference which 
could be reasonably drawn,” wrote 
the judge. “In this case the petitioner 
has raised sufficient issues of fact 
regarding the respondent’s care of 
C.R.B. necessitating a hearing in order 
to ascertain whether the allegations 
of ‘persistent neglect’ or ‘unfitness’ 
rise to the level of ‘extraordinary 
circumstances.’” The court ordered 
counsel to confer on setting up a hearing 
to determine this issue.
NEW YORK – U.S. Magistrate Judge 
Anne Y. Shields has filed a report and 
recommendation to District Judge 
Joan M. Azrack suggesting that a 
constitutional discrimination complaint 
by a gay public school teacher should be 
dismissed. Nadolecki v. William Floyd 
Union Free School District, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 88399 (E.D.N.Y., July 6, 
2016). Matthew Nadolecki, a special 
education teacher formerly employed 
by the District (which spans several 
towns along the south shore of Long 
Island), asserted three claims under 42 
U.S.C. section 1983, alleging retaliation 
for exercise of his 1st Amendment free 
speech rights, and discrimination and 
hostile environment claims under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th 
Amendment. Judge Shields found that 
the speech for which he was claiming 
protection was “employer speech” not 
protected by the First Amendment 
under the precedent of Garcetti v. 
Ceballos, because it involved formally 
filing grievances with his union, and 
that the various slights directed at him 
(mainly by students) concerning his 
sexual orientation were not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to create a hostile 
environment. Furthermore, found 
the judge, the school district did take 
disciplinary action against students 
when Nadolecki complained about 
them. Judge Shields recognized that 
“an equal protection claim may be 
stated by alleging facts in support of a 
plausible claim that plaintiff was treated 
differently than others similarly situated, 
and that such treatment was motivated 
by an intent to discriminate on the basis 
of an impermissible consideration. Such 
impermissible considerations include 
disparate treatment based upon sexual 
orientation.” However, she found that the 
plaintiff’s factual assertions fell short 
in meeting the pleading standard on 
the equal protection claims. Nadolecki 
is represented by Steven A. Morelli of 
Garden City. 
NEW YORK – U.S. District Judge Joanna 
Seybert ruled in Carr v. North Shore-
Long Island Jewish Health Systems, Inc., 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81994, 2016 WL 
3527585 (E.D.N.Y., June 23, 2106), that a 
transgender woman who is a member of 
the Unitarian Universalist Church and 
who was working as an unpaid medical 
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assistant extern at the defendant’s 
hospital could proceed to discovery on 
her claim that she was discriminatorily 
denied employment because of her sex 
and religion in violation of Title VII 
and the New York Human Rights Law. 
Rejecting the defendant’s claim that the 
complaint was “too speculative,” Judge 
Seybert wrote that “the relevant inquiry 
is whether the [complaint] plausibly 
alleges that ‘plaintiff is a member of a 
protected class, was qualified, suffered 
an adverse employment action, and 
has at least minimal support for the 
proposition that the employer was 
motivated by discriminatory intent.’” In 
this case, plaintiff alleged that almost 
all the externs were offered employment 
upon satisfactory completion of their 
externship, that there were several 
distinct incidents involving remarks 
or actions by her supervisor indicating 
discomfort with her gender and 
disapproval of her religion, and after a 
specific incident she was informed that 
her externship had been terminated, 
even though she had previously been told 
that her performance was satisfactory. 
The court found that the complaint 
“provides enough circumstantial 
evidence of discriminatory intent to 
allow Plaintiff’s failure to hire claim to 
survive Defendant’s motion. Although 
much of the conduct described in the 
[complaint] lacks a tangible link to 
a discriminatory purpose, Plaintiff 
claims that her supervisor made specific 
negative comments about her gender on 
three separate occasions. Specifically, 
Demers (1) told Plaintiff she could 
not use the women’s restroom, (2) 
refused to allow her to participate in an 
examination, stating ‘only females are 
allowed beyond this point’; and (3) told 
Plaintiff that Jesus does not recognize 
her religion, and told others that ‘he-
shes. . . and the gays will needs to answer 
to Jesus some day.’ Moreover, Plaintiff 
was terminated via email on the same 
day Demers made her last comments 
about Plaintiffs gender and religion.” 
However, the court granted defendant’s 
motion to dismiss Carr’s separate 
complaint that she was subjected to 
unlawful discrimination during the 
externship. The relevant statutes pertain 
to discrimination within an employment 
relationship, but an unpaid extern is not 
considered to be an employee. (Had 
Carr’s externship occurred in a hospital 
in New York City and more recently, 
she could have had a cause of action 
for discrimination because the City 
has enacted an ordinance extending its 
anti-discrimination law to externships, 
but this hospital is located out on Long 
Island.)
NORTH CAROLINA – On June 29, U.S. 
District Judge Louise Wood Flanagan 
(E.D.N.C.) issued an order refusing to 
consolidate H.B. 2 cases brought by 
state legislative leaders and North 
Carolinians for Privacy with an action 
that had been filed by Governor Pat 
McCrory in the Eastern District seeking 
a declaration that Section 1 of the statute 
– limiting access to sex-designated 
multiple use public restrooms to persons 
whose sex as indicated on their birth 
certificate is consistent with the sex-
designation of the facility – is 
constitutional. At the same time, and on 
her own motion, Judge Flanagan ruled 
that these lawsuits defending the statute 
should be transferred to the Middle 
District of North Carolina, to be 
considered in tandem with cases 
pending there challenging the 
lawfulness of that Section. Most of 
Judge Flanagan’s Order in Berger v. 
United States Department of Justice, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84307, 2016 WL 
3620752, is devoted to reciting the 
complex history leading up to the 
decision of the motion, including the 
filings of cases by Governor McCrory 
on May 9 and the federal government on 
May 10 in different districts, and 
subsequent consolidation and intervention 
motions, and specifying the different 
legal theories raised for and against 
H.B. 2 in the different cases. Ultimately, 
she determined, there was enough 
overlap in the constitutional and 
statutory issues to be presented to justify 
putting before one judge in one district 
the question whether H.B. 2 violates the 
constitutional rights of transgender 
people, and also whether the state law 
violates the Violence Against Women 
Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments Act, as well as questions 
raised by the Eastern District plaintiffs 
challenging the federal government’s 
compliance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act in adopting its interpretation 
of the various sex discrimination laws. 
As to whether that should be in the 
Eastern District or the Middle District, 
Judge Flanagan was inclined to give 
primacy to the first case filed, Carcano 
v. McCrory, No. 1:16-CV-236-TDS-JEP 
(M.D.N.C., filed March 28, 2016), 
brought on behalf of private plaintiffs 
by civil rights groups a few days after 
the legislature passed and Gov. McCrory 
signed the measure. When Gov. 
McCrory decided to defy the federal 
government by filing suit against it in 
the Eastern District at the deadline for 
responding to a Justice Department 
letter seeking a response to DOJ’s 
determination that the state was in 
violation of several statutes, the federal 
government filed its own suit against 
McCrory in the Middle District, which 
Judge Flanagan’s transfer order now 
fixes as the locus for resolution of the 
underlying issues. That still leaves 
Governor McCrory’s lawsuit, the most 
narrowly focused of all those pending, 
dangling by itself in the Eastern District 
. . . Sorting this all out is a procedural 
nightmare. Anybody looking for a 
chronological history of the litigation 
events leading up to the present will 
find it in Judge Flanagan’s meticulously 
constructed Order. Conveniently 
enough, also on June 29, U.S. District 
Judge Thomas D. Schroeder filed an 
order in United States v. North Carolina, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84788, 2016 WL 
3626386 (M.D. N.C.), granting a motion 
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by the legislative plaintiffs in Berger to 
intervene permissively in the case 
brought against the state by the Justice 
Department, having previously granted 
a motion allowing them to intervene as 
co-defendants in the private action 
brought against state officials by the 
ACLU & Lambda. See Carcano v. 
McCrory, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73136, 
2016 WL 3167180 (M.D.N.C., June 6, 
2016). Noting the overlap in issues and 
arguments between the cases and the 
extent to which they have gotten under 
way, Judge Schroeder concluded that 
allowing intervention of these plaintiffs 
would not “significantly complicate the 
proceedings or unduly expand the scope 
of any discovery in this case” and 
“should not significantly delay 
proceedings in this case.” Judge 
Flanagan mentioned in her order that a 
preliminary injunction motion had 
already been briefed in the Carcano 
case, pending before Judge Schroeder. 
Judge Schroeder’s decision on the 
preliminary injunction motion could 
ultimately prove outcome-dispositive 
for all these cases, depending how many 
of the various legal theories he considers 
in determining whether to grant pre-
trial relief and whether the state 
immediately seeks appellate review 
from any adverse ruling. He scheduled a 
hearing on the motion for August 1, 
2016. * * * On July 5, the Justice 
Department filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction against 
enforcement of the bathroom provision 
of H.B. 2 in United States v. State of 
North Carolina, Case No. 1:16-cv-425 
(M.D.N.C.), and requested oral 
argument on the motion, which was 
accompanied by a 68-page brief setting 
out in full the Obama Administration’s 
position that the bathroom provisions 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 
Title IX of the Education Amendments 
Act, and the Violence Against Women 
Act (VAWA). The brief relies heavily on 
the 4th Circuit’s ruling in G.G. v. 
Gloucester County School Board, 2016 
WL 1567467 (April 19, 2016), rehearing 
en banc denied (June 1), in which the 
Circuit held that the Education 
Department’s interpretation of Title IX 
to apply to gender identity discrimination 
claims should be deferred to by the 
federal courts as a reasonable 
interpretation of ambiguous statutory 
and regulatory language. The G.G. 
court noted and relied up Title VII 
precedents on gender identity 
discrimination to reach this result, and 
observed that several different circuit 
courts have now found that gender 
identity claims can be asserted under a 
variety of federal sex discrimination 
statutes. The brief also notes that 
Congress has amended VAWA expressly 
to provide protection against gender 
identity discrimination by programs 
receiving federal law enforcement 
assistant under VAWA, such as co-
defendant North Carolina Department 
of Public Safety. The motion is pending 
before U.S. District Judge Thomas D. 
Schroeder, who, as noted above, has 
granted a motion by state legislative 
leaders to intervene as co-defendants in 
the case. An amicus brief in support of 
the Justice Department’s motion was 
filed by Human Rights Campaign with 
68 corporate co-sponsors, authored by 
former Solicitor General Ted Olson, 
who was co-counsel in Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, the litigation that 
brought marriage equality back to 
California by successfully challenging 
the constitutionality of Proposition 8. 
* * * On July 7, U.S. Magistrate Judge 
Dennis Howell denied a motion by state 
Republican legislative leaders to 
intervene as defenders in a case in which 
some same-sex couples are challenging 
the constitutionality of S.B.3, a North 
Carolina law passed in 2014 allowing 
local magistrates to recuse themselves 
from performing same-sex marriages 
under a procedure which also requires 
them not to perform other marriages for 
a defined period of time. The rejected 
intervenors claimed that their 
intervention was necessary because the 
state’s Attorney General, Roy Cooper, 
had refused to defend that state’s anti-
gay marriage ban and thus could not be 
counted on to give a vigorous defense to 
the law. Interestingly, even Governor 
McCrory, champion of H.B.2, had 
vetoed S.B. 2 when it first passed the 
legislature due to doubts about its 
constitutionality. Before S.B. 2 was 
passed, Cooper had said that he would 
veto it if he were governor, asserting 
that it was an unnecessary law. 
Magistrate Howell said that the Attorney 
General’s office was “aggressively 
defending” the law, and the legislative 
leaders failed to show that their interests 
were not adequately represented. He did 
say that he would reconsider this motion 
if “the state no longer intends to defend 
the constitutionality” of the law. A 
motion to dismiss the lawsuit is pending 
before District Judge Max Cogburn, 
who has scheduled argument on the 
motion for August 8. Raleigh News 
Observer, July 8.
NORTH CAROLINA – Advancing its 
affirmative litigation strategy under 
Title VII, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission announced 
on July 6 that it had filed a lawsuit in 
federal district court against Bojangles 
Restaurants on behalf of Jonathan 
Wolfe, a transgender woman who 
claims she was subjected to a hostile 
environment at the chain’s Fayetteville 
store because of her gender identity, and 
then suffered retaliation for complaining 
about it. A company spokesperson 
responded that Wolfe was discharged 
because of insubordination and other 
misconduct, not her gender identity. 
The company is unlikely to be able to 
get the case dismissed on an argument 
that Title VII does not extend to gender 
identity discrimination, in light of the 
4th Circuit’s G.G. v. Gloucester County 
School District decision, which took 
note of Title VII precedents from other 
jurisdictions in holding that a district 
court within the circuit should have 
deferred to the Education Department’s 
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determination that gender identity 
discrimination is covered by Title 
IX’s ban on sex discrimination by 
educational institutions.
OHIO – The Highland School District 
filed a lawsuit on June 12 in U.S. District 
Court in Columbus against federal 
education department officials, seeking 
a declaration that it is not required under 
Title IX to allow a transgender grade 
school student to use girls’ restrooms. 
The district claims that it stands to lose 
more than $1 million in federal money, 
and that the Department of Education 
had threatened an enforcement action on 
behalf of the student unless the district 
met federal demands by June 28. Alliance 
Defending Freedom (surprised?) 
represents the school district, claiming 
that the threat is an illegal attempt 
by the Obama Administration to 
“rewrite” federal law. (Never mind 
that federal courts, including the 6th 
Circuit Court of Appeals, which has 
appellate jurisdiction over federal cases 
from Ohio, have been recognizing sex 
discrimination claims by transgender 
litigants for a decade now.) Columbus 
Dispatch, June 12.
PENNSYLVANIA – Should an HIV-
positive plaintiff be allowed to proceed 
on a discrimination lawsuit using a 
pseudonym? Yes, ruled U.S. Magistrate 
Judge Martin C. Carlson in Bonnie 
Jones v. OSS Orthopedic Hospital, 2016 
WL 3683422 (M.D. Pa., July 12, 2016). 
The plaintiff, who has adopted “Bonnie 
Jones” as her proposed pseudonym, 
has alleged that she has been denied 
equal access to certain facilities of the 
defendant because of her HIV status. 
The judge noted that many other courts 
have allowed HIV-positive plaintiffs to 
conceal their identification, observing: 
“At the outset, consistent with those 
cases that have considered similar claims 
by HIV positive litigants, we find that 
Jones has made a substantial showing 
that disclosure of her identity will result 
in an social stigma in some quarters 
of a type which may, and should, be 
avoided. Further, while the issues in this 
litigation present matters which may 
garner some public interest, that public 
interest can be met without the necessity 
of disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity. 
Therefore, all of these considerations 
strongly favor granting Jones’ request 
to proceed under a pseudonym. Indeed, 
the presence of these factors favoring 
granting this request are undisputed by 
any defendant. Instead, one defendant 
simply insists that Jones did not 
sufficiently protect her privacy and 
identity during the course of the state 
agency proceedings to warrant granting 
her request in this case. We disagree. 
In our view Jones has persuasively 
demonstrated that she repeatedly sought 
leave to proceed under a pseudonym 
during these state agency proceedings. 
In fact, we note that such leave to proceed 
under a pseudonym was granted by the 
state agency on July 1, 2016. (Doc. 12.) 
Therefore, we also find that the plaintiff 
has made continuing efforts to protect 
her identity and privacy in this litigation, 
and in state agency proceedings. Having 
found that the prerequisites set by law 
for proceeding under a pseudonym are 
met in this case, the motion to proceed 
under a pseudonym is granted.”
SOUTH CAROLINA – The U.S. 
Department of Education found that 
Dorchester County School District Two 
violated Title IX by discriminating 
against a transgender elementary school 
student. Negotiations ensued, and on 
June 23 the Department’s Office for 
Civil Rights announced a voluntary 
resolution agreement, under which the 
district will provide the transgender girl 
with access to girls’ bathrooms at her 
elementary school and take other steps 
to facilitate the student’s enjoyment 
of equal educational opportunity, 
including revising its policies and 
procedures and providing training to 
district and school level administrators 
on the district’s Title IX obligations 
to transgender students. U.S. Official 
News, June 23.
TENNESSEE – 4th Circuit Court Judge 
Greg McMillan has ruled that a lesbian 
spouse has no legal relationship with the 
child born to her spouse and thus cannot 
seek custody upon a divorce, but has 
stayed his ruling to allow the plaintiff 
to seek review from the state court of 
appeals, reported the Knoxville News 
Sentinel on June 24. Erica Witt and 
Sabrina Witt married in the District of 
Columbia in April 2014, bought a home 
in Knoxville and decided to have a child 
together through donor insemination 
with an anonymous donor. The child was 
born to Sabrina in January 2015. At the 
time Tennessee did not recognize same-
sex marriages contracted out of state, so 
Erica’s name was not listed on the birth 
certificate. In February 2016 Sabrina 
filed for divorce and opposed Erica’s 
standing to seek custody or visitation 
with the child on the ground that Erica 
and the child had no legal relationship 
under Tennessee law. Tennessee has the 
usual presumption that when a married 
woman bears a child, her husband is 
deemed the legal parent of the child. 
Erica argued that under Obergefell the 
court is required to accord her the same 
rights as a husband, and the court should 
read the statute as being gender neutral. 
Sabrina’s attorney contended, based 
on the wording of the statute, that this 
presumption applies only to husbands, 
and Judge McMillan agreed, stating that 
it was not up to the court to enact “social 
policy” and, he said, “I believe as a trial 
court I am not to plow new ground, but to 
apply precedent and the law.” However, 
he said that Erica could possibly seek 
visitation as a “stepparent.” Sabrina 
is represented by John Haber. Erica 
is represented by Virginia Schwamm. 
See also Memphis Commercial Appeal, 
June 25.
TENNESSEE – Bleu Copas of Anderson 
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County, Tennessee, and Caleb Laieski 
of Virginia, filed a complaint on June 
5 in the Anderson County Chancery 
Court against Governor Bill Haslam, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that 
a recently-enacted Tennessee statute 
allowing mental health therapists to 
refuse treatment to patients because 
of the therapists’ religious or personal 
moral beliefs is unconstitutional. 
Copas v. Haslam (Tenn., Anderson Co. 
Chancery Ct., filed June 5, 2016). The 
complaint alleges that the law singles out 
LGBT individuals for “discriminatory 
treatment,” as “There is no other group 
which could conceivably be the target 
of the statute,” even though it does not 
expressly mention sexual orientation, 
gender identity, or homosexuality. 
The statute says that counselors 
and therapists whose “sincerely 
held principles” prevent them from 
providing services may refrain from 
doing so without adverse consequences. 
It does provide that services may not 
be withheld in emergency situations, 
and that referrals to providers 
without such objections should be 
made. Governor Haslam stated upon 
signing the bill that professionals 
should have a right to refrain from 
providing services to people whose 
“personal beliefs” don’t match their 
own. Knoxville News-Sentinel, June 8. 
The American Counseling Association 
disagrees, providing in its ethics code 
that counselors should set aside their 
personal beliefs when it comes to 
rendering professional services, and 
the organization has announced it will 
move a national convention previously 
scheduled to be held in Nashville next 
year to a different location. 
TENNESSEE – The law firm Ropes 
& Gray received more than $600,000 
from the fee award in the Tennessee 
marriage equality litigation, having 
represented prevailing plaintiffs. (R&G 
partner Douglas Hallward-Driemeir 
argued the marriage recognition issue 
before the Supreme Court.)  The firm 
announced on June 24 that it would 
donate $100,000 to the National Center 
for Lesbian Rights, and use the rest of 
the fee award to underwrite the firm’s 
pro bono activities. NCLR Legal 
Director Shannon Minter said that this 
was the single largest donation that the 
organization had ever received from a 
law firm. In reporting about the donation 
on July 5, the National Law Journal 
noted that other firms that received fee 
awards in marriage equality litigation 
had also made donations. Perkins Coie, 
for example, which helped to represent 
same-sex marriage plaintiffs in Arizona 
and Oregon, made donations out of the 
fee awards to Lambda Legal and the 
ACLU.
TEXAS – Plaintiffs in State of Texas v. 
United States of America, Civ. Action 
No. 7:16-cv-00054-O (N.D. Tex.), which 
challenges the Obama Administration’s 
interpretation of “sex discrimination” 
under Title VII and Title IX to include 
gender identity discrimination, filed a 
motion for a preliminary injunction on 
July 6, seeking to forestall enforcement 
of Title VII and Title IX nationwide 
against employers subject to Title 
VII and schools that receive federal 
financial assistance, subjecting 
themselves to coverage under Title 
IX, until a final determination can be 
made whether the statutes reach the 
issue of bathroom and locker-room 
access for transgender individuals. 
Texas picked up a few more states after 
filing the case, so now it is brought on 
behalf of Alabama, Wisconsin, West 
Virginia, Tennessee, Arizona, Maine, 
Oklahoma, Louisiana, Utah, Georgia, 
Mississippi, and Kentucky, although 
standing is premised on the tiny 
Harrold Independent School District, 
which was lured into participating by 
Texas A.G. Ken Paxton to facilitate his 
forum shopping before Reed O’Connor, 
a district judge who is perceived to 
be predisposed against the Obama 
Administration’s administrative actions 
because of his ruling enjoining the 
Administration’s policy protecting non-
citizen parents of U.S.-born children 
against deportation. The complaint 
argues that when the Administration 
adopted its interpretation of Title 
VII and Title IX, it was violating the 
Administrative Procedure Act because 
it was adopting a new rule of law 
without going through the procedure 
required for adopting regulations. 
The brief in support of the motion 
conveniently ignores the growing body 
of federal case law supporting the view 
that sex discrimination includes gender 
identity discrimination, almost all of 
which predates the Administration’s 
embrace of this view. The brief also 
disingenuously contends that the 
Administration’s position is that any 
person of any biological sex is free at any 
time to use any restroom they want to, 
regardless of its designation as restricted 
to males or females, which of course is 
not the position of the Administration. 
As such, the plaintiffs argue from the 
premise that gender identity is not real 
and that everybody is and remains the 
sex recorded in state records when 
they were born, contrary to a growing 
body of professional opinion and 
judicial rulings. While this is a position 
supported by some early cases under 
Title VII and state sex discrimination 
laws, it is not supported by more recent 
case law, most notably the 4th Circuit’s 
decision in G.G. v. Gloucester County 
School Board, 2016 WL 1567467 
(April 19, 2016), which held that the 
Administration’s interpretation of Title 
IX was reasonable, not inconsistent with 
the state and existing regulations, and 
entitled to deference from the federal 
courts. The EEOC’s ruling on point 
cites a wide variety of federal appellate 
and trial court rulings in support of the 
broader view of the sex discrimination 
ban. Of course the 4th Circuit’s 
opinion is not binding within the 5th 
Circuit, a notably conservative circuit 
on employment discrimination issues, 
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and it is possible that a ruling on this 
motion will generate the kind of circuit 
split that could capture the attention of 
the Supreme Court, especially as the 
Gloucester County defendants have 
announced they will file a petition for 
certiorari this summer. * * * Early in 
July there were news reports that an 
additional ten states had joined in a 
similar lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District 
Court in Nebraska. The collaborating 
states are Arkansas, Kansas, Montana, 
North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, 
South Carolina, Wyoming and Michigan. 
It seems like that eventually all of the 
states that lack a legislative prohibition 
of gender identity discrimination may 
end up being co-plaintiffs in one or 
another of the lawsuits contesting the 
Obama Administration’s interpretation 
of Title IX in the context of restroom 
access for transgender students. New 
York Times, July 8.
TEXAS – The 6th District Court of 
Appeals ruled in In the Interest of 
E.R.C., a Minor Child, 2016 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 6231 (June 14, 2016), a bitterly 
contested child custody suit, that the 
fact that a judge had been endorsed 
by LGBT political groups was not by 
itself grounds for finding that the judge 
should be disqualified from hearing a 
case because of presumed bias. Wrote 
Justice Jim Moseley for the court: 
“Stokes [the mother] argued at the 
recusal hearing and on appeal that Judge 
Sulak was biased in favor of the lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
community and against Christians. At 
the hearing, Stokes introduced evidence 
that Judge Sulak had been endorsed in 
his election campaign by two groups 
representing the LGBT community 
and of the endorsement procedures of 
one of the groups. She also introduced 
evidence consisting of articles written 
either by or about LGBT activist groups, 
emails to and from Corsbie [the father], 
and emails to and from Stokes, none 
of which concerned Judge Sulak or 
evidenced any bias or partiality on 
his part. Further, no evidence was 
introduced regarding Judge Sulak’s 
involvement with the LGBT community 
or LGBT activist groups, or of his written 
or oral statements concerning LGBT 
rights or his religious views. Stokes’ 
speculation that Judge Sulak was biased 
based merely on the fact that he received 
endorsement from LGBT activist groups 
in an election campaign is not sufficient 
to overcome the presumption of judicial 
impartiality. Further, a reasonable, 
disinterested observer would recognize 
the reality that a judge participating 
in a political campaign may receive 
many endorsements from politically 
active groups and individuals and that 
at the same time, a judge is under the 
ethical obligation to remain impartial.” 
Furthermore, the record showed that 
in the course of the litigation Judge 
Sulak had made rulings both in favor 
and against both parties, further 
undermining any contention of bias. 
VIRGINIA – Responding to the 4th 
Circuit’s reversal and remand of his prior 
decision dismissing a Title IX claim 
asserted by transgender teen Gavin 
Grimm against the Gloucester County 
School District, U.S. District Judge 
Robert Doumar issued a preliminary 
injunction on June 23 requiring the 
Gloucester schools to allow Grimm to 
use restrooms consistent with his gender 
identity pending ultimate disposition 
of the case. Protesting that it would 
be filing a petition for certiorari and 
should not be required to comply with 
an injunction until a final decision on 
the merits, the school district filed a 
motion asking that the injunction be 
stayed, but on July 6 Judge Doumar 
denied the motion, tersely stating, “This 
Court is bound by the Judgment of the 
Court of Appeals.” The school district 
immediately appealed the denial to the 
4th Circuit in an “emergency motion.” 
On July 12, the 4th Circuit denied the 
motion, by the same 2-1 vote by which 
the panel issued its earlier decision. 
G.G. v. Gloucester County School 
District, 2016 WL 3743189.  Senior 
Judge Davis filed a concurring opinion 
to refute dissenting Judge Niemeyer’s 
contention that the panel’s earlier 
decision was “unprecedented,” pointing 
out that four other circuit courts had 
previously opened that gender identity 
discrimination was a form of sex 
discrimination. The school district has 
until August 29 to file a cert petition 
with the Supreme Court, but it might 
file a motion with the Supreme Court 
seeking its stay. If the Supreme Court 
were to grant a stay until it decides on 
the cert petition, Grimm would not be 
able to use restrooms consistent with his 
gender identity when school beings in 
the fall, since a decision on the petition 
would not be announced until shortly 
before the beginning of the Court’s 
October 2016 Term, at the earliest. 
Judge Doumar set the case for trial on 
January 31, 2017. The school district’s 
response to the complaint requests a 
jury trial. Newport News Daily Press, 
July 7 and 12.
WASHINGTON – U.S. Magistrate 
Judge John T. Rodgers denied a 
transgender plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment in her challenge to 
a denial of Social Security Disability 
Benefits in Herrington v. Colvin, 2016 
WL 3579222 (E.D. Wash., June 28, 
2016). This is a rather complicated 
case. The plaintiff, identified female at 
birth, identifies as male, but is referred 
to as “she” throughout the opinion. She 
applied for disability benefits when she 
was 20 years old and has never worked. 
She has a high school education. At her 
hearing, she testified to various kinds of 
physical pain, claimed that “she hears 
voices and on average she stays in her 
room all day.” “Plaintiff further testified 
that she would prefer to be male, but that 
due to her health, she could not proceed 
with any transitional procedures,” wrote 
the judge. Later in the opinion, there 
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is reference to a doctor having advised 
against hormone therapy because of the 
plaintiff’s high cholesterol. The doctors 
who testified agreed that the plaintiff has 
“gender identity disorder” and suffers 
from “depression and anxiety” but did 
not directly opine that she was disabled 
from working. The occupational expert 
who testified contended that she could 
undertake various kinds of jobs, but her 
attempts to apply for jobs have been 
unsuccessful, apparently due to her 
lack of education, training, and ability 
to present herself as a desirable job 
candidate. She also presented testimony 
from a clinical social work, who testified 
through two letters, the first of which 
stated that plaintiff “is very isolated and 
is avoidant of public situations due to her 
anxiety. She is further restricted due to 
her social limitations of presenting as a 
young man vs. the female person that she 
is.” The social worker said that plaintiff 
perceives herself as unemployable; “Her 
negativity as well as her avoidance 
prohibit her from engaging in the 
community at large,” and she concluded 
in her second letter, “I do not believe 
that she is able to present herself in a 
positive light regarding a job interview 
even if she were invited to do so.” The 
ALJ concluded that she was capable 
of working and denied her benefits, 
a conclusion that was sustained by 
Judge Rodgers, who granted summary 
judgment to the Commissioner. Judge 
Rodgers found that the ALJ had 
provided sufficient reasons for finding 
the plaintiff not credible concerning 
the intensity, persistence, and limiting 
effects of her symptoms, although 
conceding that the ALJ may have 
erred in concluding that plaintiff’s 
“self-reports” about her condition were 
not supported by “objective medical 
evidence.” 
WASHINGTON – Chief U.S. District 
Judge Thomas O. Rice granted the 
government’s motion to dismiss Mark 
C. Wilhelm’s lawsuit challenging the 
denial of his petition to “correct” his 
court martial record by the Board for 
Correction of Naval Records. Wilhelm v. 
U.S. Department of the Navy, 2016 WL 
3149710, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72884 
(E.D. Wash., June 3, 2016). The story 
behind this case is complicated. Wilhelm 
served with distinction in the Navy from 
1982 until 1995, when he was released 
from duty with an honorable discharge. 
Shortly thereafter he figured out that 
he was gay, but this did not deter him 
from enlisting in the Naval Reserves, 
intending to keep his homosexuality a 
secret. (At the time, the military was 
operating under the recently-enacted 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” policy, under 
which gay people could serve so long 
as everybody could pretend they weren’t 
gay and they didn’t say or do anything 
to reveal their homosexuality.) He was 
designated a Chief Warrant Officer. 
According to Judge Rice’s opinion, 
“However, not long after Wilhelm 
returned to active duty in February 
2000 and was assigned to Atsugi, Japan, 
it was widely rumored that Wilhelm was 
homosexual. Wilhelm told a number 
of inconsequential lies about himself 
during this time, primarily to make 
himself sound more masculine and 
reduce suspicion about his sexuality.” 
While Wilhelm was on leave in April 
2002 he visited Moscow and engaged 
in consensual gay sex, leading to a 
confrontation with Russian intelligence 
officers who threatened to expose his 
homosexuality to the Navy unless he 
agreed to spy for Russia. “Wilhelm 
declined and reported the attempted 
blackmail to the U.S. Embassy.” This 
of course led to an investigation by the 
Navy, during which Wilhelm eventually 
confessed to being gay and engaging in 
gay sex. He was then charged with 38 
specifications of wrongdoing, three of 
which related to violation of the military 
sodomy ban, the balance relating to a 
wide variety of offenses under military 
law, some seemingly trivial. On April 9, 
2003, he pled guilty at a general court-
martial to nine specifications, none 
of them directly involving sexual 
misconduct but relating to other offenses 
charged against him, and he was 
sentenced to dismissal from the Navy. 
At around that time, the Supreme Court 
ruled in Lawrence v. Texas that criminal 
bans against private, consensual adult 
homosexual conduct violated the Due 
Process Clause, and subsequently, the 
highest military appeals court ruled in 
U.S. v. Marcum that sodomy charges 
against military personnel “would be 
subject to a different analysis than they 
had previously.” In essence, the military 
courts would only move against those 
who engaged in conduct that fell outside 
the scope of Lawrence or could be 
deemed  prejudicial to the service. 
Wilhelm sought “correction” of his 
military record, but was turned down 
by the Naval Board and went to court. 
Judge Rice pointed out that judicial 
review would be quite limited (while 
rejecting the government’s argument 
that Wilhelm’s claim was not justiciable), 
since the courts grant substantial 
deference to the administrative 
decisions of the military on personnel 
matters, but what really determined the 
ruling to dismiss Wilhelm’s case was 
that he pled guilty to charges that did not 
relate directly to homosexual conduct. 
The court found it reasonable for the 
Naval Board to omit any mention of the 
“homosexual” aspect of the case when it 
declined to change Wilhelm’s military 
records. Wilhelm argued that the anti-
gay bias of the military, and particularly 
of the individuals who investigated his 
situation, should count to invalidate 
his bad conduct discharge, especially 
in light of Lawrence, Marcum, and the 
repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell,” but the 
court rejected this argument. “Whether 
or not the Board made the right decision 
in denying Wilhelm clemency is not the 
focus of a reviewing court under the 
[Administrative Procedure Act],” wrote 
Judge Rice; “rather, the task is merely to 
determine whether the Board’s decision, 
afforded ‘all due deference,’ contains ‘a 
rational connection between the facts 
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found and the choice made.’ Because 
it is clear based on the allegations 
in the Amended Complaint together 
with the attachments thereto that the 
Board did just that, Wilhelm has not 
stated an actionable claim.” Wilhelm 
is represented by Dale F. Saran of 
Oceanside, California and Matthew Z. 
Crotty of Spokane, Washington. If he 
cares to persist, he can appeal this to the 
9th Circuit, but it doesn’t look good . . .
 
CRIMINAL LITIGATION NOTES
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 6TH 
CIRCUIT – On July 13 the 6th Circuit 
issued a decision dismissing Rowan 
County, Kentucky, Clerk Kim Davis’s 
appeal from the U.S. District Court’s 
ruling against her on the question 
whether she was violating the law by 
refusing to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples based on her personal 
religious objection to same-sex 
marriages. However, at the same time 
the court vacated the district court’s 
preliminary injunction on grounds of 
mootness, since Kentucky has modified 
the law governing marriage licenses 
in such a way that Davis no longer 
has objections to issuing them, as the 
names of county clerks have been 
removed from the forms. However, the 
6th Circuit held that the district court’s 
September 3, 2015, order holding Davis 
in contempt of course “does not meet 
the requirements for vacatur” under 
the court’s precedents, and thus is 
“not vacated.” The contempt judgment 
stands. Miller v. Davis, Nos. 15-5880 
& 5-5978.
CALIFORNIA – Santa Clara County 
Superior Court Judge Jose S. Franco 
has ruled that police sting operations 
at Columbus Park focused on the men’s 
restroom facility there constituted 
“selective enforcement in violation 
of the suspects’ equal protection 
rights,” according to a June 17 report 
in The Mercury News. Judge France 
agreed with the argument by Deputy 
Public Defender Carlie Ware, who had 
argued for dismissal of charges on the 
ground that the police had specifically 
targeted gay men for their enforcement 
action. Ruled Franco: “The claim that 
this investigative focus was driven by 
complaints is minimally supported by 
the evidence presented, especially as it 
relates to the park. Unpopular groups 
have too often been made to bear the 
brunt of discriminatory prosecution 
or selective enforcement.” The article 
noted that in May a Los Angeles County 
judge had thrown out similar charges 
involving Long Beach police, and that 
police in several southern California 
communities have stopped conducting 
such sting operations because of judicial 
disapproval of the tactics. 
 
MICHIGAN – During his trial on charges 
that he got straight men too drunk to 
consent and then performed oral sex 
on them, Larry Lee was dissatisfied 
with appointed defense counsel and 
wrote letters to the trial judge asking 
to be able to defend himself or to have 
new counsel assigned. He alleges that 
the trial judge refused to consider his 
requests and steamrollered him into 
continuing with his original appointed 
counsel. Lee was convicted despite his 
insistence that in both cases charged 
against him the straight men had 
flirted with him at parties and then had 
consented to have sex with him, only 
later repenting of the experience and 
contacting law enforcement to complaint 
against him. Appellate counsel was 
appointed for him, but he claims that 
appellate counsel provided ineffective 
representation by failing to raise the 
violation of his 6th Amendment right to 
self-representation as part of his direct 
appeal. In this habeas proceeding, after 
reciting the complicated procedural 
history of the case, U.S. District Judge 
Robert H. Cleland concluded that 
despite several procedural faults, Lee 
should get habeas relief, directing the 
state of Michigan to appoint counsel for 
him so that he can file an appeal as of 
right to the Michigan Court of Appeals, 
contending that his conviction should 
be vacated for denial of his right to self-
representation. Lee v. Haas, 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 82194, 2016 WL 3437599 
(E.D. Mich., June 24, 2016). 
MISSISSIPPI – Jackson County 
(Mississippi) Circuit Judge Robert 
Krebs sentenced Josh Vallum to life 
in prison on July 12 after taking his 
guilty plea in the beating death of 
Mercedes Williamson, a transgender 
woman. The U.S. Justice Department 
is considering whether to lodge federal 
hate crime charges against Vallum, 
who was scheduled to go to trial just a 
week before he agreed to plead guilty. 
Vallum had told law enforcement 
authorities that he killed Williamson 
after he reached between her legs and 
realized she had a penis, but this was 
not consistent with other witnesses who 
said that Williamson and Vallum had 
dated and had an active sex life and 
that Vallum knew that Williamson was 
transgender and considered them to have 
a “homosexual” relationship, which he 
was trying to keep secret from the gang 
he ran with. AP National News, July 13.
NEVADA – The Court of Appeals of 
Nevada affirmed the jury conviction 
of Rodger O. Evans on charges of 
“exploitation of elderly over $5,000” 
in Evans v. State of Nevada, 2016 WL 
3586687 (June 20, 2016). On appeal 
Evans argued, among other things, 
that the trial judge erred in excluding 
evidence as to the victim’s sexual 
orientation. Evans’ theory was that the 
fact the victim was a gay man without 
children was relevant to Evans’ argument 
that the money to him was a gift typical 
of the victim’s generosity to friends. 
Wrote the court: “Evans contends that 
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the victim’s sexual orientation is relevant 
to show why the victim does not have 
children of his own and why he would 
give such generous gifts to Evans, rather 
than to his own family. But one does 
not need to be of a particular sexual 
orientation in order not to have children; 
many people do not have children from 
many reasons having nothing to do with 
their sexual orientation or preferences. 
Furthermore,” continued the court, 
“one’s sexual orientation has nothing to 
do with one’s generosity or stinginess 
toward others; the victim’s sexual 
orientation has no discernible relation 
to whether he did or did not voluntarily 
give large amounts of money to Evans 
or to any other person.” Thus, it was not 
relevant and the trial judge correctly 
excluded the evidence. What the court 
does not say but seems implicit was that 
the court suspected Evans’ aim was to 
get the jury to sympathize with him and 
against a gay victim. Didn’t work . . .
NEW YORK – On June 14 New York 
County Supreme Court Justice A. Kirke 
Bartley sentenced Elliot Morales to 
40-years-to-life after a jury convicted 
Morales of second-degree murder as 
a hate crime because of the victim’s 
sexual orientation in the shooting death 
of Mark Carson in the West Village, 
Manhattan, in May 2013. People v. 
Morales. Morales shot Carson in the 
head while mouthing homophobic 
epithets. Carson and his friend Danny 
Robinson had been walking together 
on 6th Avenue near 8th Street when 
Morales encountered the two men and 
started shouting at them, pursued them, 
and gunned down Carson. Morales 
claimed he acted in self-defense 
because he thought Carson was armed 
and prepared to shoot him. (Carson 
was not armed.) Morales also argued 
he could not be convicted of a hate 
crime because he identified as bisexual. 
In addition to the murder conviction, 
Morales, who fled the scene of the 
shooting but was quickly apprehended 
by a police officer, was convicted on 
five counts of criminal possession 
of a weapon, one count of menacing 
the police officer who apprehended 
him, and one count of menacing a gay 
bartender in a West Village restaurant 
prior to his confrontation with Carson 
and Robinson. Morales also had a 
prior violent felony conviction on his 
record, and Justice Bartley rejected 
his argument that it should not be 
taken into account in determining 
the sentence in this case. The murder 
of Carson in the heart of the heavily-
gay neighborhood shocked the NYC 
LGBT community, leading to vigils 
and protests. Morales, who insisted the 
shooting was an “accident,” represented 
himself at trial and announced he would 
appeal the convictions and sentence. 
GayCityNews.com, June 14.
NEW YORK – U.S. District Judge David 
N. Hurd granted a motion for acquittal 
at the end of the government’s case 
against Michael J. Mahannah, who 
was charged with attempting to induce 
a young boy into having sex with him. 
United States v. Mahannah, 2016 WL 
3675569 (N.D.N.Y., June 22, 2016). It 
is embarrassing to read Judge Hurd’s 
summary of the testimony. It seems that 
a government agent, one Investigator 
Schmitter, was out trolling to arrest 
gay men and started texting Mahannah, 
posing as a sex-starved gay boy eager to 
find an adult man with whom to have 
sex. Schmitter was persistent, even 
when Mahannah dismissed him as too 
young and said he had previously had 
a relationship with somebody who was 
HIV positive, but finally Mahannah 
agreed to an assignation and was 
arrested. All the “inducement” here 
seemed to come from the government 
agent. Wrote Hurd, “The terms persuade, 
induce, entice and coerce are not defined 
in the statute and ‘are words of common 
usage that have plain and ordinary 
meanings.’ Given such meanings, 
Mahannah did not urge, influence or 
tempt the alleged minor towards illegal 
sexual activity as demonstrated by the 
facts [in cases the government was 
citing]. The proof presented by the 
government is a very rare case where 
the defendant may have had an interest 
in performing an illegal sexual activity 
but did not attempt to persuade, induce, 
entice or coerce the alleged minor. Even 
viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government and in the 
context of the totality of the evidence, a 
jury could not find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mahannah had the requisite 
intent to satisfy the second element of 
Section 2422(b), to knowingly attempt 
to persuade, induce, entire or coerce 
a minor.” He also found that the 
government filed to offer “sufficient 
evidence that Mahannah took a 
substantial step toward the commission 
of the crime.” Mahannah testified that 
he set a meeting with the “minor” to 
“advise the minor that what he was doing 
was wrong and could result in a sexually 
transmitted disease.” Concluded Judge 
Hurd, “Once the suggestive influence 
of the investigator was removed, there is 
no evidence that the defendant had any 
intent to persuade a minor or engaged 
in the proposed sexual activity.” Judge 
Hurd noted the lack of any physical 
evidence “to counter Mahannah’s 
stated reason for meeting with the 
minor. After text conservations with 
a very persuasive, very professional 
investigator, riding a bicycle to meet 
the boy to advise him that what he was 
doing was wrong is not a substantial 
step toward the commission of the 
alleged crime.” Thus, the prosecution 
fell apart at the end of the government’s 
case, and the charges against Mahannah 
were dismissed by the court. 
WASHINGTON – Musab Mohammed 
Masmari was sentenced to 120 months 
in federal prison for attempting 
to set fire to a gay club in Seattle, 
“Neighbors,” on New Year’s Eve 2013. 
Masmari was subsequently spotted and 
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identified from a security video and 
was apprehended when he traveled to 
the airport, having purchased a ticket 
to fly to Turkey. He was represented 
by counsel, who advised him to take 
a plea with the understanding that the 
government would recommend the 
mandatory minimum sentence of 60 
months, which it did. An employee of 
Neighbors who was present at the bar 
when the fire was discovered filed a 
victim impact statement and addressed 
the court during sentencing, describing 
the impact that a fire set at Seattle’s 
“largest and longest running gay club” 
on a crowded holiday evening had on 
the LGBT community in that city. Thus 
persuaded, the trial judge, Ricardo S. 
Martinez, sentenced Masmari to double 
the mandatory minimum for his offense. 
On June 15, 2016, Judge Martinez 
rejected Masmari’s motion to set aside 
or correct the sentence downward to 
60 months. Masmari v. U.S., 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78820, 2016 WL 
3780381 (W.D. Wash.). Masmari’s 
main claim was that he suffered from 
ineffective assistance of counsel, 
because his attorney urged him to 
plead guilty based on the government’s 
representation that it would seek the 
mandatory minimum sentence but he 
ended up getting sentenced to twice as 
long. Judge Martinez pointed out that 
even if the government might have had 
difficulty proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt the “knowing and malicious 
intent” necessary for conviction 
under the statute, in part because 
Masmari claimed to be inebriated at 
the time he set the fire, that was not 
a basis for finding defense counsel’s 
recommendation defective. The court 
found that Masmari was not entitled to 
raise a defense of voluntary intoxication 
because this was a general intent crime, 
and that he did not dispute that despite 
his intoxication he had the requisite 
intent to set the fire, intending to cause 
damage to property and persons. (One 
consequence of the fire was more than 
$87,000 in costs to fix up the damage it 
caused, an amount that the court ordered 
Masmari to pay as restitution.) It was 
also noted that the government lived 
up to its promise, but advocating a 60 
month sentence to the court. Masmari, 
now an inmate, represented himself pro 
se on the motion. 
REFUGEE LITIGATION NOTES
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 2ND 
CIRCUIT – How bad are things for gay 
men in Angola? To judge by the July 6 
ruling by a 2nd Circuit panel in Silva v. 
Lynch, 2016 WL 3621925 (not officially 
published), the BIA could plausibly 
resolve the question against the claims 
of a gay Angolan who argued that 
he would be persecuted if forced to 
return there, both by his homophobic 
father and by the general population. 
On March 17, 2015, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals affirmed a 2013 
decision by an Immigration Judge 
denying Silva’s application for asylum, 
withholding of removal, and relief 
under the Convention against Torture. 
Silva did not allege that he had been 
harmed in the past, but claimed “that 
he would be persecuted in the future 
by his father and by the Angolan 
population because he is gay.” Wrote 
the court as to the former, “the agency 
reasonably concluded that there was no 
evidence in the record that the Angolan 
government would be unwilling or 
unable to prevent Silva’s father from 
harming him or punishing his father 
if he did.” The court dismissed the 
salience of a letter from Silva’s mother 
stating “that she was forced to flee 
to the Congo to avoid Silva’s father,” 
because it “was from an interested 
witness who was not subject to cross-
examination.” The burden was on Silva 
to show that his father was likely to 
harm him because of his homosexual 
orientation if he was returned to 
Angola, and the court found that the 
agency could conclude Silva had 
not met that burden. As to Silva’s 
other argument, the court observed 
that “the record contains conflicting 
evidence concerning the prevalence of 
violence against gay men in Angola, 
and the task of resolving conflicts 
in the record evidence is ‘largely 
within the discretion of the agency.’ 
The 2011 State Department Report 
notes that gay men in Angola report 
facing violence and discrimination, 
but it does not disclose the extent of 
that violence or its frequency. Silva 
submitted an additional article stating 
that homosexuals in Angola do not 
reveal their sexual orientation for 
fear of stigma and social exclusion; 
the article also reported on one gay 
man who had rocks thrown at him.” 
But the Department of Homeland 
Security “submitted two articles, 
one of which states that, although 
homosexuality is technically illegal 
in Angola, there are no reports of an 
prosecutions for violating the law, and 
that a new proposed law criminalizes 
discrimination based on sexual 
orientation. Moreover, the articles 
quote an HIV/AIDS activist, as well 
as a human rights observer, to the 
effect that violence against gay men is 
uncommon in Angola and that Angola 
is ahead of other African nations with 
respect to the treatment of LGBT 
individuals.” The court concluded that 
it was up to the BIA, not the court, to 
decide how to resolve this conflicting 
evidence. These claims are supposed 
to be assessed based on conditions in 
the country when the applicant left, not 
present conditions. It appears, however, 
that since 2011 Angola has repealed 
express criminal penalties for gay sex 
and it is at least arguable that more 
recent legislative action might provide 
some protection against discrimination 
because of sexual orientation in that 
country. That is, a recent on-line search 
for information tends to confirm the 
suggestion that conditions for gay 
people have been improving in Angola.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 2ND 
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CIRCUIT – A notably unsympathetic 
2nd Circuit panel rejected the 
contention that hundreds of murders 
of gay men each year in Brazil would 
support a claim that a gay Brazilian 
would have the necessary reasonable 
fear of persecution sufficient to justify 
withholding of removal from the United 
States in Feitosa v. Lynch, 2016 WL 
3190549, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9990 
(June 2, 2016). On December 31, 2014, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals 
affirmed an Immigration Judge’s ruling 
denying the petitioner’s application for 
asylum, withholding of removal and 
relief under the Convention against 
Torture. The court’s summary order 
rejecting the petitioner’s appeal, 
assuming the parties’ familiarity with 
“the underlying facts and procedural 
history in this case,” is skimpy on 
details, not revealing how the petitioner 
came to the United States or the 
circumstances under which his case 
was initiated. The petitioner’s asylum 
petition was untimely, and the court 
held that it had no jurisdiction to review 
the IJ’s dismissal of the asylum petition 
on this ground in the absence of any 
constitutional or legal issues about the 
IJ’s decision; the petitioner “simply 
‘quarrels over the correctness of the 
factual findings,’” wrote the court. As to 
the withholding of removal ruling, the 
petitioner’s burden would be to show 
that past harms he suffered in Brazil 
and/or evidence about conditions for gay 
men in Brazil at the time of his hearing 
would support the conclusion that he 
had a reasonable fear of persecution 
if he were deported to his homeland. 
“Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s 
conclusion that the rapes [petitioner] 
suffered lacked a nexus to a protected 
ground: [petitioner] did not allege 
any facts to support a nexus finding.” 
(Rapes?) It seems the petitioner was 
expelled from his family’s home when 
he was 17, but the court said that this 
“did not rise to the level of persecution” 
because “he found an alternate place to 
live and a job.” As to his fear of future 
persecution, “In this case, [petitioner] 
did not allege any individualized fear 
of persecution (other than his claims 
of past persecution discussed above); 
accordingly, to prove his entitlement 
to relief, he had to show a pattern or 
practice of persecuting or torturing gay 
men in Brazil. His country conditions 
evidence consisted of two newspaper 
articles and one report. This evidence 
revealed numerous troubling incidents 
of violence towards gay men in Brazil. 
However, as the agency concluded, the 
evidence of approximately 188 killings 
of gay men based on their sexual 
orientation in 2012 is not enough to 
establish, by a clear probability, that 
the harm inflicted on gay men in Brazil 
is sufficiently ‘systematic or pervasive 
as to amount to a pattern or practice of 
persecution.’” Wait a minute: hundreds 
of murders in one year does not “amount 
to a pattern or practice of persecution”? 
It is mere coincidence having nothing 
to do with their sexual orientation that 
hundreds of gay men were murdered in 
one year?? One is struck by the irony 
of reading this June 2 statement by 
the 2nd Circuit panel, when the New 
York Times subsequently reported in 
depth about the alarming situation for 
gay people in Brazil. See A. Jacobs, 
Brazil is Confronting an Epidemic of 
Anti-Gay Violence, New York Times, 
July 5, 2016 (website), July 6, 2016 
(print edition) (“Brazilians have been 
confronting their own epidemic of anti-
gay violence – one that, by some counts, 
has earned Brazil the ignominious 
ranking of the world’s deadliest 
place for lesbians, gays, bisexual and 
transgender people.”) Unfortunately, 
under the standards governing judicial 
review of BIA rulings, the court of 
appeals is supposed to focus solely 
on the evidence presenting to the 
Immigration Judge at the time of the 
hearing, limiting its review to the record 
compiled at that time, and to ignore 
later evidence about actual conditions 
in the country at the time it is reviewing 
the decision. This article suggests that 
the petitioner would have good reason 
to fear persecution were he deported 
to Brazil now. He was raped more than 
once as a teenager (the court does not 
mention by whom) but that does not 
constitute, in the eyes of the court, 
“persecution,” because he failed to 
allege that he was raped because he was 
gay? He was thrown out by his family, 
but that’s not persecution because he 
found a place to stay and a job until he 
fled to the U.S. Hundreds of gay men 
are murdered every year in Brazil, a 
situation that has become worse since 
2012 and that the government seems to 
be powerless or unwilling to counter, 
but petitioner has no reasonable fear of 
persecution? This sounds like a system 
designed to evade the facts.  The court 
also rejected the petitioner’s argument 
that the Immigration Judge was biased 
because he failed to expressly deal 
with all the evidence submitted by the 
petitioner in his written decision. “His 
argument that the IJ erred in failing 
to request additional evidence fails 
because it was [petitioner’s] burden to 
establish his eligibility for relief.” The 
petitioner is represented by Maria Isabel 
A.N. Thomas of Princeton, New Jersey. 
In the context of the current situation in 
Brazil, this ruling strikes this writer as 
fundamentally unjust.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 5TH 
CIRCUIT – A gay HIV-positive man 
from Mexico lost his appeal of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial 
of his request for asylum, withholding of 
removal, or relief under the Convention 
against Torture (CAT), in Elizondo v. 
Lynch, 2016 WL 3402589, 2016 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 11086 (5th Cir., June 20, 
2016). Although the court accepted the 
proposition that HIV-positive gay men 
qualify as a “particular social group” 
for purposes of analyzing such claims, 
it found that Elizondo’s evidence 
about his experiences in Mexico did 
not prove that he was persecuted 
because of his membership in that 
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class. “Though Elizondo testified that 
he suffered insults from persons based 
on his homosexuality,” wrote the court 
per curiam, “those comments do not 
qualify as persecution. Elizondo’s 
testimony regarding the robberies he 
suffered and the assault he experienced 
also do not show that he was persecuted 
on account of his membership in 
a particular social group. Further, 
Elizondo did not report any incidents 
to the authorities, and there is no 
evidence in the record that the Mexican 
government is unable or unwilling 
to control the violence.” Apparently, 
the court proceeds oblivious to the 
general media reports about anti-gay 
violence in Mexico or the government’s 
limited ability to control violent acts 
by criminal groups, or the dismissive 
or abusive responses of the police to 
complaints by gay citizens. “The BIA’s 
and the IJ’s decisions that Elizondo 
was not entitled to asylum because he 
failed to establish that he suffered past 
persecution by actors that the Mexican 
government was unwilling or unable to 
control and based on membership in a 
particular social group are supported 
by substantial evidence,” wrote the 
court. “Because Elizondo fails to 
show that he is entitled to relief in the 
form of asylum,” continued the court, 
“he cannot establish entitlement to 
withholding of removal, which requires 
a higher burden of proof. The record 
evidence does not show that it was 
more likely than not Elizondo would be 
tortured if returned to Mexico,” so he 
was not entitled to relief under the CAT, 
either. Elizondo was represented by 
Jodilyn Marie Goodwin of Harlingen, 
Texas on the appeal.
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH 
CIRCUIT – The 9th Circuit announced 
that a majority of active judges in the 
circuit voted to grant en banc rehearing 
of an appeal by a gay, HIV-positive 
Mexican man, whose petition to review 
the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
denial of his application for asylum, 
withholding of removal or protection 
under the Convention against Torture 
was denied last November in a 2-1 
panel decision. Bringas-Rodriguez 
v. Lynch, 805 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 
2015), petition for rehearing en banc 
granted, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10766 
(9th Cir., June 14, 2016). Evidently a 
majority of the judges on the circuit 
found some merit to dissenting Judge 
William Fletcher’s detailed critique of 
the majority opinion. The petitioner 
recounted a lengthy history of sexual 
abuse perpetrated by male members of 
his family throughout his childhood. 
The petitioner, brought to the U.S. 
by his mother and step-father as a 
teenager in 2004, lived in the U.S. 
without incident until he incurred a 
90-day jail sentence at age 20 (in 2010) 
on a charge of “contributing to the 
delinquency of a minor” in Colorado 
when “he was drinking at his house and 
a friend brought over a minor.” After 
he served his sentence, the Department 
of Homeland Security sought to deport 
him, and he filed his application for 
asylum, withholding or CAT protection 
in February 2012. The Immigration 
Judge and the BIA faulted him for not 
going to the authorities when he was 
sexually abused by family members, 
even though at the time these events 
occurred the Mexican police were 
notorious for abusing gays and refusing 
to follow up on these kinds of cases. 
The 3-judge panel decision relied 
on recent State Department country 
reports about recent developments 
concerning LGBT rights in Mexico to 
reject the claim that he could reasonably 
fear persecution in Mexico, but Judge 
Fletcher pointed out that since the 
petitioner last entered the U.S.A. from 
Mexico in 2004, more recent country 
reports were irrelevant. The question 
whether he had a reasonable fear of 
persecution as an openly gay, HIV+ 
man in Mexico is supposed to be 
judged based on the conditions in the 
country at the time he left. Fletcher 
also noted ways in which the IJ and 
panel decisions had misrepresented the 
factual record in the case. Grants of en 
banc rehearing are exceedingly rare in 
cases where the government is seeking 
to deport undocumented non-citizens, 
so the grant of rehearing, which 
effectively quashes the panel decision 
as a precedent, is significant, in light 
of the recent trend of federal appellate 
decisions resisting asylum claims from 
gay Mexicans. (By contrast, the 9th 
Circuit has been very open to asylum 
claims from transgender Mexicans 
over the past few years.) In the huge 
9th Circuit – there are currently 29 
active judges, in addition to many 
senior judges who still hear cases – 
en banc rehearing is carried out in 
11-member panels. In this case, the 
three-judge panel included a district 
judge sitting by designation (who was 
the tie-breaker on the panel), so the 
en banc panel will include the two 
judges from the 3-judge panel and nine 
randomly drawn members from among 
the active judges of the circuit. If Judge 
Fletcher’s views carry the day in the en 
banc panel, the result could be a more 
liberal view of asylum claims from gay 
Mexicans in a circuit which is home to 
a large proportion of the undocumented 
immigrants from Mexico, and thus 
receives a large proportion of their 
petitions to review BIA denials. The 
petitioner’s quest for en banc review in 
this case was supported by five amicus 
briefs that were joined by a wide array 
of LGBT rights groups, disability rights 
groups, organizations concerned with 
refugee issues, and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 
whose brief was prepared by pro bono 
attorneys at Williams & Connolly LLP, 
Washington, D.C. 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH 
CIRCUIT – In Ceron-Martinez v. Lynch, 
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 10380, 2016 WL 
3212256 (June 8, 2016), one sees how 
critical the composition of three-judge 
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panels can be to the possible success of 
a pro se refugee appeal. The petitioner is 
an HIV-positive man from Mexico who 
was denied withholding of removal by 
an Immigration Judge and the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. He sought review, 
arguing that the IJ and the BIA “failed 
to presume the truth of his testimony 
that the hospital [in Mexico] turned 
him away because he had AIDS” even 
though they did not make a finding that 
he lacked credibility. The memorandum 
opinion for the majority of the panel – 
George W. Bush appointees Consuelo 
Callahan and Randy Smith – engaged 
in an extremely technical argument 
disclaiming jurisdiction to deal with 
Ceron’s appeal on the merits, claiming 
he had not sufficiently “exhausted” the 
administrative process. In a strongly-
worded dissent, Senior Judge Dorothy 
Nelson, a Carter appointee, sharply 
disagreed with the majority, finding 
that Ceron had “sufficiently exhausted 
his argument that the IJ and BIA failed 
to presume the truth of his testimony, 
and that he also sufficiently raised a 
pattern or practice of persecution of a 
group of persons claim.” She pointed 
out that Ceron was pro se for “a 
majority of the proceedings before the 
IJ and the BIA,” and that he “adequately 
raised to the BIA the issue of the IJ’s 
consideration of his credibility such 
that we have jurisdiction to consider 
the merits of his argument.” She also 
contended that “a fair reading of 
Ceron’s December 2013 and April 2014 
briefs demonstrates that he has raised a 
pattern or practice claim,” including his 
submission of documentary evidence 
on “the persecution of individuals 
suffering from HIV/AIDS in Mexico, 
such as a news article about a gay, 
HIV-positive man who was tortured, 
beaten and suffocated, and found dead 
with a sign stating in part, ‘This is 
what happens to me for going around 
infecting people with AIDS.” Ceron’s 
brief also described the “widespread 
. . . stigmatization and abuse of HIV-
positive individuals or people with 
AIDS in Mexico” and asserted that he 
“will suffer persecution if forced to 
return to Mexico.” Since they did not 
question his credibility, she wrote, “we 
have jurisdiction to consider Ceron’s 
argument that the IJ and BIA failed to 
presume the truth of his testimony, and 
that Ceron adequately raised a pattern 
or practice claim.” She would have 
granted the petition to review the BIA’s 
decision on the merits. 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 9TH 
CIRCUIT – A gay man from Moldova 
struck out in his appeal of the Board 
of Immigration Appeal (BIA) denial 
of his petition for asylum, withholding 
of removal or protection under the 
Convention against Torture (CAT). 
Zubcu v. Lynch, 2016 WL 3079311, 
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 9944 (9th Cir., 
June 1, 2016). As is frequently the 
case in these summary proceedings, 
the memorandum opinion for the 9th 
Circuit panel does not include a detailed 
recitation of factual allegations. The 
court found that the BIA’s ruling against 
the petitioner on credibility grounds 
was supported by substantial evidence. 
The problem is that he submitted two 
asylum applications, the first grounded 
on a claim that he “was persecuted due 
to his political opinion and religion,” 
the second that he was persecuted 
“based on his sexual orientation.” BIA 
found that the failure to mention sexual 
orientation in the first or to substantiate 
the allegations about political 
persecution fatally undermined the 
petitioner’s credibility, both as to his 
asylum petitions and his CAT claim. 
Furthermore, there was nothing in the 
record to document a contention that he 
was likely to confront torture or serious 
harm if deported back to Moldova. 
The petitioner claimed that his first 
asylum petition was filled out for him 
by a friend to whom he didn’t want to 
disclose his sexual orientation. That 
argument cut no ice with the BIA or the 
court, which quoted a prior case: “the 
record does not compel the finding that 
the IJ’s unwillingness to believe this 
explanation, in light of the importance 
of the omitted incidents in his asylum 
claim, was erroneous.” Petitioner’s 
counsel on appeal was Reynold E. 
Finnegan, II, of Finnegan & Diba, Los 
Angeles.
PRISONER LITIGATION NOTES
CALIFORNIA – On June 6, 2016, the 
United States Supreme Court ruled 
that the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
[“PLRA”] requires inmates to exhaust 
“only such administrative remedies 
that are ‘available’” prior to initiating 
federal civil rights litigation. Ross v. 
Blake, 2016 WL 3128839 at *11, 2016 
U.S. LEXIS 3614 at *27. In Johnson v. 
Perry, 2016 WL 3543503 (E.D. Calif., 
June 24, 2016), United States Magistrate 
Judge Allison Claire summarized the 
exceptions to exhaustion, as identified 
by the Supreme Court, as follows: (1) 
when an administrative procedure 
“operates as a simple dead end – when 
officers [are] unable or consistently 
unwilling to provide any relief to 
aggrieved inmates”; (2) when the 
administrative process is “so opaque 
that if becomes, practically speaking, 
incapable of use,” that is, “no ordinary 
prisoner can discern or navigate it”; 
and (3) “when prison administrators 
thwart inmates from taking advantage 
of a grievance process through 
machination, misrepresentation, or 
intimidation.” Ross, Slip Op. at 9-10. 
Here, prisoner Gilroy E. Johnson alleged 
that officials thwarted his filing of 
grievances, after he suffered retaliation 
following complaining about officer 
misconduct. Screening the case under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2), Judge Claire 
dismissed the complaint for inadequate 
specificity in pleading of exhaustion 
under the PLRA, but the Supreme 
Court’s recognition of exceptions to 
exhaustion (particularly interference 
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with remedies available in theory) is 
validation of where numerous Circuit 
Courts have been trending recently. 
On the merits, Judge Claire also found 
Johnson’s allegations too vague and 
conclusory, but she allowed him to 
replead Eighth Amendment causes of 
action based on: (1) failure to protect; 
(2) purposeful contamination of his 
food; and (3) interference with his legal 
mail. The first claims bears elaboration 
for Law Notes readers. Johnson claimed 
that officials called him gay, a “snitch” 
and a child molester to incite others 
to harm him, stating a potential claim 
of deliberate indifference to his safety 
under Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 
825, 837 (1994). Judge Claire included 
a nationwide string of cases finding 
failure to protect claims based on verbal 
harassment designed to incite inmate-
on-inmate violence. See Valandingham 
v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th 
Cir. 1989) (correctional officer calling 
a prisoner “a ‘snitch’ in the presence of 
other inmates is ‘material’ to a section 
1983 claim for denial of the right not 
to be subjected to physical harm”); 
Thomas v. D.C., 887 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 
(D.D.C. 1995) (telling other inmates 
plaintiff was “a homosexual and a 
‘snitch’”); see also Flores v. Wall, 2012 
WL 4471101, at *12, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 136668, at *41-2 (D.R.I. Aug. 
31, 2012), report and recommendation 
adopted, 2012 WL 4470998, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 139972 (D.R.I. Sept. 25, 
2012) (correctional officers “spreading 
rumors that plaintiff was homosexual 
and a snitch,” citing cases from the 
First, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits 
and District Courts in Kentucky 
and Missouri). Judge Claire denied 
appointment of counsel at this juncture. 
William J. Rold
CALIFORNIA – Law Notes reported 
“California Adopts Guidelines for 
Prisoner Requests for Sex Reassignment 
Surgery,” as part of the settlement of 
the Quine litigation (November 2015 
at page 489). The settlement included 
provision of “other” treatments and 
services, some of which were yet to 
be negotiated. The parties are still 
fighting about them. By Order of June 
9, 2016, which appears to be available 
at this time only in PACER, in Quine 
v. Beard, 3:14-CV-02726 (N.D. Calif.) 
JST (NJV), and in news accounts, U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Nandor J. Vadas (who 
has enforcement of the settlement) 
ruled on some of the minutiae facing 
transgender prisoners on a daily basis. 
He found that transgender prisoners 
should have “at least some access” to the 
following: Pajama/Nightgown, Robe, 
Sandals, Scarf, T-Shirts, and Walking 
Shoes. Chains/necklaces should be 
allowed “in the same manner as 
inmates housed in female institutions”; 
and “supervised access” should be 
permitted for pumice stone, emery 
boards, and curling irons.  By contrast, 
the following items allowed in female 
institutions “may justify a policy that 
does not allow . . . bracelet, earrings, 
hair brush, and hair clips” in male 
institutions. The parties were directed 
to continue to meet and attempt to agree 
about “binders.” Attorneys for Quine 
heralded the decision as challenging 
“gender norms” used to discriminate 
against transgender prisoners, 
according to a report by Associated 
Press, 6/10/16. Shiloh Quine, who is 
serving a life sentence, is set for sex 
reassignment surgery in December. 
She is represented by Morgan Lewis 
& Bockus, LLP, San Francisco, and 
the Transgender Law Center, Oakland. 
William J. Rold
CALIFORNIA – Last fall, U.S. 
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Seng 
dismissed the pro se complaint of 
transgender inmate Dwayne Denegal, 
a/k/a Fatima Shabazz, for failure to 
state a claim in Denegal v. Farrell, 
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122326 (E.D. 
Calif., September 14, 2015), reported in 
Law Notes (October 2015 at pages 462-
3), primarily because she did not then 
have a diagnosis of “gender dysphoria” 
and he regarded her claim to be a 
medical “dispute” about treatment 
that is not actionable under the Eighth 
Amendment (and without citing the 
Ninth Circuit’s reversal of a summary 
dismissal of a transgender prisoner’s 
pro se complaint protesting lack of 
treatment in Rosati v. Igbinoso, 2015 
WL 3916977 (9th Cir. June 26, 2015), 
reported in Law Notes (Summer 2015 
at page 299). Now Denegal is back, 
apparently pleading her entire history 
since childhood and her odyssey in 
prison (per the lengthy recitation in 
the opinion), and Judge Seng will 
allow her to proceed past screening, 
in Denegal v. Farrell, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 88937, 2016 WL 3648956 (E.D. 
Calif., July 8, 2016), so she will be able 
to litigate her claim that she is being 
unconstitutionally denied appropriate 
treatment for the serious medical 
condition of her gender dysphoria. 
Denegal is receiving hormone therapy, 
and this lawsuit is about her demand 
for sex reassignment surgery. In light 
of litigation over this issue in several 
cases last year in the federal courts 
in California, she may have a strong 
case. Surprisingly, the court’s opinion 
does not mention a concession by the 
California Corrections system last 
summer that it may not maintain a 
blanket ban on sex reassignment surgery 
for transgender inmates, regardless 
of credible medical opinion that such 
surgery is “medically necessary” in 
a particular case. William J. Rold & 
Arthur S. Leonard
ILLINOIS – Dannel Maurice Mitchell 
is an HIV+ inmate and a determined 
litigator, with various cases before 
two federal judges in the Southern 
District of Illinois. In Mitchell v. 
Pace, 2016 WL 3087454 (S.D. Ill., 
June 2, 2016), United States District 
Judge J. Phil Gilbert reviewed under 
28 U.S.C. § 1915A the sufficiency 
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of a claim that Mitchell was denied a 
shower after accidentally defecating on 
himself and was forced to clean himself 
in humiliating fashion before other 
inmates and staff. Judge Gilbert found 
that Mitchell stated a claim against the 
corrections officer who said he was 
taking an “unauthorized” shower and 
forced him to leave the shower before 
washing, leaving him with “no other 
option than to clean himself in front of 
his peers in the common area.” Judge 
Gilbert reviewed the claim as one of 
“forced public nudity . . . evaluated 
under the same standard as claims of 
humiliating strip searches.” He found 
that Mitchell “plausibly alleges that the 
[incident] in question was motivated by 
a desire to harass or humiliate rather 
than by a legitimate justification,” 
citing King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 
897 (7th Cir. 2015) and other 7th Circuit 
cases. He found that the officer could 
have issued a ticket for the unauthorized 
shower while still allowing Mitchell to 
clean himself. He ordered service and 
directed that the defendant not waive 
reply under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). In 
Mitchell v. Fulk, 2016 WL 3071993 
(S.D. Ill., June 1, 2016), United States 
District Judge Staci M. Yandle 
addressed preliminary review of claims 
of denial of medical care for HIV 
and other conditions. Without much 
discussion about the actual denials 
of care (which recited mostly a list 
of complaints, including “untreated” 
pain), she found on “liberal” reading 
of the complaint “colorable” claims of 
deliberate indifference under Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), 
against the individual defendants, who 
included physicians and nurses, as well 
as a consultant – if he could be shown 
to be a “state actor” under the standards 
of Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance 
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 822-30 (7th Cir. 
2009). She found inadequate allegation 
of pattern and practice to proceed against 
the corporate defendants (Wexford 
Health Services and the University 
of Illinois), and she dismissed these 
claims without prejudice. The opinion 
includes a review of standards for 
liability generally, including individual 
responsibility of nurses under Holloway 
v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 
1063, 1075 (7th Cir. 2012). She also 
directed service (with addresses to be 
provided in camera, if needed) and 
required responsive pleadings. William 
J. Rold
LOUISIANA – U.S. Magistrate Judge 
Karen Roby Wells dismissed pro 
se HIV+ inmate Pernell C. Kellup’s 
complaint on screening under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A in 
Kellup v. Gusman, 2016 WL 3627321 
(E.D. La., June 9, 2016). Judge Wells 
conducted a Spears hearing – Fifth 
Circuit informational interview with 
pro se inmates to screen cases under 
Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th 
Cir. 1985) – and determined that his 
claims of mold and sewage problems 
in the Orleans Parrish jail system did 
not amount to Eighth Amendment 
violations under Wilson v. Lynaugh, 
878 F.2d 846, 849 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1989). 
Moreover, a one-week delay in receipt 
of HIV medication (while diagnosis 
was confirmed) did not state a claim 
under Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 
102-103 (1976), even though he claimed 
nausea and weight loss during the 
interval. The delay was too short and 
the consequences too small to constitute 
“deliberate indifference” (Fifth Circuit 
string cites omitted). William J. Rold
OKLAHOMA – In Wherry v. Gunter, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87950, 2016 
WL 3676796 (W.D. Okla., July 6, 
2016), Chief U.S. District Judge Joe 
L. Heaton adopted the Report and 
Recommendation of Magistrate Judge 
Charles B. Goodwin, dismissing the 
civil rights complaint of pro se inmate 
Ronnie Wherry, Jr., on initial screening 
(and assessing “one strike” under the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, for 
frivolous pleadings) under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(g). Wherry 
alleged that a guard threatened to 
“spray your black ass” and called him 
“Itsy Bitsy Teeny Weeny,” which he said 
was a homophobic slur in prison. The 
statements were isolated (two remarks 
in one day), and not accompanied by 
physical conduct. Calling the remarks 
“limited commentary” in a prison 
context, Judge Goodwin found violations 
of neither the Eighth Amendment nor 
the Equal Protection Clause. Wherry 
was a California prisoner confined 
at North Fork Correctional Facility 
[“North Fork”], a private prison in 
Oklahoma run by the Tennessee-based 
Corrections Corporation of America 
[“CCA”]. Although a claim was not 
stated against her, the guard engaged 
in state action under West v. Atkins, 
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); but Wherry also 
sued North Fork, which Judge Goodwin 
found not to be amenable to suit.  There 
are no appearances listed in the decision 
(or on PACER), so Judge Goodwin’s 
web page and internet recitations about 
North Fork and its amenability to suit 
apparently are derived from the court’s 
judicial notice and other District Court 
decisions regarding CCA’s operations 
in Oklahoma. Judge Goodwin does not 
discuss whether or not CCA could be 
sued, but it seems academic on these 
facts. William J. Rold
TEXAS – This case raises the issue 
of when a prisoner who has had three 
prior cases dismissed for failure to state 
a claim can nevertheless overcome 
the “three strikes” bar of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act and proceed in 
forma pauperis, because of “imminent 
danger.” Plaintiff Robert Miller alleged 
that a sergeant persuaded medical staff 
to deny him HIV medication for over 
a month and also arranged for another 
inmate to assault him. United States 
District Judge Michael H. Schneider 
ruled that the “imminent danger” 
exception did not apply to allegations 
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about “past acts” in Miller v. University 
of Texas Medical Branch, 2016 WL 
3267346 (June 15, 2016), adopting the 
report of the reviewing United States 
Magistrate, who also noted that, in 
addition to the three prior “strikes,” the 
instant complaint was duplicative of 
yet another lawsuit Miller had pending 
in the Eastern District of Texas. Judge 
Schneider found that the allegations 
of denial of medical care for a fixed 
period in the past and the placement 
of an “enemy” in Miller’s cell to 
facilitate an assault did not meet the 
“imminent danger of serious physical 
injury” exception to the three-strikes 
rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), because 
the danger did not exist at the time 
the federal lawsuit was filed, citing 
Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 
(7th Cir. 2003), and Baños v. O’Guin, 
144 F.3d 883, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1998). 
The dismissal was without prejudice 
to Miller’s proceeding after paying 
the full filing fee, and also without 
prejudice to the Court’s “frivolousness 
analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A” 
should Miller pay the fee and refile. 
William J. Rold
WISCONSIN – Law Notes has twice 
previously written about Wisconsin 
transgender prisoner Dominique Dewayne 
Gulley-Fernandez’s multiple lawsuits 
about conditions of confinement, 
most recently in Gulley-Fernandez v. 
Johnson, 2016 WL 1169470 (E.D. Wisc., 
March 21, 2016), reported in April 2016 
at page 167, wherein U.S. District Judge 
Rudolph T. Randa denied preliminary 
relief but ordered consolidation of 
claims. Now, after defendants have 
answered the most recent pleadings 
(including two new lawsuits), Judge 
Randa again denies preliminary relief 
in Gulley-Fernandez v. Johnson, 
2016 WL 3149714 (E.D. Wisc., June 
3, 2016). Gulley-Fernandez asked 
for a transfer, claiming transphobic 
harassment and unlawful seizure of 
written materials. State officials filed 
an affidavit describing their efforts 
to keep Gulley-Fernandez in general 
population, thwarted, they say, by her 
own conduct (“he continues to yell or 
talk at the cell front and through the 
air vents about his sexual preferences 
which has led many of the other 
inmates getting aggravated”). The state 
also says that the “seized” materials 
were magazines belonging to another 
inmate, where Gulley-Fernandez 
had used the law library typewriter 
to alter addresses in order to receive 
the publications herself. Judge Randa 
found that the submissions indicated 
that Gulley-Fernandez was a “troubled 
individual with behavioral problems 
. . . regularly receiving support at the 
prison . . . [whose] ongoing actions and 
behavior results in the staff moving 
him to restrictive housing. None of the 
staff’s actions resulted from retaliatory 
animus and instead were used to 
protect Gulley.” Gulley-Fernandez 
demonstrated neither irreparable harm 
nor likelihood of success on the merits 
sufficient for preliminary relief. Judge 
Randa has previously denied counsel, 
but he again allows the plaintiff to 
proceed on medical care and protection 
from harm claims. It seems clear that 
Gulley-Fernandez is foundering, and 
legal assistance (and an expert) would 
be useful – and save the court’s time in 
the long run. William J. Rold
LEGISLATIVE & ADMINISTRATIVE
U.S. CONGRESS – Rep. Jason Chaffetz 
(R-Utah), chair of the House Oversight 
& Government Reform Committee, 
held a July 12 hearing on H.R. 2802, 
a bill ironically named the “First 
Amendment Defense Act” that would 
violate the Establishment Clause by 
sheltering those with religiously-based 
objections to same-sex marriage from 
any adverse consequences to their 
employment, tax status or government 
contracts under federal law. The 1st 
Amendment requires the government 
to be neutral in matters of religion, so 
privileging particular religious beliefs 
would seem to be a clear violation of 
such neutrality, as a federal district 
court ruled in preliminarily enjoining 
enforcement of Mississippi’s HB 1523. 
Proponents of the measure asserted 
that it was intended to accommodate 
the religious free exercise rights of 
individuals and institutions and should 
be allowed the same as other provisions 
of federal law that accommodate 
religious observers. The measure 
cannot be enacted during the current 
session of Congress, since Senate 
Democrats would filibuster it and even 
if it were to get through both houses, 
President Obama would veto it.   
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE – 
On June 30, the Defense Department 
issued Release No. NOR-246-16, titled 
“Secretary of Defense Ash Carter 
Announces Policy for Transgender 
Service Members. The policy establishes 
“a construct by which service members 
may transition gender while serving, 
sets standards for medical care, and 
outlines responsibilities for military 
services and commanders to develop 
and implement guidance, training and 
specific policies in the near and long-
term.” Which is DOD bureaucratic 
speak for saying that a process is being 
launched that will roll out over time – 
about a one-year period – but: “Effective 
immediately, service members may 
no longer be involuntarily separated, 
discharged or denied reenlistment 
solely on the basis of gender identity. 
Service members currently on duty 
will be able to serve openly.” This was 
a historic announcement, denied rather 
longer than had been expected when 
Secretary Carter announced shortly 
after his appointment that he would 
launch an effort to figure out how to 
allow transgender people to serve in 
the U.S. military. Carter designated 
Acting Under Secretary of Defense 
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for Personnel and Readiness Peter 
Levine as the point person to work 
with the various military services 
to “monitor and oversee” the effort 
to make appropriate policy changes 
and physical adjustment of facilities. 
“The full policy must be completely 
implemented no later than July 1, 
2017,” says the release. A “Transgender 
Service Member Policy Implementation 
Fact Sheet” can be found on the DoD 
website. While the announced policy 
will allow transgender people already 
in the military to remain, the “initial 
accession policy” governing new 
recruits “will require an individual to 
have completed any medical treatment 
that their doctor has determined is 
necessary in connection with their 
gender transition, and to have been 
stable in their preferred gender for 18 
months, as certified by their doctor, 
before they can enter the military.” In 
other words, young people who have 
been diagnosed with gender dysphoria 
but have not initiated a transition 
process will not be welcome to enlisted 
and initiate their transition process at 
the expense of the Defense Department, 
but those who are already in the service 
and receive the appropriate diagnosis 
from military medical personal will be 
covered for their transition procedures 
to the extent they are deemed 
medically necessary. After a transition 
is completed, marked by a change in 
the Service members “gender marker” 
in the DoD’s personnel system, they 
“will use berthing, bathroom, and 
shower facilities associated with their 
gender.” Any complaints of anti-
trans discrimination will be handled 
through DoD’s established equality 
opportunity channels. 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT 
COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS – On 
June 15 the Labor Department 
published final regulations instructing 
federal contractors how to comply 
with E.O. 112146, as amended by 
President Obama to extend the ban on 
discrimination by federal contractors 
to sexual orientation and gender 
identity. This was the first time since 
the 1970s that the Department updated 
its sex discrimination guidelines. 
According to a fact sheet issued to 
announce the new guidelines, the new 
rules bring the sex discrimination 
guidelines “from the ‘Mad Men’ era to 
the modern era.” The final regulations, 
which were first published as proposed 
rules on January 30, 2015, go into 
effect on August 15, 2016.
ARKANSAS – A Texarkana non-
discrimination ordinance that had 
been adopted unanimously by the City 
Council was repealed in a referendum 
vote on June 28 by 3,409 to 881. Only 
20% of the voters favored keeping the 
ordinance! The ordinance dealt with 
city employment and city contractors, 
and included sexual orientation and 
gender identity as forbidden grounds 
for discrimination. Opponents whipped 
up a storm against the measure by 
calling it a “bathroom bill” and raising 
fears that the measure would endanger 
women and children by allowing 
transgender predators into bathrooms. 
In reporting on the vote, the Arkansas 
Times speculated that it was prelude 
to a state “bathroom bill” in 2017, 
confirming that Arkansas voters 
overall are clueless about transgender 
people and their lives. Arkansas 
Times, June 29. * * * The Arkansas 
Legislative Council’s Administrative 
Rules and Regulations Subcommittee 
gave final approval on July 12 of a 
regulation to allow counselors to refuse 
to work with clients if the counselor 
has a “conflict of conscience.” Critics 
of the new measure claim it permits 
discrimination by counselors against 
LGBT clients. The rule protects 
counselors from sanctions for referring 
away clients because of an “ethical, 
moral or religious principle” held by the 
counselor. The head of the state Board 
of Examiners in Counseling, defending 
the rule, said it was necessary to 
protect the rights of both counselors an 
clients, and that counselors would be 
required to perform “due diligence” by 
consulting with a peer before exercise 
their right to refuse services. The 
American Counseling Association’s 
CEO, Rich Yep, told the press that 
this new rule “directly violates” the 
organization’s standards and “creates 
an environment” for discrimination. 
“As a profession dedicated to diversity 
and inclusivity, we urged them not 
to pass this,” he wrote, stating that 
the ACA “remains steadfast in its 
opposition to this unethical law 
that enables prejudice.” Little Rock 
Democrat Gazette, July 13.
CALIFORNIA – Palm Springs City 
Council voted unanimously on July 
6 to approve an ordinance to convert 
all single-stall restrooms in public 
buildings to being gender-neutral. The 
ordinance also applies to businesses 
accessible to the public, such as bars, 
restaurants, and retail stores. The 
intent is to protect transgender people 
who fear harassment when using 
public facilities consistent with their 
gender identity. A similar ordinance 
passed last year by Cathedral City 
took effect on January 1, 2016. The 
Council is also considering possible 
legislation to encourage businesses 
to increase privacy in restrooms by 
installing floor-to-ceiling toilet stalls. 
The council is also considering a bill 
that would require anybody doing 
business with the city to adopt an equal 
benefits plan, under which employers 
would be barred from discrimination 
because of sexual orientation in the 
administration of their benefit plans. 
Desert Sun, July 8. * * * The City of 
Long Beach Council voted 8-0 to halt 
“nonessential” travel to North Carolina 
or Mississippi until their governments 
repeal recently enacted anti-LGBT 
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laws. The vote also called for City 
Hall to draft letters to the governors 
of those states demanding repeal of 
the laws. The council acted on the 
recommendation of the city’s Human 
Relations Commission. Long Beach 
Press-Telegram, June 23. We wonder 
whether Governor McCrory (N.C.) or 
Governor Bryant (MI) will deign to 
answer the letters.
DELAWARE – The Delaware Senate 
gave unanimous approval on June 9 
to a bill amending the definition of 
misconduct as ground for divorce 
to remove “homosexuality” and 
“lesbianism,” reported the Associated 
Press on June 10. “The divorce 
law defines marital misconduct as 
behavior by a spouse so destructive 
that a person filing for divorce 
could not reasonably be expected to 
continue in the relationship,” said 
the report, given other examples of 
conduct listing in the statute: adultery, 
bigamy, criminal conviction with a 
penalty of imprisonment for a year or 
more, habitual drinking or drug use, 
contracting a sexually-transmitted 
disease. The measure had already 
been approved by the House and was 
sent to Governor Jack Markell for his 
approval.
FLORIDA – The Florida Department 
of Children and Families has reinstated 
a proposal explicitly banning bullying 
and harassment of LGBT foster 
children in group homes, after the 
withdrawal of the proposal at the 
instance of the Scott Administration, 
had generated a “public outcry” by 
civil rights groups, child-welfare 
advocates and former foster youth, 
according to a July 7 report in the 
Orlando Sentinel. The Department 
announced that it is creating a position 
for a full-time ombudsman to deal with 
discrimination complaints that might 
be reported to an anonymous hotline 
that it will operate. The proposed 
rule will also ban facility staff from 
any “attempt to change or discourage 
a child’s sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or gender expression.” The 
DCF Secretary, Mike Carroll, denied 
that the June 12 shootings at the Pulse 
nightclub in Orlando had anything to 
do with the Department’s decision to 
reverse its withdrawal of the proposal. 
Of course, the Florida Conference of 
Catholic Bishops, which presumably 
supports bullying and harassment 
of gay youth in order to scare them 
straight, announced its opposition to 
the proposal, purportedly basing it 
on concern for “other children” who 
might be required to share a bedroom 
with “someone who ‘identifies’ as the 
same gender but remains biologically 
different” and thus be subjected to 
assaults. Bizarre!  * * * The Miami 
Beach Commission voted unanimously 
to adopt a ban on “conversion therapy” 
offered by licensed health care 
providers to minors on June 8. The 
vote came in the wake of the Florida 
legislature’s failure to pass H.B. 137, 
a bill that was introduced by Miami 
Beach’s openly gay state representative, 
David Richardson.  Safeguarding 
America’s Values for Everyone, Press 
Release, June 8.
GUAM – Guam is subject to Title IX 
and receives funding for its public 
schools from the U.S. government, so 
efforts are under way to comply with 
the requirements to accommodate 
transgender students. Pacific Daily 
News (July 4) reported that the 
University of Guam and the Guam 
Community College have both 
signified that transgender students 
may access restrooms consistent 
with their gender identity, and that 
any newly constructed facilities will 
include gender-neutral restrooms 
in order to provide an appropriate 
choice of facilities to all students. Jon 
Fernandez, superintendent of the Guam 
Department of Education, indicated 
that every year Guam’s educational 
systems receive more than $45 million 
in federal funds that are essential to 
operation of the system. 
HAWAII – On June 29, Governor 
David Ige signed H.B. 2084 into law, 
prohibiting insurers in the states from 
discrimination against individual 
because of their gender identity. 
Honolulu Civil Beat, July 2.
ILLINOIS – The Chicago City 
Council voted on June 22 to delete a 
provision of the city’s Human Rights 
Ordinance that allowed operators of 
public accommodations to require 
patrons to present government-issued 
identification if their use of sex-
designated facilities such as restrooms 
or locker rooms was questioned. The 
provision was attacked as a means of 
“outing” and embarrassing transgender 
patrons. 
INDIANA – The Howard County 
Commissioners approved on June 20 an 
amendment to the county’s fair housing 
ordinance to add sexual orientation, 
gender identity and marital status as 
prohibited grounds of discrimination, 
in order to be sure that the county would 
be able to receive pending grants from 
the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development. The measure was 
passed “under protest” – not because 
the commissioners did not want to ban 
discrimination against LGBT people, 
but because they felt that the phrase 
“actual or perceived” that was included 
to track HUD language was ambiguous 
and could create enforcement problems. 
Kokomo Tribune, June 22.
IOWA – Seizing upon a poorly-worded 
brochure published by the Iowa 
Civil Rights Commission, the Fort 
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Des Moines Church of Christ filed 
a lawsuit seeking to claim a religious 
exemption from any obligation to allow 
transgender persons to use restrooms in 
the church consistent with their gender 
identity. The offending brochure, 
published in 2008, appeared to require 
churches to allow persons attending 
religious services that were “open to 
the public” to comply with the anti-
discrimination law’s gender identity 
provision. However, in response to this 
lawsuit and the threat of another by the 
Cornerstone World Outreach Church 
of Sioux City, the Commission quickly 
issued a revised brochure clarifying that 
places of worship are generally exempt 
from the public accommodations 
provisions except when they are used 
as polling places, are operating as day 
care centers, or engaged in other non-
religious activities. The Commission 
said that it has never been asked to 
consider a complaint against a church 
in a gender identity case since the 
statute was amended in 2007 to add 
gender identity protection. Indeed, the 
Commission’s director said that the 
Commission “has not done anything 
to suggest it would be enforcing these 
laws against ministers in the pulpit, 
and there has been no new publication 
or statement from the ICRC raising the 
issue.” One suspects that the lawsuit 
was brought to make a political point 
rather than in anticipation of having 
to defend discrimination claims. Such 
suspicions are fed by the identification 
of the church’s legal counsel: Alliance 
Defending Freedom, an organization 
that is busy stirring up anti-gay and 
anti-transgender litigation at every 
opportunity. Des Moines Register, July 9.
KANSAS – The State Board of 
Education voted unanimously to 
“ignore” the federal Education 
Department’s directive to school 
systems that receive federal money 
concerning their obligation under Title 
IX of the Education Amendments Act 
to afford appropriate restroom access 
for transgender students. The vote 
left it up to individual school districts 
to decide whether to comply. The 
Associated Press reported that Kansas 
receives over $479 million in federal 
assistance for its public schools, 
about 10% of the state’s education 
budget. The Obama Administration 
has instigated lawsuits against some 
school districts, but has avowed that it 
will not take action to suspend federal 
funding pursuant to Title IX until the 
federal courts definitely uphold this 
interpretation of the law. 
KENTUCKY – The Bowling Green 
City Commission voted on July 5 to 
approve a syringe exchange program 
as a public health measure to combat 
the spread of disease. The program 
is being developed by the Warren 
County Health Department. The action 
responds to S.B. 192, passed by the 
Kentucky General Assembly in March, 
which allows local governments to set 
up such programs. Bowling Green Daily 
News, July 6. * * * Attorney General 
Matt Beshear’s office has issued a 
formal opinion that Rowan County 
Clerk Kim Davis violated the state’s 
Open Records Act by denying a request 
by the Campaign for Accountability for 
copies of any documents reflecting a 
retainer or attorney-client engagement 
agreement between Davis or her staff 
and Liberty Counsel, the anti-gay 
religious organization that represented 
her in her marriage license battle 
before the federal district court. Davis 
had incompletely replied to the request, 
and then refused a request by the 
Attorney General’s office to see the 
documents that she had withheld under 
her claim of privilege. The opinion 
does not state that she violated the 
Act by withholding documents from 
Campaign for Accountability, but 
rather that she violated it by refusing to 
allow the Attorney General’s Office to 
examine the documents she claimed to 
be exempt from disclosure to a member 
of the public. Davis’s attorney at 
Liberty Counsel, Mat Staver, said that 
the documents covered by the Opinion 
would be provided to the AG’s office. 
Liberty Counsel has represented Davis 
pro bono, of course. Louisville Courier-
Journal, July 6. * * * The Kentucky 
Department of Corrections has ended a 
policy that allowed prison wardens to 
ban incoming sexually-oriented mail 
for inmates if they concluded that it 
would “promote homosexuality.” The 
ACLU of Kentucky had challenged the 
policy on First Amendment grounds. 
Corrections Commissioner Rodney 
Ballard issued a revised inmate male 
policy to prison staff during the first 
week of June, stating that all “sexually 
explicit materials” (defined as “pictorial 
depictions of nudity” or “actual or 
simulated sexual acts”) would be 
prohibited, regardless of whether it has 
anything to do with homosexuality. 
Henderson Gleaner, June 9. 
MAINE – A group calling itself 
Equal Rights Not Special Rights 
(very unoriginal name, derived from 
the people who sponsored Colorado 
Amendment 2 in 1992) has launched 
a referendum effort to repeal the 
provision of the Maine Human Rights 
Act prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination.  The addition of sexual 
orientation to the Human Rights Act 
was approved by Maine voters in 2005 
by a 55-45 percent margin, after a 
previous referendum had repealed a 
legislative enactment. The proponents 
of the new effort asserted that it was 
necessary to protect the religious free 
exercise rights of those who do not 
wish to associated with homosexuals 
or have an involvement with same-sex 
marriages. The Maine legislature’s 
attempt to enact same-sex marriage 
was repealed in a 2009 referendum, 
but then in 2012 a referendum vote 
approved same-sex marriage by 53-
47 percent. A 2014 NY Times poll 
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showed 63% support for same-sex 
marriage among Maine residents. The 
proponents have one year from the 
time they start collecting signatures to 
obtain at least 61,123 valid signatures 
of registered voters in order to get the 
measure on the November 2017 general 
election ballot.  Portland Press, July 9.
MASSACHUSETTS – Negotiators 
from the state House and Senate 
reached a compromise on a bill to 
add protection against discrimination 
because of gender identity in places 
of public accommodation to the state’s 
Law Against Discrimination, and the 
measure passed both houses easily 
in a vote on July 7. Governor Charlie 
Baker, a Republican who had opposed 
the original bill, had later signaled that 
he would be inclined to sign the House 
version, which included a provision 
requiring the Attorney General to issue 
guidance and when and how action 
could be taken against people who 
assert gender identity for “an improper 
purpose.” This measure was intended 
to get at the phony objection cited by 
opponents that forbidding this kind 
of discrimination will expose women 
and children to danger from attack 
in public restrooms. A version of this 
provision survived in the compromise 
bill. Boston Globe, July 8. Governor 
Baker signed the measure into law on 
July 8. It becomes effective on Oct. 1, 
a compromise date between the Senate 
and House versions.
MICHIGAN – The City Council of 
Howell voted unanimously on June 27 
to approve a new antidiscrimination 
ordinance that prohibits employment 
and housing discrimination on various 
grounds, including sexual orientation 
and gender identity. A local press 
report said that 38 other Michigan 
communities have adopted similar 
ordinance, and that Howell’s was 
patterned on one enacted three years ago 
in Battle Creek. The ordinance provides 
exemptions for religious organizations, 
and does not cover places of public 
accommodation. Livingston County 
Daily Press, June 29. * * * The Portage 
City Council voted 6-1 on June 28 to 
approve an ordinance that would ban 
discrimination in housing, employment 
and public accommodations because of 
sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Newschannel3.com.
MISSISSIPPI – The Jackson City 
Council voted 7-0 on June 14 to include 
sexual orientation and gender identity 
in the city’s anti-discrimination 
ordinance covering housing, public 
accommodations and employment, and 
also to expand the hate crimes ordinance 
to encompass these categories. The 
vote was a sign of defiance to the state 
government, which legislated earlier 
this year to allow individuals and 
organizations with religious or moral 
objections to marriage equality and sex 
outside of heterosexual marriage to act 
in accord with their beliefs. As noted 
above, the state statute, which was to 
go into effect on July 1, did not do so 
because of a last-minute preliminary 
injunction issued by the U.S. District 
Court, finding that plaintiffs were 
likely to prevail on their claim that the 
statute violates the federal constitution. 
As Jackson is the only jurisdiction 
within Mississippi that prohibits such 
discrimination, the state law was 
largely symbolic with respect to the 
rest of the state but threatened to render 
the Jackson ordinance unenforceable. 
NEW HAMPSHIRE – On June 30, 
Governor Margaret Hassan signed 
Executive Order 2016-04, expanding 
the state’s existing anti-discrimination 
executive order to include gender 
identity or gender expression.  The 
order applies to state agencies in their 
employment practices and provision of 
services, and requires that executive 
branch contracts and grants include 
anti-discrimination provisions that 
cover gender identity or expression. 
State agencies are directed to review 
all their policies to bring them into 
compliance, with the Division of 
Personnel charged to provide guidance 
to state agencies by September 15 and 
propose any necessary rule changes. 
NEW JERSEY – After a city resident 
and Garden State Equality asked the 
town of Clifton to fly a rainbow flag 
to celebrate gay pride, Town Council 
divided evenly on the question, but 
Mayor Jim Anzali broke the tie at a 
June 6 meeting in favor of flying the 
flag. The mayor said he did not think 
that flying a pride flag “is going to hurt 
anybody.” A flag raising ceremony was 
held on June 25. AP State News, June 9.
NEW YORK – The State Division of 
Human Rights, which enforces the New 
York State Human Rights Law, has 
published a new regulation prohibiting 
discrimination based on an individual’s 
relationship or association with a 
member of a “protected class.” Gay 
people are explicitly protected under 
the statute, and a recent regulation 
promulgated by the agency provides 
that transgender people are also 
covered, both within the ambit of sex 
discrimination, and for those dealing 
with gender dysphoria, the ambit of 
the disability discrimination provision. 
In a press release announcing the new 
regulations, the Division gave the 
following example of what might be 
prohibited: “job seekers may not be 
denied employment because of the 
gender identity, transgender status, or 
other protected characteristics of their 
spouses.” JD Supra, June 29.
NEW YORK – The New York City 
Council approved an ordinance on 
June 21 that requires single-stall public 
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bathrooms to be gender-neutral. The 
measure, which takes effect January 1, 
2017, was approved by a vote of 47-2. 
The measure would apply to any single-
stall restroom that is open to public use. 
Restaurants and other retail businesses 
in New York have already begun putting 
up new identifying signs on restrooms 
to indicate that people are welcome 
to use restrooms consistent with their 
gender identity. 
NEW YORK – The New York City 
Civilian Complaint Review Board 
issued its first comprehensive report 
on relationships between the LGBT 
community and the New York City 
Police Department in a document 
titled “Pride, Prejudice and Policing: 
An Evaluation of LGBTQ-Related 
Complaints from January 2010 through 
December 2015.” The document is 
available on the Board’s website: http://
www.nyc.gov/ccrb. It contains detailed 
breakdowns with graphs and charts 
of complaints filed with the Board 
concerning conduct by NYPD staff 
towards LGBTQ community members. 
Overall, the data show that the volume 
of complaints in this category were at a 
peak in 2012 and have declined in each 
subsequent year. 
NEW YORK – Long Beach City Council 
voted unanimously on June 21 to 
add gender identity to the city’s 
anti-discrimination policy for its 
employees. The policy covers both 
discrimination and harassment. The 
city’s anti-discrimination ordinance 
does not cover use of bathrooms or 
other facilities, however. Newsday, 
June 23.
NORTH CAROLINA – The Charlotte 
Mecklenburg Schools updated their 
policies to comply with the U.S. 
Education Department’s requirements 
under Title IX, in open defiance of the 
state’s H.B.2. Transgender students can 
either use the bathroom they prefer or 
can request access to a private facility 
(such as a restroom in a school nurse’s 
office). Staff members are instructed 
to address students by the name and 
pronoun corresponding to their gender 
identity. The governor’s office issued a 
statement criticizing the school district 
as having made a “radical change” to 
its policies. H.B. 2 is under attack in 
several court proceedings, and motions 
for preliminary injunctions against its 
enforcement are pending. abc11.com, 
June 21.
OHIO – The City Council of Newark, 
Ohio, voted unanimously to amend 
its equal employment opportunity, 
fair housing and ethnic intimidation 
laws to add “sexual orientation,” 
“gender identity,” and “gender 
expression” as protected categories. 
Newark Advocate, July 6. * * * A 
little “zing” to the GOP? On July 13, 
the City Council in Cleveland, Ohio, 
unanimously repealed a provision in 
its anti-discrimination ordinance that 
had allowed limitations on restroom 
access by transgender individuals. 
The city’s 2009 anti-discrimination 
ordinance included gender identity, 
but expressly allowed employers and 
businesses to limit restroom access 
based on biological sex. The proposal 
to change that was introduced in 2013, 
but remained dormant until somebody 
woke up and decided it would be a good 
idea to move the repeal measure prior 
to the Republican Convention. Under 
the revised law, transgender people can 
use facilities that are consistent with 
their gender identity in workplaces and 
places of public accommodation. * * * 
The Cincinnati Public Library Board 
voted unanimously to reject a request 
by a transgender employee to cover 
her gender confirmation surgery under 
the health insurance plan. Although 
costs were not discussed publicly, a 
member of the board asserted that it 
would not be “fair” to ask “the public” 
to pay for the procedure. The vote 
affirmed a recommendation from the 
board’s human resources committee. 
Cincinnati Enquirer, June 15.
OREGON – The Oregon Division 
of Motor Vehicles stated that it may 
need a substantial period of time in 
order to modify the software used to 
generate drivers’ licenses in order to 
accommodate a court order granting 
an individual’s petition to get a license 
that does not designate them as either 
male or female. On June 10, Judge 
Amy Holmes Hehn of the Multnomah 
County Circuit Court granted a petition 
by Jamie Shupe of Portland, born with 
male anatomy but seeking a license that 
does not assign Shupe a specific legal 
gender. Shupe had undergone hormone 
therapy after retiring from the military, 
stating that “transitioning to female 
was the only option available then” but 
refusing to embrace the gender binary. 
“It feels amazing to be free from a 
binary sex classification system that 
inadequately addressed who I really 
am, a system in which I felt confined,” 
said Shupe in response to Judge Hehn’s 
ruling. A spokesperson for the DMV 
said that they had been in touch with 
Shupe. “At this point, we can’t fulfill 
the request,” said David House, “but 
we are studying it to figure out what 
computer system changes and statutory 
changes might need to be made.” 
He said that the existing database 
program did not support a “third kind 
of sex designation.” cnn.com, June 12; 
Statesmanjournal.com, June 22.
PENNSYLVANIA – The Philadelphia 
School Reform Commission voted 
on June 16 to approve a new policy 
allowing transgender students to use 
restrooms and joint groups – including 
athletic teams – that correspond with 
their gender identity, reported the 
Associated Press. Students will be 
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allowed to determine which pronouns 
should be used to address them, and 
can wear clothing consistent with 
their gender identity at school. * * * 
The Pittsburgh School Board voted 
unanimously on June 22 to approve a 
districtwide policy outlining the rights, 
protections, and support systems that 
school must provide for transgender 
students, reported the Associated 
Press. The policy allows students to use 
bathrooms and participate in physical 
education classes and intramural 
sports that “align with their gender 
identity,” according to the AP report. 
Students may also determine the 
preferred name and gender pronouns 
to be used for them. * * * Proposals to 
amend the state’s anti-discrimination 
law to cover sexual orientation and 
gender identity have been blocked for 
many years in legislative committees 
with Republicans controlling both 
houses, but a bill to protect LGBT 
people from discrimination received 
Senate committee approval in June 
after the Orlando massacre. However, 
in order to win enough votes from 
Republicans to approve the measure, 
sponsors agreed to remove coverage of 
public accommodations. Sharon Herald, 
June 28. Republicans generally believe 
that allowing transgender people to use 
restrooms consistent with their gender 
identity will lead to the destruction of 
Western Civilization as we know it. 
(They don’t seem to have realized that 
transgender people have been using 
restrooms consistent with their gender 
identity since the beginning of recorded 
time, during which Western Civilization 
seems to have advanced . . . ) Actually, 
we’re just kidding. What Republican 
legislators probably believe, with 
some justification, is that if they vote 
to approve such a measure, they will 
attract primary opponents when they 
seek re-election who will based their 
campaigns on the fear-engendering 
argument that letting transgender 
women use women’s restrooms puts 
cisgender women and children at risk of 
violation of their privacy and possible 
sexual assault by cisgender men posing 
as transgender women in order to get 
fraudulent access to the facilities. In 
order to lend credence to such fears, 
some anti-transgender men have 
started to invade women’s restrooms in 
a few isolated cases in order to make 
this seem like a real possibility. Of 
course, a law that protects the right 
of transgender people to use facilities 
consistent with their gender identity 
would not authorize a cisgender man to 
use a restroom designated for women!! 
RHODE ISLAND – The United 
Healthcare plan covering Rhode 
Island state employees began 
covering hormone therapy and sex 
reassignment surgery for transgender 
state employees as of July 1, according 
to an announcement by Governor Gina 
Raimondo on June 23. According to 
a report by the Providence Journal 
(June 24), Rhode Island is the twelfth 
state to extend such coverage to its 
employees. Rhode Island was among 
the early states to forbid gender identity 
discrimination, dating back 15 years. 
The coverage for “irreversible surgical 
interventions” is limited to employees 
18 years or older, and surgical coverage 
is only available for persons who 
have completed twelve months of 
“successful continuous full time real 
life experience in the desired gender.”
TENNESSEE – The Nashville Metro 
Council voted to eliminate the 
requirement that businesses with single-
toilet restrooms have separate facilities 
for labeled as being exclusively for men 
or women. The Council unanimously 
voted to “broaden exceptions for 
unisex restrooms, which are only 
allowed in Nashville businesses that 
fall below a square-footage threshold,” 
reported the Memphis Commercial 
Appeal on June 25. The measure 
was introduced by a councilmember 
after constituents who wanted to open 
a vegetarian restaurant with a unisex 
bathroom were told by Metro codes 
inspectors that they could not have 
unisex restrooms because of the size 
of their establishment. Councilman 
Brett Withers said that he learned 
that several restaurants and other 
businesses were in violation of code 
provisions because they wanted to 
make single-user restroom facilities 
available to all patrons regardless of 
sex or gender identity. The new law 
authorizes “unisex restrooms at most 
businesses that have two or more 
bathroom facilities that each consist of 
single toilets and have locks.”
TEXAS – Responding to an inquiry 
from Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick, Texas 
Attorney General Ken Paxton issue A.G. 
Opinion KP-0100 on June 28, advising 
that the Fort Worth Independent 
School District’s superintendent had 
violated chapters 11 and 26 of the 
Texas Education Code by unilaterally 
adopting a policy providing that school 
officials will not advise parents about 
the gender identity of their children 
without the children’s permission. The 
superintendent adopted “Guidelines” 
on transgender students in April, which 
were stated to be mandatory for the 
current school year. The guidelines were 
developed by district staff and were 
adopted without any chance for public 
comment or school board vote. Paxton 
asserted that state law protects the right 
of parents to information about their 
children. The Guidelines, on the other 
hand, assert that students have a right to 
privacy, including “keeping a student’s 
actual or perceived gender identity and 
expression private,” and directed that 
school personnel “may only share this 
information on a need-to-know basis 
or as the student directs. This includes 
sharing information with the student’s 
parent or guardian.” The Guidelines also 
direct that students have a right to control 
the degree to which parents or guardians 
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will be involved with the “transitioning” 
process of the student. Paxton opined that 
to the extent the Guidelines subordinate 
the rights of parents provided by 
Chapter 26, and were adopted without 
the input of the public and the school 
district’s board, they violate Chapter 11. 
Austin American-Statesman, June 29. 
Some of this may be sour grapes, since 
Patrick and Paxton were looking for an 
appropriately-situated school district to 
be a plaintiff in the law suit attacking the 
Obama Administration’s construction 
of Title IX to cover gender identity 
discrimination in schools, and they 
had hoped to enlist Fort Worth, until it 
developed that the school superintendent 
refused to play along. As a result, they 
ended up using a tiny rural district that 
does not appear to have any transgender 
students. 
UTAH – The Utah County Board of 
Commissioners voted unanimously on 
July 5 to add gender identity, sexual 
orientation, and pregnancy/pregnancy-
related conditions to the county’s non-
discrimination policy, which makes 
the County’s personnel rules and 
regulations match up with those of the 
state government. In 2015, the famous 
“Utah compromise” resulted in the 
addition of gender identity and sexual 
orientation to the state’s civil rights 
law. Thus, the Commissioners’ action 
was mainly symbolic, since the county 
was already required to comply with 
state law. However, County Personnel 
Director Lana Jensen said, “We are 
just making sure everyone is aware 
those are officially part of the protected 
categories.” Provo Daily Herald, July 5. 
WASHINGTON – Proponents of an 
initiative that would repeal a state rule 
allowing transgender people to use 
restroom facilities consistent with their 
gender identity failed to file petition 
signatures by the statutory deadline to 
get on this November’s ballot. In light 
of current voting statistics, proponents 
would need at least 246,372 valid 
signatures from registered voters to 
qualify their initiative. At the rate 
that signatures tend to be disqualified, 
this means that they would actually 
have to get at least 325,000 signatures 
to survive any challenge and get to 
the ballot. They had scheduled an 
appointment to turn in the signatures by 
the July 8 deadline, but they contacted 
the secretary of state’s office on July 7 
to cancel the appointment. AP Alerts, 
July 8.
LAW & SOCIETY NOTES
MASSACRE AT ORLANDO GAY 
BAR – On June 12, Omar Mateen 
brought an arsenal of weapons into 
Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, 
and opened fire, ultimately killing 49 
people in the crowded gay-oriented 
club and wounding scores more. Most 
of the dead were Hispanic LGBT 
people who were there celebrating a 
theme night at the bar. During the hours 
of his rampage and hostage taking, 
Mateen communicated allegiance to 
various Islamic terrorist groups. He 
died when law enforcement officers 
forced their way into the bar to rescue 
the remaining patrons and exchanged 
gunfire with him. Afterwards some 
survivors claimed that Mateen had 
frequented the bar in the past, and some 
gay individuals claimed to have had 
contact with him through gay-oriented 
cruising apps, at least one person 
claiming to have had sex with him. His 
first wife speculated that he may have 
been a closeted gay man. However, 
a month later federal investigators 
asserted that these claims were not 
substantiated. Immediate reaction from 
Obama Administration officials was to 
describe it both as a terrorist act and 
a hate crime, although again federal 
law enforcement officials a month 
later were insisting that there was no 
evidence Mateen was anti-gay, which 
would seem an odd thing to say about 
a man who invaded a gay bar, shooting 
and killing people and, according to 
some survivors, voicing anti-gay slurs. 
Much remains to be learned about 
this occurrence, which was generally 
accounted the worst multiple-shooting 
incident in the United States for a 
century or more. It stimulated rallies 
and memorial services internationally, 
but did not appear to have any 
discernible effect on Republicans in 
the U.S. Congress, who subsequently 
sought to repeal President Obama’s 
executive order barring anti-LGBT 
discrimination by defense contractors 
leading to an impasse in Congress over 
a defense spending bill and callously 
scheduled exactly a month later a 
committee hearing on a proposed 
“First Amendment Defense Act” 
intended to “protect” individuals and 
institutions who sought to discriminate 
against LGBT people based on their 
religious views. (It seemed clear that 
a main goal of the bill was to protect 
non-profit educational institutions 
from losing their privileged federal 
tax status if they violated Title IX by 
discriminating against married same-
sex couples.)
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION – The 
Republican and Democrat National 
Conventions were scheduled to begin 
on July 18 and July 25, respectively. At 
our deadline, presumptive Republican 
Presidential Candidate Donald Trump 
had announced that he would nominate 
Indiana Governor Michael Pence to 
be his running mate. Trump has never 
held elective office or any government 
position. Pence, who served six terms 
in the House of Representatives before 
winning election as governor of 
Indiana, had a solidly anti-gay voting 
record in the House, according to 
Human Rights Campaign. As governor, 
he is most famous for having advocated 
and signed into law an extreme 
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Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
that critics claims would sanction 
anti-gay discrimination by Indiana 
businesses; blowback from the business 
community was so severe that Pence 
reluctantly signed an amendment 
providing that the RFRA could not be 
raised as defense to a discrimination 
claim. Pence describes himself as an 
Evangelical Christian. Trump’s views 
on LGBT issues are a moving target. At 
times in the past he voiced support for 
same-sex marriage, criticized attempts 
to police transgender access to public 
restrooms, and supported measures 
to ban anti-gay discrimination, but 
in the course of his current run 
for the Republican nomination he 
backed away from all those positions, 
announced that he would appoint 
Justices to the Supreme Court who 
would overrule the marriage equality 
decision, and affirmed that he would 
rescind President Obama’s executive 
orders requiring federal contractors 
not to discriminate because of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Neither 
Trump nor Pence raised any objection 
to the product of the Republican 
Platform Committee, which opposes 
the Equality Act, criticizes the Supreme 
Court’s marriage equality decision, and 
endorses conversion therapy to “cure” 
homosexuality. As we went to press, 
presumptive Democratic President 
Candidate Hillary Clinton had not 
announced her choice for running 
mate. Clinton, who was First Lady of 
Arkansas and the United States during 
her husband’s administrations, served 
as U.S. Senator from New York and as 
President Obama’s first Secretary of 
State. She supported the repeal of the 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” military policy, 
the invalidation of the Defense of 
Marriage Act, and the Supreme Court’s 
Obergefell decision, although some 
critics noted that DADT and DOMA 
were both signed into law by her 
husband, President Bill Clinton, and 
she did not endorse marriage equality 
until after President Obama had done so 
during his 2012 re-election campaign. 
The proposed party platform work 
out by a committee dominated by her 
supporters calls for enactment of the 
Equality Act and generally endorses 
equality rights for LGBT people under 
federal law. 
INTERNATIONAL SPREAD OF 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY – A 
Melbourne-Australia based LGBT 
rights activist, Tony Pitman, announced 
that after Colombia and several 
Mexican states embraced marriage 
equality during June, the number of 
people in the world living in marriage 
equality jurisdictions had exceeded 
one billion.  He cumulated current 
population estimates. The largest 
country by population with marriage 
equality is the United States, followed 
by Brazil, France, the U.K., and South 
Africa, all with populations exceeding 
50 million people. The population 
estimates were current as of July 1, 2016. 
Since the first same-sex marriages 
took place in the Netherlands in 2001, 
“we’ve gone from zero to a billion in 
just 15 years,” Pitman exulted. But, 
he said, “It’s terribly disappointing 
that Australians will never be able 
to say that we were among the first 




DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY – In 1975, a “rogue” local 
clerk in Boulder, Colorado, issued 
marriage licenses to some same-sex 
couples, including Richard Frank 
Adams and Anthony C. Sullivan. 
Adams, a U.S. citizen, then sought to 
sponsor Sullivan, an Australian, as 
his spouse for immigration purposes. 
The Attorney General of Colorado had 
disavowed the legality of the resulting 
marriages. Adams’ petition was denied 
by the Immigration Service in an 
outrageously insulting letter, and he lost 
his appeal in the 9th Circuit, which held 
that the federal government could define 
marriage as solely the union of a man 
and woman for federal immigration 
purposes, regardless what a state did. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in 
U.S. v. Windsor (2013), holding that 
federal refusal to recognize a state-
sanctioned same-sex marriage violates 
the 5th Amendment, came many years 
after Adams’ death, but Sullivan, who 
survived him and was residing in the 
U.S. “under the radar,” sought to revive 
that old petition with the assistance of 
immigration lawyer Lavi Soloway, who 
specializes in representing same-sex 
couples. Soloway pressed for an apology 
from the government for the way the 
petition was treated in the 1970s, and for 
a new decision. A written apology was 
soon forthcoming from the Homeland 
Security Department, and on January 
5, 2016, the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Service (USCIS) approved 
Adams’ old visa petition. On April 21, 
the USCIS issued Sullivan a “green 
card” and a notice that his application 
for permanent residence in the U.S. had 
been approved. “It is with great pleasure 
that we welcome you to permanent 
resident status in the United States,” 
reads the notice on a Form I-797C. The 
resident status is good for ten years 
and can be renewed at that time. The 
full story of how this all unfolded can 
be found at a website maintained by 
Soloway, domaproject.org. 
NATIONAL PTA – The National Parent 
Teacher Association adopted a resolution 
during its 2016 Annual Convention on 
Recognition of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, 
Transgender and Queer/Questioning 
Individuals as a Protected Class. They 
are for it, calling for federal policies 
that specifically protect LGBTQ youth 
and “local practices that create and 
maintain safe, affirming and inclusive 
learning environments for all students,” 
according to their July 5 news release. 
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The specific concerns mentioned in 
the press release are bullying and 
discrimination, but the release did 
not explicitly state a position on the 
bathroom access issue that is roiling 
the country. 
HIV / AIDS – Media sources in 
Australia reported that Associate 
Professor David Harrich of QIMR 
Berghofer Medical Research 
Institute in Brisbane had achieved an 
experimental breakthrough with HIV, 
finding a protein that can be used to 
“switch off” infected cells, thus ending 
their replication. So far his discoveries 
have only been in vitro, and he is 
proceeding now to testing in animal 
subjects to determine the mechanism 
by which this discovery works. If it 
pans out, it could be possible to treat 
people with HIV infection once, rather 
than having to administer medication 
daily throughout their life. Courier-
Mail, July 15. * * * News of Prof. 
Harrich’s discovery came hard on 
the heels of an announcement by the 
nation’s health officials that anti-
retroviral treatment for HIV was now 
so widespread in Australia that new 
cases of AIDS are not being diagnosed. 
While 1,000 or more new cases of 
HIV infection are being reported 
annually, actual cases of full-blown 
AIDS, in which an untreated infection 
results in immune system collapse 
and the blossoming of opportunistic 
infections, are just not occurring, 
thus leading to celebratory headlines 
announcing that the AIDS epidemic 
is “over” in Australia. Well, yes and 
no. As long more than a thousand 
new HIV infections are detected each 
year, and as thousands of people are 
taking daily meds in order to suppress 
HIV infection, and some people are 
dying each year from complications 
resulting from the medication or the 
underlying infection, the epidemic is 
hardly “over”.  It has just evolved to a 
different stage.
GALLUP POLL ON SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE – According to a Gallup 
Poll published on June 22, almost 
half of the same-sex couples living 
together in the U.S. are married. A 
Reuters report summarizing the results 
said, “The percentage of marriage 
cohabiting same-sex couples, as 
opposed to couples living together but 
not married, rose to 49 percent from 38 
percent before the ruling [in Obergefell 
v. Hodges on June 26, 2015].” Gallup 
estimated that 123,000 same-sex U.S. 
couples married in the year after 
Obergefell, with a high number of 
those unions actually taking place 
in states that had already legalized 
marriage equality as a result of prior 
litigation and legislative action. Gallup 
estimates that 9.6% of gay and lesbian 
Americans are now married, and that 
the percentage of same-sex couples 
living in a “domestic partnership” has 
declined to 10.1% from 12.8% during 
the same time period. Data had to be 
accumulated from interviews, since 
states do not general keep records 
showing which marriages involve 
different-sex couples and which 
marriages involve same-sex couples. 
The 2020 U.S. census should provide 
interesting nationwide data on the 
prevalence of same-sex marriage!
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 
– A study published in the journal 
Archives of Sexual Behavior claims 
that the percentage of American adults 
who say they have had at least one 
homosexual experience has doubled 
since the 1990s. The study is based on 
a survey of 30,000 adults. According 
to the survey data, the percentage of 
men who had sex at least once with 
another man had increased from 4.5% 
to 8.2% between 1990 and 2014, and 
the percent of women who had sex 
at least once with another woman 
increased from 3.6% to 8.7%. Also, 
the percentage of adults who said they 
had sex at least once with a man and 
once with a woman increased from 
3.1% to 7.7%. Among “millennials” – 
adults between ages 18 and 29 during 
the 2010s – 7.5% of men and 12.2% of 
women reported having had at least one 
same-sex experience. Prior to 1990, the 
percentage of the adult population who 
believed that same-sex relations were 
“not wrong” was 13%; in 2014, that 
figure had risen to 49% for all adults 
and 63% for millennials. 
WILLIAMS INSTITUTE (UCLA) – The 
Williams Institute released a study, 
titled “How Many Adults Identify as 
Transgender in the United States,” 
which substantially increases prior 
estimates, conclude that 0.6% of the 
adult population, or approximately 1.4 
million individuals, today identify as 
transgender. The study extrapolated 
from data collected in the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System. In 
2014, 19 states participating in that 
survey included a question about 
transgender identity. The authors of the 
student also used data from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s American Community 
Survey to supplement the date from 
the 19 states covered in the BRFSS 
surveys. Thus, Williams Institute 
announced, “The study provides the 
first ever state-level estimates of the 
percentage of adults who identify as 
transgender for all 50 states. Hawaii 
(0.8%), California (0.8%), Georgia 
(0.8%), New Mexico (0.8%), Florida 
(0.7%), and Texas (0.7%) are the states 
that have the highest percentages of 
adults who identify as transgender.” 
The study found that “young adults 
are more likely than older adults 
to identify as transgender. Among 
adults ages 18 to 24, 0.7% identify as 
transgender; among adults ages 25 to 
64, 0.6% identify as transgender; and 
among adults ages 65 and older, 0.5% 
identify as transgender.” The survey 
authors are Andrew R. Flores, Jody L. 
Herman, Gary J. Gates, and Taylor N.T. 
Brown.
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UNITED METHODIST CHURCH – 
The Western District of the United 
Methodist Church elected an openly-
gay bishop, Rev. Karen Oliveto, on 
July 15, despite the denomination’s 
continuing condemnation of same-sex 
relationships. She is pastor of Glide 
Memorial United Methodist Church 
in San Francisco, and is the first 
openly-gay bishop to be elected in the 
12.7 million member church. Several 
regional district have appointed gay 
clergy, some Methodist churches have 
allowed same-sex marriages to take 
place, and there is turmoil within the 
denomination over these issues. AP 
Online, July 16.
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH – 
Responding to press questioning during 
a flight from Argentina to Rome on 
June 26, Pope Francis was asked by a 
reporter whether he agreed with a recent 
comment by a Roman Catholic cardinal 
from Germany, reacting to the Orlando 
massacre, that the church should 
apologize to gays. According to the New 
York Times version of a Reuters report, 
“Francis, looking sad, recalled church 
teachings that homosexuals ‘should not 
be discriminated against.’ ‘They should 
be respected, accompanied pastorally,’ 
he said. Then he added that he thought 
the church should apologize not only 
to gay people it had offended, but also 
to the poor, to women who have been 
exploited, and to children who have 
been exploited by being forced to work. 
‘It must apologize for having blessed 
so many weapons,’ he said.” Critics 
quickly pointed out the evasive nature 
of these remarks, as Francis did not 
state any change in church doctrine 
regarding gay people, was willing to 
refer to exploitation of women but 
not to allowing women to participate 
fully in the church as priests or other 
high clerical officials, and referred to 
exploitation of children “being forced 
to work” but not “being forced into 
having sex with priests.” Indeed!
STONEWALL INN: ENSHRINING 
GAY HISTORY – The Stonewall Inn on 
Christopher Street, site of a historic “riot” 
in June 1969 that is now widely identified 
as a signal event in the modern LGBT 
rights movement in the United States, 
became the focus of federal and state 
attention as President Barack Obama 
announced on June 24 the designation of 
a national monument zone centered on it 
– the first officially designated national 
monument commemorating gay history 
– to be known as Stonewall National 
Monument. The White House released 
a statement by the President, saying that 
the monument would “tell the story of 
our struggle for LGBT rights.” (Obama 
had prominently mentioned Stonewall 
in a litany of important civil rights 
events during his second inaugural 
address.) Governor Andrew Cuomo then 
designated it formally in a “Citation” 
on June 26 as a “State Historic Site.” 
Cuomo also announced the appointment 
of an LGBT Memorial Commission in 
his Executive Order No. 158, charging 
the Commission with recommending 
a site and design of a memorial “in 
the vicinity of the western portion of 
Greenwich Village” to honor the victims 
of the June 12 Orlando massacre. The 
Commission was directed to complete 
its work and provide its recommendation 
to the governor by December 31, 2016. 
* * * In a separate action, on June 17 
New York City dedicated the corner of 
6th Avenue and Washington Place as 
Sgt. Charles H. Cochrane Way, in honor 
of a gay NYC police officer who came 
out publicly to testify for the NYC Gay 
Rights Bill in 1986 and co-founded the 
Gay Officers Action League to advocate 
for LGBT people within the New York 
City Police Department. Cochrane, who 
would lead GOAL’s active participation 
in the annual Gay Pride March for 
many years, passed away in 2008. * * * 
In another LGBT history development, 
U.S. Representative Joseph Crowley 
(D-Queens & the Bronx) announced 
that the House of Representatives had 
passed by unanimous consent his bill, 
H.R. 2607), to rename the Jackson 
Heights Post Office in honor of the late 
Jeanne and Jules Manford, co-founders 
of Parents, Families and Friends of 
Lesbians and Gays (PFLAG) and 
parents of LGBT rights activist Morty 
Manford. A companion bill has been 
introduced in the Senate by New York’s 
two senators, Charles E. Schumer and 
Kirsten Gillibrand. 
INTERNATIONAL NOTES
UNITED NATIONS – The United 
Nations Security Council issued a 
statement on June 14 condemning the 
June 12 Orlando gay bar massacre, 
specifically denouncing targeting people 
“as a result of their sexual orientation.” 
This is the first such statement to be 
issued by the Security Council in 
response to a highly-publicized anti-
gay incident. eTurbonews.com, June 14. 
Later in June, the United Nations Human 
Rights Council voted to create the UN’s 
first LGBT rights watchdog, by a vote 
of 23-18 with 6 abstentions. The official 
title will be “independent expert” and 
the position is charged with monitoring 
“violence and discrimination based on 
sexual orientation and gender identity.” 
In the past, resolutions of the Council 
had directed the human rights office to 
prepare reports on LGBT rights, but had 
not authorized establishing a position 
specifically to deal with LGBT rights 
issues. Opponents of the resolution 
were led by Pakistan on behalf of 
members of the Organization for 
Islamic Cooperation, which succeeded 
in amending the resolution to require 
respect for local values, “religious 
sensitivities,” or domestic politics.” 
Another amendment condemned any 
“coercive measures” to change national 
policies, which responds specifically to 
threats by western nations to suspend 
financial aid from governments that 
persecute people because of their 
sexual orientation or gender identity. 
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Surprisingly, South Africa was 
among the abstaining voters, despite 
its constitutional provisions (the 
first in the world) forbidding sexual 
orientation discrimination. The South 
African representative said that the 
abstention was due to the “arrogant and 
confrontational” of proponents of the 
resolution. BuzzFeed.com, June 30.
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN 
STATES – The creation of a core group 
on the promotion of the rights of LGBTI 
person was announced on June 15 
during the 46th regular session of the 
General Assembly of the Organization 
of American States. Brazil initiated the 
move with the support of Argentina, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, the United 
States, Mexico and Uruguay. The group 
is committed to support OAS efforts 
aimed at ensuring LGBT human rights 
in member countries. The statement 
announcing formation of the group 
specifically referenced the Orlando 
massacre. Mena Report, June 18. 
Ironically, although the government of 
Brazil has staked out an affirmative gay 
rights position, news reports reflect an 
“epidemic” of anti-gay violence in the 
country by gangs that the government 
seems unable to control, according to a 
July 6 report in the New York Times. 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS – The Court ruled in Taddeucci 
and McCall v. Italy, No. 51362/09, that 
Italy violated the European Convention 
on Human Rights by refusing to allow a 
gay man from New Zealand who is the 
same-sex partner of an Italian national to 
settle in Italy with his partner. The men 
have been living as a couple since 1999, 
and decided to move to Italy in 2003 
because of Mr. Taddeucci’s poor health. 
McCall received a temporary residence 
permit as a student, but the police 
rejected his subsequent application for a 
permit as a family member. The district 
court upheld their appeal, but the Court 
of Appeal found for the police authority. 
The Court of Cassation dismissed 
their appeal. They then moved to the 
Netherlands and pursued their appeal 
to the European Court, which found a 
violation of Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination) and Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life). The 
court said that Taddeucci and McCall 
should not be treated the same as an 
unmarried heterosexual couple, because 
Italy provided no legal recognition 
for same-sex couples at the time they 
applied for the residence permit. In 
deciding to treat gay couples the same as 
unmarried straight couples without any 
form of spousal status available for gay 
couples, said the court, the State violated 
its non-discrimination obligations under 
the Convention. This is, of course, a 
transitional problem, because recently 
Italy has legislated to create domestic 
partnerships for same-sex couples that 
will afford residence rights.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS – The Court ruled in Case of 
O.M. v. Hungary, No. 9912/15, that it 
was improper for Hungarian authorities 
to hold a gay asylum applicant from Iran 
in detention pending the outcome of his 
case, since his detention was not justified 
by any of the reasons in the “exhaustive 
lists” of Article 5, Section 1 of the 
Convention. The authorities had stated 
that he was being detained to prevent him 
from fleeing the jurisdiction while his 
case was pending. The Court considered 
this illogical; why would the man flee 
the jurisdiction if he had specifically 
sought asylum in the country? “The 
Court reiterates that Article 5 enshrines 
a fundamental human right, namely 
the protection of the individual against 
arbitrary interference by the State with 
his or her right to liberty.” The relevant 
provisions “contain an exhaustive 
list of permissible grounds on which 
individuals may be deprived of their 
liberty and no deprivation of liberty 
will be lawful unless it falls within 
one of those grounds,” said the court, 
which found that “the applicant’s 
detention verged on arbitrariness” which 
enabled the Court to conclude that the 
Convention had been violated from 
June 25 through August 22 of 2014 
while the applicant was detained until 
the authorities had concluded that he 
was entitled to asylum in Hungary. 
ASCENSION ISLAND – The Ascension 
Island Council voted in favor of 
marriage equality on May 31, according 
to a report by internet journalist Rex 
Wockner, who also reports that the 
population in this British dependency 
island is about 880 people. Wockner 
noted that same-sex marriage became 
legal in Pitcairn Islands (population 48) 
in May 2015, in Jersey (Channel Islands) 
there was a 37-4 preliminary vote in 
favor of in September 2015, and the 
Isle of Man (population almost 86,000) 
voted 6-3 to legalize marriage equality 
in April 2016. 
AUSTRALIA – The High Court of 
Australia reversed a jury conviction 
under Crim. Code section 317(b) 
(intentional transmission of a serious 
disease) in Zaburoni v. R, (2016) 330 
ALR 49, finding that the evidence 
presented at the trial would not support 
the jury in concluding that the defendant, 
an HIV-positive man, had intended to 
transmit the virus to his female sexual 
partner. It was not enough for the 
prosecution to show that the defendant 
knew he was HIV-positive and was 
aware that the virus could be transmitted 
sexually. The man had pled guilty to 
an alternative count under Crim. Code 
section 320, which makes it an offence 
to do “grievous bodily harm to another” 
and would subject him to a maximum 
penalty of 14 years. The prosecution 
insisted on continuing the case under 
section 317(b), which would subject 
the defendant to a maximum prison 
term of life, and the jury convicted on 
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this. The High Court agreed with Mr. 
Zaburoni that “knowledge or foresight 
of result, whether possible, probable 
or certain, is not a substitute in law for 
proof of a specific intent under the Code 
. . . Where the accused is aware that, 
save for some supervening event, his 
or her conduct will certainly produce 
a particular result, the inference that 
the accused intended, by engaging in 
that conduct, to produce that particular 
result is compelling. Nonetheless, 
foresight that conduct will produce a 
particular result as a ‘virtual certainty’ 
is of evidential significance and under 
the Code it remains that the trier of 
fact must be satisfied that the accused 
meant to produce the particular result.” 
* * * The Parliamentary election held 
in Australia has returned the Liberal 
government to office. Prime Minister 
Turnbull reiterated his commitment to 
hold a national plebiscite on the subject 
of same-sex marriage prior to any vote in 
Parliament, but the leader of the Labour 
Party, which came very close to denying 
the Liberals a majority, announced 
consideration of pushing a private 
members vote in hopes of persuading 
the P.M. that the overwhelming support 
for marriage equality in public opinion 
polls would justify saving the expense 
and divisiveness of a plebiscite and 
allowing a free vote in the Parliament, 
which many observers suggest would 
be successful, as several opponents of 
marriage equality were defeated for 
reelection and several new supporters 
were successful in winning seats. * * * 
Family Court Chief Justice Diana 
Bryant told the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation that she hopes to change 
the way transgender children access 
hormone treatment because the current 
process, requiring approval of a Family 
Court judge, is “difficult and stressful” 
for the children. She said that Australia 
is the only country in the world that 
requires a court order in addition to 
expert medical approval, for children to 
access hormone therapy. She has asked 
the Attorney General’s Department to 
organize a “roundtable” with the major 
hospitals to see if they can come up 
with a “simpler and consistent method 
of dealing with these matters. I would 
ultimately envisage an application that 
could be made relatively simple by 
consent.” ABC Premium News, July 5. 
BERMUDA – Bermuda held a 
referendum on June 23 on same-sex 
marriage, in which opponents heavily 
outvoted proponents, but because fewer 
than 50% of the island’s registered voters 
showed up, the result is not binding 
on the government. Former Attorney-
General Mark Pettingill, a proponent 
for marriage equality, announced that 
he will represent two same-sex couples 
who will apply for a marriage license 
and then file suit when they are turned 
down, asserting that denial of the right 
to marry violates the Human Rights 
Act, which they will argue must take 
priority over the Marriage Act. Royal 
Gazette, June 29.
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA – The 
Parliamentary Assembly voted on July 
14 to amend the Anti-Discrimination 
Law to make explicit protection against 
discrimination because of sexual 
orientation or gender identity. Indeed, 
going beyond what other countries have 
done, the amended law also expressly 
protects intersex people, and improves 
the procedures available for individuals 
who confront discrimination to invoke 
the assistance of the government. 
Local activists claimed that the express 
protection for intersex people was a first 
for South-East Europe. The steps were 
taken in accord with requirements of the 
European Union for countries seeking 
to obtain or maintain membership.
BRAZIL – The New York Times reported 
on July 5 that Brazil is experience an 
“epidemic of anti-gay violence.” The 
article recites accounts of assaults and 
murders in various parts of the country 
which appear to have targeted victims 
because of their sexuality. It reported 
that a local gay rights group has counted 
nearly 1600 murders in hate-motivated 
attacks since January 2011, averaging 
one anti-gay murder a day in a country 
of 200 million people. This despite 
the fact that the legal climate for gay 
people in Brazil has become very 
liberal, including marriage equality, gay 
people adopting children, and formal 
protection against discrimination. On 
the other hand, LGBT rights advocates 
report that the police have not been 
particularly cooperative, often omitting 
anti-gay animus from official reports 
on murders. The country is generally 
experiencing a sharp rise in street crime 
and homicides. There is one openly gay 
member of the Congress, but he said that 
a large coalition of Christian Evangelical 
legislators has blocked proposed hate 
crimes legislation. Local groups also 
report that transgender Brazilians are 
at heightened risk for violence, and that 
some assailants have videotaped their 
assaults against transgender people and 
posted them online.
CAMEROON – The Minister of Public 
Health, Andre Mam Fouda, announced 
on June 23 that HIV/AIDS screening 
will now be compulsory for anyone 
seeking medical service, as part of the 
new direction for combatting the HIV 
epidemic in the country and improving 
management and care for those living 
with HIV infection. Agence de Presse 
Africaine, June 25.
CANADA – The Court of Appeal for 
Ontario ruled on June 29 in Trinity 
Western University v. Law Society of 
Upper Canada, 2016 ONCA 518, that the 
Law Society was within its rights to deny 
accreditation to TWU’s new law school. 
The school requires staff and students 
to adhere to a university requirement 
that they sign a “community covenant” 
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that forbids sex outside of heterosexual 
marriage. While the school claims that 
it does not discriminate because of 
sexual orientation, the covenant raised 
concerns by the Law Society, which 
maintains its own non-discrimination 
policy as an ethical standard for the 
profession. Refusal of accreditation 
means that the law school’s graduates 
cannot gain admission to practice law 
in Ontario which, given the structure of 
the profession in Canada, is tantamount 
to saying that they are excluded from 
practice where most of the nation’s 
major litigation takes place. TWU is 
an evangelical Christian private school, 
which has been seeking accreditation 
from law societies throughout Canada 
for its new law degree program. The 
Law Society’s governing body voted 28-
21 to deny accreditation, on the ground 
that the school’s policies discriminate 
based on sexual orientation, gender, 
marital status and religion, conflicting 
with the ethical standards of the legal 
profession in Ontario. The Canadian 
Bar Association intervened in the case 
in support of the Law Society. The 
Court found that a “reasonableness” 
standard applies to the LSUC’s 
decision, as applied to the balancing 
of freedom of religion and equality 
requirements under the nation’s Charter 
of Rights, and that LSUC met that 
standard. The Court of Appeal decision 
conflicts with Superior Court rulings 
in British Columbia and Nova Scotia, 
where courts overturned denials of 
accreditation by local law societies, so 
there are some places in Canada where 
TWU graduates could practice unless 
those rulings were to be overturned. 
Globeandmail.com, June 29.
CANADA – The government of Ontario 
announced that it is introduced gender-
neutral driver’s licenses and health 
identification cards. Beginning early 
in 2017, drivers will be able to select 
one of three designations: M for Male, 
F for Female, and X for neither of the 
above. The province has also started 
issuing health cards that do not display 
information about the person’s sex on 
the front of the card, and ServiceOntario 
will issue new cards without the sex 
identifier at no charge. The government 
is also launching public consultations to 
develop policies on how the government 
collects, uses and displays sex and 
gender information on government forms 
and products, according to a June 30 
news release from the government of 
Ontario. Canadian Government News.
CANADA – A meeting the synod of the 
Anglican Church of Canada narrowly 
approved a resolution to allow same-
sex marriages to be performed in the 
denomination’s churches on July 11 – 
but at first the news reports said that the 
measure had been defeated by one vote. 
There are three voting orders within 
the church – lay, clergy and bishops – 
and the resolution needed at least 2/3 
support within each of these groups to 
pass. It achieved that with the lay voters 
and the bishops, but at first appeared 
to fall one vote short with the clergy. 
After the vote was announced, however, 
several members said that their votes 
had not been properly registered, and 
a reexamination on July 12 revealed 
that all three groups had achieved the 
requisite margin. The resolution must 
be affirmed at the next synod meeting 
in 2019 in order to become “church 
law,” but some Bishops and clergy 
indicated that they were prepared to act 
on it in the interim, going ahead with 
same-sex marriages in their churches. 
Canadian Press, July 12. * * * Prime 
Minister Justin Trudeau, an outspoken 
supporter of LGBT rights, made history 
by raising a rainbow flag on Parliament 
Hill in Ottawa and then marching in a 
Pride Parade, the first Canadian head of 
government to do so. * * * Vancouver 
became the first Canadian city to 
adopt an inclusive transgender policy 
by vote of the City Council on July 
13. The vote approves implementing 
a series of recommendations made 
by a consulting group specializing in 
transgender issues, including gender-
neutral public restrooms and sensitivity 
training for city government staff. A 
team will be appointed by the Council 
to oversee implementation and report 
annually on progress, with changes 
being implemented over the next 6-18 
months. (Construction and remodeling 
of facilities may take some time.) 
bc.ctvnews.ca, July 14.
CANADA – Health Canada announced 
that the deferral period for gay men to 
donate blood has been reduced from 
five years to one year, consistent with 
the trend in other countries. The new 
rule will take effect on August 15, 2016. 
Health Minister Jane Philpott told 
the CBC that the Liberal government 
hopes to reduce the waiting period even 
further, acknowledged that the new 
policy would still disqualify many gay 
men from donating blood, and stated: 
“I would rather see Canada take a step 
in the right direction than stand still.” 
Digital Journal, June 21.
CARIBBEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
– The CCJ dismissed a suit brought 
by Jamaican gay activist Maurice 
Tomlinson challenging the validity of 
statutes in Belize and Trinidad & Tobago 
that on their face prohibit the entry of 
homosexuals into those countries. The 
court accepted an argument on behalf 
of the respondent countries that they did 
not deny entry to homosexual citizens 
of other countries that are signatory to 
the governing rules of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM). The court 
accepted an argument from Belize 
that its immigration law is intended 
only to bar individuals who engage 
in prostitution, and from Trinidad & 
Tobago that it does not in practice bar 
homosexuals from entering the country. 
Although his case was dismissed, 
Tomlinson declared it a victory because 
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the two countries had gone on record 
stating that their statutory bans were 
not literally enforced. “It is now up to 
the international community to press 
for the repeal of this law so that it will 
be clear in relation to non-nationals 
of the CARICOM region,” declared 
Tomlinson. The court called upon the 
respondent states to voluntarily amend 
their laws to harmonize with CARICOM 
treating obligations, reported dailyxtra.
com, June 10.
CHINA – Yu Hu (a pseudonym) has sued 
a hospital in central Henan Province for 
subjecting him to treatment intended to 
“cure his sexual orientation disorder,” 
reported China News Service on 
June 14. He alleges that members 
of his family forcibly admitted him 
to the hospital after he divorced his 
wife, tied to a bed, medicated, and 
threatened with violence. He was 
released from the hospital after his 
same-sex partner contacted LGBT 
rights organizations, which notified 
the police that he was being detained 
unlawfully in the hospital. His lawyer 
sued in the local court, alleging 
violation of personal freedom and 
being subjected to violence. He said, 
“They did it simply because I am gay. 
I don’t know how many other people 
have been treated like this. They must 
be held accountable.” There is some 
precedent for the case. The report says 
that in 2014 a court in Beijing ordered a 
group of psychologists in Chongqinq to 
apologize to a man for subjecting him 
to sexual orientation change efforts. 
* * * A local labor dispute arbitration 
committee in Guangzhou rejected a 
petition by an HIV-positive man to be 
reinstated to his job, taking the position 
that “infectious disease prevention and 
treatment regulations stipulating that 
HIV-positive individuals should be 
quarantined until they are proven to no 
longer been infectious are still in effect.” 
The individual, using the pseudonym 
Ah Ming, said that he would ask the 
National Health and Family Planning 
Commission to explain its reasons for 
requiring a quarantine, contending that 
this violates national policy. Global 
Times, June 24.
COSTA RICA – The Social Security 
Agency announced on June 10 that it 
will extend pension payments to the 
surviving partner of same-sex couples 
when one member has died. The 
country’s LGBT community has been 
lobbying for this change for many years. 
A member of the agency’s board, Jose 
Luis Loria, said that he was “satisfied” 
that gay people would be treated equally 
to heterosexual widows or widowers, 
according to a June 10 report by Agence 
France Presse English Wire.
CZECH REPUBLIC – The Constitutional 
Court has overturned a law that banned 
individual gays and lesbians living in 
a registered partnership from adopting 
children. The Court said that the ban 
was discriminatory because individual 
gays and lesbians who did not live in a 
registered partnership were allowed to 
adopt. However, the opinion does not 
approve joint adoptions by same-sex 
couples. Associated Press, June 28.
FRANCE – Following the example 
of the U.K. and the U.S., the French 
government announced on July 11 
that it was modifying its regulations 
on blood donation to end the lifetime 
disqualification of anybody who had 
engaged in gay sex. Gay men will be 
allowed to donate blood provided they 
certify that they have not engaged in 
sexual activity with another man for at 
least a year prior to the donation date. 
The one-year rule has been criticized as 
unrealistically long, given the current 
level of accuracy of HIV-antibody 
testing and the likelihood that most gay 
men will continue to be excluded under 
its application. New Europe, July 12.
GREECE – Agence France Presse 
English Wire reported on June 3 that 
a gay Syrian man whose asylum claim 
was rejected by Greece would be sent to 
Turkey under a controversial agreement 
brokered by the European Union, under 
which failed asylum seekers would be 
sent to Turkey in light of the migrant 
crisis affecting Europe. The man’s 
application for asylum was rejected 
and a Board of Appeal ruled that it was 
safe for him to return to Turkey, but a 
representative of the Greek Council 
for Refugees said that they would try 
to appeal the ruling further. The man 
claimed to have fled Istanbul after living 
there several years because he had been 
threatened due to his sexual orientation. 
Previously the board had granted 
asylum to people in similar situations, 
but the system has been overwhelmed 
by the flood of migrants from Syria. 
INDIA – The state of Kerala has 
become the first to announce a pension 
scheme for transgender individuals over 
60 years of age, in a proposed new state 
budget. Kerala was also a leader in 
establishing a state Transgender Policy 
last year marking an affirmative effort 
by the government to hire transgender 
people to fill civil service vacancies, 
and to end stigma and discrimination 
against transgender residents. Merinews, 
July 9. * * * The Supreme Court on 
June 29 refused to take up a new petition 
challenging the validity of the colonial-
era sodomy law, stating that it would refer 
the petition to the Chief Justice to decide 
whether it should be heard together 
with several curative petitions that are 
pending before a panel of the court. 
Indianexpress.com, June 29. * * * The 
sodomy law, Section 377 of the Indian 
Penal Code, is still being enforced, as 
exemplified by a ruling on June 29 by 
the Bombay High Court, which rejected 
a plea filed by a 33-year-old man who 
is subject to criminal proceedings for 
a consensual sexual relationship with a 
27-year-old man. “A division bench of 
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Justice Abhay Oka and Justice Amjad 
Sayed said it cannot be said it is not an 
offence against society, especially after 
the Supreme Court upheld the validity 
of the penal section,” reported the 
Hindustan Times on June 30. The police 
became involved because the man’s wife 
discovered evidence of the relationship 
and reported it. * * * The Supreme Court 
issued a statement on June 30, clarifying 
that its 2014 ruling concerning rights 
of transgender people was not meant 
to affect the rights of lesbians, gay men 
or bisexuals. The Ministry of Social 
Justice and Empowerment had sought 
clarification as to whether LGB people 
were included in the Court’s mandate 
to treat transgenders in the Other 
Backward Classes category for purposes 
of affirmative efforts in education and 
employment. The Pioneer, July 1. 
ISRAEL – A planned Pride March in 
Beersheba was cancelled by organizers 
in response to an order from Israel’s 
Supreme Court, granted in response to 
an application by security officials, to 
abandon the planned parade route for 
a less prominent route. The court said 
that police intelligence assessments 
suggested that a march along the 
planned route would incite a violent 
response, and Israeli security officials 
are now gun-shy as a result of anti-gay 
violence resulting in a murder at last 
year’s Jerusalem Pride. The organizers 
said they would hold a protest rally 
instead of a march. This was to have 
been Beersheba’s first Pride March. 
Thai News Service, July 15. 
JAPAN – Naha City, the capital of 
Japan’s Okinawa Prefecture, has become 
the fifth local government in Japan to 
adopt a measure recognizing same-sex 
partnerships as equivalent to marriage. 
Same-sex couples can obtain certificates 
recognizing their partnerships provided 
both members of the couple are age 
20 or older. The certification system 
is intended to aid same-sex couples 
in making housing applications and 
being recognized as next-of-kin in 
relevant situations. Application form 
are available on the city’s website, and 
submissions were accepted beginning 
July 11. Kyodo News, July 8. 
KENYA – In a ruling that drew outraged 
comments from the international 
human rights community and 
suggestions that international treaties 
be amended expressly to address the 
issue, Judge M.J. Anyara Emukule of 
the High Court of Kenya ruled that anal 
examinations of individuals charged 
with homosexual acts are not a violation 
of human rights under the nation’s 
constitution or international treaty 
obligations. He rejected the contention 
of the petitioners that they had not 
freely consented to the examinations, 
and asserted that “the right to fair trial” 
guaranteed in the constitution “does 
not, with respect, extend to excluding 
an accused from medical examination.” 
He asserted: “on matters of sodomy or 
acts against the order of nature as is 
envisaged in Section 162 of the Penal 
Code, rectal or anal examination is 
according to current medical science, 
and constitution of the human anatomy, 
the only way of examination to show 
whether the anus is dry or has been 
subjected to application of medical 
lubricants for ease of anal penetration. 
The anus, unlike the vagina, has no 
natural lubrication. There is no other 
part of the human body which to carry 
out the medical examination. Whether 
the examination was reasonable or not 
is a question of fact which only the trial 
court or as the case may be the appellate 
Court after ascertaining all the facts 
may determine and, whether or not 
the person who took the samples was 
ignorant or negligent. Was there, was 
there no anal sex? Those are questions 
before the trial, not the Constitutional, 
court.”  COL & GMN v. Kwale, Petition 
No. 21 of 2015 (June 16, 2016).
MALTA – The government announced 
on July 8 that all ministries are 
supposed to introduce gender-neutral 
restroom facilities in their buildings by 
September, in order to “ensure a non-
judgmental or exclusive environment for 
all,” according to an official statement. 
While there would still be male and 
female only facilities, at least a third 
of all restroom facilities would have 
to be designated as gender neutral. 
Under the country’s recently enacted 
Gender Identity Law, individuals are not 
required to obtain medical intervention 
in order to effect a legal change of gender 
based on their self-determined gender 
identity. Malta is the smallest European 
Union nation, but now occupies the “top 
spot” on the Rainbow Map of Europe 
charting LGBT-friendly government 
policies. dpa International, July 8.
MEXICO – Another state heard from. 
The Morelos state congress approved a 
reform of the state constitution to allow 
for same-sex marriage. This was subject 
to approval by the municipalities within 
the state, a majority being required. 
Under the rules for this procedure, a 
municipality that failed to act on the 
proposal would be counted as a yes 
vote. Somewhat controversially, the 
congress declared that the measure 
had been adopted, based on its claim 
that of the State’s 33 municipalities, 
12 municipalities voted in favor, 15 
were opposed, 5 failed to act, and one 
obtained an extension because of a delay 
in notification. The five that failed to act 
were automatically being counted as 
“yes” votes and establishing a majority 
to amend the constitution. Groups 
opposed to the measure protested, 
claiming that some of the “fictional” 
yes votes came from municipalities that 
had actually voted no but had failed to 
submit the certification of their vote by 
the deadline, and threatening to sue. 
Morelos became the 10th state to be 
added to the marriage equality list, in 
addition to Mexico City, and was said 
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to be the first to do so by amending its 
state constitution. This account is based 
on reporting by internet journalist Rex 
Wockner, who maintains a running 
commentary on his blog about the 
unfolding story of marriage equality in 
Mexico. * * * Coalescing around the 
ongoing struggle to spread marriage 
equality nationwide, activists have 
formed a new national LGBT rights 
movement organization, MOViiMX, 
which can be contacted through the 
website www.moviimx.org.
NORTHERN IRELAND – Health 
Minister Michelle O’Neill announced 
on June 2 that Northern Ireland was 
following the lead of the U.K. in lifting 
the lifetime ban on men donating blood. 
Henceforth there would be a one-year 
deferral period, so only men who affirm 
that they have not had sex with another 
man during the previous 12-month 
period will be allowed to donate blood. 
WashingtonPost.com, June 2.
NORWAY – On June 7 the Norwegian 
Parliament approved a new healthcare 
law under which transgender people 
can self-declare their appropriate legal 
gender. The measure ended requirements 
of compulsory psychiatric evaluations, 
diagnoses of gender dysphoria and 
sterilization surgery as a prerequisite 
to recognizing legal gender. A report 
by Human Rights Watch asserted that 
this made Norway the fourth country 
in Europe to separate medical and 
legal processes for recognizing gender 
identity, the others being Denmark 
and Ireland (through internal political 
action) and Malta (in response to a 
ruling by the European Court of Human 
Rights). According to the report, 41 
states in Europe have legal gender 
recognition provisions in place, 35 of 
which require a psychiatric diagnosis 
and 24 requiring surgical sterilization 
before a legal change of status will be 
recognized. The Norwegian Ministry 
of Health proposed the new law. Plus 
Media Premium Official News, June 8.
PAKISTAN – Local media reported 
on June 27 that 50 clerics had issued a 
fatwa (religious decree) providing that 
marriage with a transgender person 
is lawful. According to the fatwa, a 
transgender person having “visible signs 
of being a male” can marry a woman, 
and a transgender person having “visible 
signs of being a female” can marry a 
man. But somebody who carries “visible 
signs of both genders” must remain 
single. The fatwa also condemned any 
act intended to “humiliate, insult or 
tease” transgender people, and declared 
that funeral rituals for transgender 
people should be consistent with those 
exhibiting the same gender traits. Daily 
Regional Times, June 28.
PORTUGAL – President Marcelo Rebelo 
de Sousa vetoed a law authorizing non-
compensated surrogacy where a woman 
cannot conceive a child, but approved 
a measure allowing lesbian couples 
and single women access to in-vitro 
fertilization services with donated sperm 
in order to have children. The surrogacy 
legislation had passed by a slim margin 
over strong opposition by the Catholic 
Church, which remains politically 
influential in Portugal. An attempt 
might be made for a legislative override 
of the veto. Surrogacy is controversial 
in Europe, with France, Germany and 
Italy prohibiting the practice. Britain, 
Ireland, Denmark and Belgium allow 
“altruistic surrogacy,” typically where a 
woman does a favor for a woman who 
cannot conceive children and is not 
compensated for her services apart for 
reimbursement of expenses.  Agence 
France Presse English Wire, June 8.
SWITZERLAND – The Parliament 
voted June 17 in favor of stepchild 
adoption by a vote of 125-86 with 3 
abstentions. This is expected to open 
up the possibility for second parent 
adoptions by same-sex couples raising 
children. NELFA, June 17. * * * Swiss 
health authorities announced their 
intention to end the lifetime ban on 
blood donation by gay men, moving to 
a one year deferral period as several 
other countries have recently done. The 
theory is that if a gay man has abstained 
from sex for at least a year, it is highly 
unlikely that his blood will carry HIV 
if it tests negative using currently 
available screening tests. thelocal.ch, 
June 21.
TAIWAN (REPUBLIC OF CHINA) 
– Changhua County is offering same-
sex couples the right to record their 
partnerships at household registration 
offices. Although the record does 
not create legal rights, it is symbolic 
of the local government’s support in 
the ongoing struggle to achieve legal 
recognition for same-sex couples. The 
county’s action follows similar measure 
adopted in Hsinchu County and in the 
cities of Chiayi, Kaohsiun, New Tapei, 
Taichung, Tainan, Taipei and Taoyuan. 
The nine municipalities cover over 75 
percent of the nation’s population, and 
to date more than 500 same-sex couples 
have taken advantage of the right to 
register their partnerships. Thai News 
Service, June 30.
TURKEY – Authorities in Istanbul 
banned an annual gay pride march on 
purported security grounds. Although 
modern Turkey no longer outlaws 
private consensual homosexual 
conduct, gay people in Turkey complain 
of harassment and abuse, especially 
as the Erdogan administration has 
been leading the country towards 
Islamisation. Erdogan has avoided 
addressing gay issues directly. Agence 
France Presse English Wire, June 17. 
Early in July there was a failed attempt 
by dissidents in the military to stage 
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a coup. How this might affect future 
relations between the government and 
the LGBT community was uncertain.
UNITED KINGDOM – The Women 
and Equalities Minister, Nicky Morgan, 
announced on July 9 that the government 
would undertake a review of the 
Gender Recognition Act with an eye to 
improving the process for determining 
legal gender without reference to 
surgical procedures. The review is 
intended to reduce “unnecessary red 
tape” and adopt a streamlined process 
that will be easier for transgender 
residents to navigate. The goal will be 
to achieve legal and social equality for 
transgender people. European Union 
News, July 9. The article reporting 
on this, although dated July 9, did 
not say anything about whether the 
change in leadership flowing from the 
Brexit vote would affect these plans, 
possibly because as of that date it was 
expected that the Cameron government 
would function until October as the 
Conservative Party determined who 
would succeed David Cameron as 
Prime Minister. By July 12, however, all 
competition to Theresa May, the Home 
Secretary, had fallen by the wayside, 
and she took office on July 13. * * * 
The Bristol Evening Post reported 
July 6 that a gay man from Nigeria 
who had been denied asylum in the 
U.K. was immediately imprisoned upon 
being delivered back to Nigeria, and 
authorities there took the resettlement 
money that the U.K. Home Office had 
given to him upon his departure. He 
was held for seven days before being 
released, presumably with a warning 
to refrain from violating the country’s 
sodomy law, which carries potential 
penalties of imprisonment up to 14 years 
or stoning (quite Biblical). That the 
British Home Office sees no ground for 
asylum for gay refugees from Nigeria 
is incredible but unfortunately true, 
even in a case such as this, where the 
petitioner had fled Nigeria after “being 
viciously assaulted with his partner, who 
died as a result of the injuries inflicted 
upon them.” It apparently made not 
different to U.K. authorities that Nigeria 
is officially one of the world’s most 
outspokenly anti-gay countries. * * * 
The new Prime Minister, Theresa May, 
announced the appointment of Justine 
Greening to be Education Minister. 
Greening, who had recently come out as 
a lesbian, is the first Education Minister 
who is a product of a comprehensive 
state secondary school.  
PROFESSIONAL NOTES
THE NATIONAL LGBT LAW 
ASSOCIATION’S LAVENDER LAW 
CONFERENCE will be held in 
Washington, D.C., on August 4-6. 
The keynote speaker will be STUART 
DELERY, whose recent service as 
Acting Associate Attorney General, 
the number three position in the Justice 
Department, made him the highest 
ranking openly gay attorney in that 
Department’s history. The event will 
be held at the Renaissance Washington 
D.C. Downtown Hotel.
TLDEF –THE TRANSGENDER LEGAL 
DEFENSE & EDUCATION FUND 
announced that its new Executive 
Director is JILLIAN WEISS, a 
transgender New York attorney. Weiss is 
a tenured professor at Ramapo College. 
She earned her law degree at Seton 
Hall University. She maintained a law 
practice in addition to her teaching job, 
and has litigated precedent-setting cases 
on behalf of transgender plaintiffs. She is 
only the second ED in the organization’s 
history, following the retirement of its 
founding director, Michael Silverman. 
For their work advancing the legal 
rights of transgender people, both Weiss 
and Silverman have received the Arthur 
S. Leonard Award from the New York 
City Bar Association. Weiss’s law firm 
associate, Ezra Young, will join her at 
TLDEF as a staff attorney. 
Having wound up affairs at Freedom 
to Marry, Executive Director EVAN 
WOLFSON is joining the international 
law firm Dentons as senior counsel. 
He hopes to advise the firm on its 
internal human rights policies as well as 
providing counsel to clients on similar 
matters. In recent months Wolfson has 
traveled to several different countries, in 
some cases at the invitation of local U.S. 
embassies, to speak with local activists 
about strategies for achieving marriage 
equality. He will be based in the firm’s 
New York City office. Wall Street 
Journal Law Blog, June 23.
On June 7, openly transgender Judge 
VICTORIA KOLAKOWSKI was re-
elected for a seat on the Alameda 
County Superior Court. She is the 
only openly transgender person to hold 
elective office in California. When 
she was first sworn in, she became the 
second openly transgender trial judge in 
the nation, as Houston, Texas, Associate 
Municipal Court Judge PHYLLIS FRYE 
was appointed and sworn in between 
Judge Kolakowski’s first election and 
her inauguration, thus becoming the 
first openly transgender sitting judge! 
Former U.S. Solicitor General DONALD 
B. VERRILLI, JR., who argued for 
the Obama Administration before the 
Supreme Court to invalidate DOMA 
and strike down state bans on same-
sex marriage, was the featured keynote 
speaker at Lambda Legal’s annual 
reception in Washington, D.C., on June 15. 
(Previous speakers at this event included 
Attorneys General ERIC HOLDER and 
LORETTA LYNCH.) Lambda’s National 
Director of Constitutional Litigation, 
SUSAN SOMMER, was the other 
featured speaker at the event, held at the 
Newseum.
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PUBLICATIONS NOTEDThe LGBT BAR ASSOCIATION OF GREATER NEW YORK 2016 Pride Reception on June 16 included a 
Roundtable Discussion on the Equality 
Act now pending in Congress. Panelists 
were former LeGaL President and 
Law Notes Editor ART LEONARD, 
former NYC Council Speaker Christine 
Quinn, and transgender rights activist 
and Democratic National Committee 
Executive Committee Member Babs 
Siperstein. U.S. Rep. David Cicilline 
(D-R.I.), lead sponsor of the bill in 
the House, intended to participate, but 
weather conditions grounded his flight 
from D.C.
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